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Abstract 
The prediction and forecasting of violent conflict, is of vital importance to 
formulate coherent national strategies effecting regional and worldwide stability and 
security.  Using open source data, this research formulates and constructs a suite of 
statistical models that predict future transitions into and out of violent conflict and 
forecasts the regional and global incidences of violent conflict over a ten-year time 
horizon.  A total of thirty predictor variables are tested and evaluated for inclusion in 
twelve conditional logistic regression models, which calculate the probability that a 
nation will transition from its current conflict state, either “In Conflict” or “Not in 
Conflict”, to a new state in the following year.  These probabilities are then used to 
construct a series of nation-specific Markov chain models that forecast violent conflict, as 
well as yield insights into regional conflict trends out to year 2024 and beyond.  The 
logistic regression models proposed in this study achieve training dataset accuracies of 
88.76%, and validation dataset accuracies of 84.67%.  Additionally, the Markov models 
achieve three year forecast accuracies of 85.16% during model validation.  Given the 
current state of included predictor variables, this study predicts that global violent 
conflict rates remain constant through year 2024, but are projected to increase beyond 
that timeframe with 95 of the 182 considered nations projected to be in a state of violent 
conflict from the current 84 nations in conflict. 
KEYWORDS: Conflict Transitions, Logistic Regression, Markov Models 
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A LOGISTIC REGRESSION AND MARKOV MODEL FOR THE PREDICTION 
OF NATION-STATE VIOLENT CONFLICTS AND TRANSITIONS 
 
I.  Introduction 
“It makes no difference what men think of war, said the judge.  War endures.  As well ask 
men what they think of stone.  War was always here.  Before man was, war waited for 
him.  The ultimate trade awaiting its ultimate practitioner.” 
Cormac McCarthy, Blood Meridian 
1.1 General Issue 
Violent conflict between competing groups has been a pervasive and driving force 
for all of human history.  It has evolved from small skirmishes between unarmed groups, 
wielding rudimentary weapons, to industrialized global conflagrations.  Global 
incidences of violent conflict are at historically high levels, with 223 individual ongoing 
violent conflicts occurring throughout the globe, as shown in Figure 1 (Heidelberg 
Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014).  While some of these conflicts are 
new, many have been ongoing for a decade or more, with no potential resolution in sight.  
Many recent studies have focused, with much success, on identifying the factors relevant 
for the accurate prediction armed conflict in nations.   However, these studies have 
mainly focused on predicting conflict in the following year or two.  While there is much 
to be gained from these analyses, a more operationally relevant question is: where and 
when will conflict transitions occur?  A conflict transition is an event in which a nation 
transitions into or out of a state of violent conflict. 
Conflict transitions by their very definition are rare events and. while some 
conflicts, are brought about by the unforeseen “Black Swan” events, many times there are 
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overt but subtle indicators that a conflict is becoming more likely.  Moreover, research in 
support of this study has identified a trend that, once a nation enters a certain conflict 
state, it tends to remain in such a state until some new event or events occur to disrupt 
this “conflict inertia”.  To answer the question concerning when and where conflict 
transitions will occur, this study develops a collection of conditional logistic regression 
and Markov chain models to predict when and where these conflict transitions are likely 
to occur and subsequently forecast global conflict incidences using open source data. 
 
Figure 1: National Level Violent Conflict in 2014 
(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014) 
1.2 Problem Statement 
Use open source data to develop statistical models that predict and lend insight 
concerning when and where the world’s nations transition into or out of violent conflict. 
3 
1.3 Research Objective and Focus 
The objective of this study is to predict future worldwide and long-term conflict 
trends, national conflict transience indices, and to identify the exacerbating and/or 
enabling factors that lead to increased or decreased probabilities of conflict transitions.  
This study utilizes Markov modeling methods supported by conditional logistic 
regression models to predict transitions into and out of violent conflict, and the 
subsequent forecasting of global incidences of violent conflict.  This study analyzed 
global conflict and its contributing factors for the years 2004 through 2014. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study seeks to answer the five following research questions pertaining to the 
prediction of conflict transitions and forecasting of global conflict. 
Question 1 
How accurately can statistical models predict conflict transitions for individual 
nations? 
Question 2 
What factors are the significant predictors of conflict transitions? 
Question 3 
How is the number of global conflicts predicted to change by 2024 and beyond? 
Question 4 
What nations are susceptible to conflict transitions; which nations appear 
invulnerable to conflict transitions?  
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Question 5 
Which nations, currently not in conflict, are identified as near-term risks for 
transitions into violent conflict? 
1.5 Methodology 
This study compiles and formats over 30 disparate databases into a single 
conditional conflict database (CCD).  This effort is required for the development of 
twelve region specific conditional logistic regression models, one set for nations 
classified as “in conflict” and the other set for nations classified as “not in conflict”.  
Using these conditional logistic regression models, we develop nation-specific Markov 
models to forecast conflict status transitions and future conflict trends for 182 of the 
world’s nations.  The complete study methodology is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Study Methodology 
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1.6 Study Assumptions and Limitations 
Assumptions 
Four underlying assumptions were required to proceed with the methodology and 
analysis in this study.  Similar to previous conflict prediction studies, this research first 
assumes the existence of statistical and trend variables that are accurate and viable 
predictors of violent conflict.  Second, this study assumes that any variable identified as 
significant within the model will remain relevant from year to year, and for the duration 
of the conflict forecasting period.  Next, this study assumes that the six geographic 
regions utilized for the development of the conditional logistic regression models provide 
suitable commonality in terms of economy, geography, ethnic, and religious 
demographics to facilitate the modeling effort.  Finally, to support the forecasting of 
global conflict, this study assumes that regional factors relevant to conflict remain 
unchanged throughout the forecasting period. 
Limitations 
Data availability is this study’s single greatest limitation, mandating a 
combination of data lag prediction and data imputation for the development of the 
conditional logistic regression models.  Data lag prediction refers to the requirement of 
using data sets that may be one-to-three years behind the dependent variable, a 
suboptimal but proven method for the prediction of violent conflict in nations 
(Boekestein, 2015).  Missing data further exacerbates the lag in the data sets, and it must 
be accounted for using statistical data imputation methods available in commercial 
software.  In addition to these limitations, this study requires an expanded conflict data 
set, spanning the years 2004 through 2014, in order to capture enough instances of 
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conflict transitions to effectively build the regional logistic regression models.  While an 
expanded data set is not in itself a limitation, the dynamic conditions of the contemporary 
operating environment do not wholly resemble the conditions present a decade earlier, 
which may result in a loss of fidelity in some of the final recommended models 
constructed using these older data sets.  In addition to the independent variables, the 
dependent variable “transitions into conflict” is limited by the availability of data 
provided by the Heidelberg Institute for Conflict Research (HIIK).  This variable is 
derived from the HIIK’s annually published Conflict Barometer; the 2014 Conflict 
Barometer is the most current available publication, and thus year 2014 sets the 
benchmark for all forecasting analyses conducted in this study. 
1.7 Implications 
Dr. George Box once remarked that “Essentially, all models are wrong, but some 
are useful” (Box, 1979).  While predictive accuracy is an important aspect of this study, it 
was never the goal to develop a model with perfect accuracy.  Instead, it is the goal of 
this study to gain relevant and actionable insights from the suite of models developed 
herein.  These insights include identifying the regional factors relevant to conflict 
transitions, nations susceptible or “immune” to these transitions, and regional conflict 
trends that may impact future policy decisions.  It is the expectation of this research to 
provide commanders and national level leadership an accurate and tractable analysis to 
aid the development and execution of future foreign policy and security strategies. 
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1.8 Overview of Remaining Chapters 
Including the introduction, this thesis is comprised of five chapters.  Chapter 2 
reviews previous studies and literature pertaining to conflict prediction, logistic 
regression, and Markov models.  The detailed literature review is vital to narrow the 
research scope of this study and provide insights into viable methods for the modeling 
and prediction of violent conflict transitions.  Chapter 3 presents an in-depth discussion 
of the data base design methodology, mathematics, notation, modeling approach, and 
software required to answer the study questions.  Chapter 4 provides a validation of both 
the conditional logistic regression and Markov models, and presents a comprehensive 
analysis of the results obtained from said models.  Finally, Chapter 5 summarizes the 
methodology, results, conclusions, and limitations of this research, and finally proposes 
operationally relevant studies that may capitalize on the methodology and results 
developed in this thesis. 
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II. Literature Review 
“Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so in warfare there are no constant 
conditions.” 
Sun Tzu, The Art of War  
2.1 Overview 
This research is an effort to define a methodology for the use of multi-state 
Markov chain models (MCM) for the prediction of nation-state transitions into and out of 
violent conflict.  With this objective in mind, this chapter is broken down into five 
sections, beginning with this overview.  The second section of this chapter is a survey of 
previous nation-state conflict prediction studies, with a focus on models predicting 
conflicts post 2001, their methodologies and subsequent predictive success rates.  The 
third section reviews non-conflict oriented prediction studies utilizing multi-state Markov 
models, with an emphasis on viral epidemiology and spatial relations.  The final section 
provides a synopsis and definitions for the different levels of conflict, which may be 
modeled as states within the MCM, and examines common prediction variables used in 
previous studies as well as additional variables that may be relevant to this analysis.  This 
review is not exhaustive; instead it examines the variables and regional dynamics, 
highlighting the nature and factors unique to modern violent conflict. 
2.2 Nation-State Conflict Prediction: Relevant Research 
For the purpose of this research, we are primarily concerned with analytical and 
predictive studies conducted during the Era of Persistent Conflict: the period following 
the terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, influenced by the dynamic and unique 
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challenges posed by the modern international political landscape.  The seminal work, A 
Global Forecasting Model of Political Instability, a Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
funded study led by Dr. Jack A. Goldstone, part of the CIA’s Political Instability Task 
Force, derived a series of models predicting political instability two years prior to event 
onset (Goldstone, et al., 2005).  Utilizing a set of global, open-source data, spanning the 
time frame of 1955 – 2003, the CIA study compiled an exhaustive list of instability 
events, with the final problem set including nearly 300 “Adverse Regime Changes”, 
“Ethnic Wars”, “Revolutionary Wars”, and “Genocides/Politicides” (Goldstone, et al., 
2005).  The study’s dependent variable was the onset of political instability brought about 
by the occurrence of one or more of the problem set events.  Multiple methodologies, 
including event history models, logistic regression, neural networks, and Markov 
processes were employed to identify factors associated with political instability, the onset 
of which is considered a rare event, given definitions laid out in their study.  As a result, 
the case control method, common in epidemiological analysis of rare occurrences, 
became their primary methodology (Goldstone, et al., 2005).  The study initially tested 
hundreds of variables under the assumption that the complexity associated with the onset 
of political instability would require an equally complex model or set of models, each 
specific to regime type and problem set event (Goldstone, et al., 2005).  In actuality, the 
CIA-funded study determined these initial assumptions to be incorrect, noting that a 
small subset of the original variables and a relatively simple model were sufficient to 
model political instability across various regime types. 
What separates the CIA-funded study from past conflict and political instability 
prediction studies was the ability to significantly reduce the unexplained variance in the 
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model.  Previous quantitative studies, sought only to find statistically significant 
variables, but paid little attention to the variables ability to explain variance within the 
overall model (Ward, Greenhill, & Bakke, 2010).  However, as Dr. Michael Ward so 
adroitly points out, previous studies spent significant effort in the pursuit of finding 
statistically significant variables but little effort in determining what variables actually 
improve the predictive ability of the models.  As a result, most of these models fail to 
achieve predictive accuracy rates in excess of 50%, and often times are convoluted and 
difficult to interpret.  For nearly three years, the Political Instability Task Force struggled 
to develop a model having an accuracy greater than 60-70%.  However, their 
methodology combined with an internally developed four-part regime categorization 
yields postdictive accuracy rates of 80% or greater (Goldstone, et al., 2005).  However, 
the CIA funded study can only achieve these postdictive rates on a subset of randomly 
sampled, politically vulnerable nation-states, and thus cannot achieve “whole world” 
accuracy (Boekestein, 2015). 
In 2007, the Center for Army Analysis (CAA) initiated the Forecast and Analysis 
of Complex Threats (FACT) study, which eventually became a series of four studies 
(FACT I-IV), each refining the data and methodology of the previous study.  The original 
study directors Shearer and Marvin sought to develop a methodology to “predict the 
future conflict of select nation-states, but in a manner that facilitated explanation;” in 
essence a relatively simple model that was still relevant to the Army Staff (Shearer & 
Marvin, 2010).  Conflict data used in the FACT studies was collected from the 
Heidelberg Institute of International Conflict Research (HIIK), which at the time 
classified conflict intensity levels into six categories: No Conflict, Dispute, Latent 
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Conflict, Crisis, Severe Crisis, and War; these categories have since been updated to: 0 – 
No Conflict, 1 – Dispute, 2 – Non-Violent Crisis, 3 – Violent Crisis, 4 – Limited War, 
and 5 – War (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014).  As part of 
the methodology, the FACT study maps the four highest HIIK intensity levels to two 
categories: Conflict and Peace (Shearer & Marvin, 2010).  In addition to the HIIK data, 
the FACT studies utilized a variety of open source governmental and non-governmental 
databases, such as the World Bank, Food and Agricultural Organization of the United 
Nations, and the Polity IV Project to gather feature (macro-structural indicators) data.  
The methodologies employed in FACT I-III used a common weighted moving average 
forecasting model combined with a factor analysis algorithm to classify their specific 
future feature vectors, known as the K-Nearest Neighbor.  Using principal component 
analysis (PCA) was used to create the multiple features employed in the study, ultimately 
maximizing the explained variance within the data.  The K-Nearest Neighbor algorithm 
then classifies each of these feature vectors as a function of the n-closest past feature 
vectors, with decision rules requiring either a simple or super-majority for a classification 
of Conflict or Peace, with best results occurring when K = 7 (Shearer & Marvin, 2010).   
The FACT studies yielded accuracies in excess of 85% when the predicted nation scores 
were classified as conflict, peace, or uncertain.  However, this high postdictive accuracy 
is due to the fact that 25% of the 157 considered nations are categorized as “uncertain”, 
reducing the overall confidence in the predictive ability of the model. 
In his 2011 paper, Predicting Armed Conflict, 2010-2050, Hegre employs 
dynamic multinomial logit model estimation techniques to develop a three-state transition 
probability matrix capable of predicting changes in global and regional incidences of 
12 
armed conflict out to year 2050.  The Hegre study created and used the Uppsala/PRIO 
conflict data set, consolidating relevant data for 169 countries from 1970 to 2009. The 
Uppsala/PRIO data reports three conflict levels: “No Conflict” or less that 25 combat-
related deaths per year, “Minor Conflict” or between 25 and 999 combat related deaths 
per year, and “Major Conflict” when greater than 1000 combat related deaths are reported 
in a year (Hegre et al., 2011).  The primary predictive methodology employed by Dr. 
Hegre, was a C++ based simulation based upon a statistical model of conflict onset, 
escalation, and termination dependent on a set of both endogenous and exogenous 
variables (Hegre et al., 2011).  The methodology employs a nine step process of (1) 
Estimating the underlying statistical model through dynamic multinomial estimation; (2) 
Developing assumptions about the distribution of the exogenous variables; (3) Simulating 
conflicts for the current year; (4) Drawing a realization of the coefficients of the 
multinomial logit model (Equation 8); (5) Calculating the nine probabilities of transition 
between states shown in Table 1; (6) Randomly drawing whether a country experiences 
conflict, based on estimated probabilities; (7) Updating the values of the explanatory 
variables; (8) Repeat steps (4) – (7) for each year of the forecast; and finally (9) 
Repeating step (3) – (8) a number of times to even out the impact of individual 
realizations of the multinomial logit coefficients and the individual values of the 
probability distributions (Hegre et al., 2011). 
A dynamic, multinomial logit model was used to estimate the probability 
transition matrix with the outcome at time t, based on a t-1 set as the indicator variables.  
The model is identified by setting the baseline outcome to j = 0, “No Conflict”, resulting 
in the estimates 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 being interpreted as the impact of the explanatory variable, x, 
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on the probability of being in “Minor Conflict” and “Major Conflict” relative to “No 
Conflict” (Hegre et al., 2011).   Essentially, this model shows which variables increase 
the risk of conflict onset; however, the predicted duration of the conflict is calculated 
through the use of interaction terms between the states at t-1 and the predictor variables, 
producing the transition probability matrix shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Transition Probability Matrix: Conflict at t vs. t-1, 1970-2009 
 (Hegre, Karlsen, Nygard, Strand, & Urdal, 2011) 
 
The Hegre Model divides the world into nine regions, based upon the observation 
that conflict tends to cluster in a few geographical regions, sharing similar rates 
associated with risk factors such as infant mortality rates or poverty levels.  These regions 
are: South and Central America and the Caribbean; Western Europe, North America, and 
Oceania; Eastern Europe; Western Asia and North Africa; West Africa; East and Central 
Africa; Southern Africa; South and Central Asia; Eastern and South East Asia.  However, 
the methodology further investigates the “neighborhoods” associated with each nation.  
The neighborhood of country A is defined as all n countries [B1…BN] that share a border 
with A; where country A shares a border with country Bi if there is less than 100km 
distance between any points of their territories (Hegre et al., 2011).  This was an 
important factor in their methodology, as it allowed them to model the cross border 
Conflict at t-1 No Conflict Minor Conflict Major Conflict Total
No Conflict 5116 (0.966) 156 (0.029) 23 (0.004) 5295 (1.000)
Minor Conflict 145 (0.207) 481 (0.689) 72 (0.103) 698 (1.000)
Major Conflict 24 (0.070) 70 (0.205) 247 (0.724) 341 (1.000)
Observations 5285 707 342 6334
Row proportions in parentheses
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effects of conflict on near neighbors, creating a measure of neighborhood effects, relevant 
to each country. 
The Hegre model is unique from previous conflict prediction studies, as it does 
not restrict its predictions to solely the onset of conflict, thereby excluding ongoing 
conflicts.  Additionally, the Hegre Model simultaneously predicts conflict onset, 
escalation, and termination, allowing for the prediction of both the global and regional 
incidence of armed conflict.  The prediction horizon is also unique to the Hegre model 
due to its length, 7-9 years, with an average postdictive accuracy (across all regions) of 
79%, and a false positive rate of 8.5% given a probability threshold of 𝑝 > 0.3, for the 
state of interest (Hegre et al., 2011).  As the title of Hegre’s paper indicates, his objective 
was to predict conflicts out to year 2050, which he accomplished through the use of 
projections of predictor variables, as provided by the UN World Population Prospects and 
the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis (Hegre et al., 2011).  Using this 
data, Hegre predicts an overall decline in the global incidence level of violent conflict; a 
decline attributed to improvements in variables associated with infant mortality, 
education and youth bulges (Hegre et al., 2011).  However, since these long term 
predictions are based on projections as opposed to actual data, the Hegre Model estimates 
should be interpreted as long-term global, and to a lesser extent regional, conflict trends, 
given projected conditions as opposed to specific national level predictions. 
Boekestein conducted the most recent analysis concerning the prediction of future 
nation-state conflict, in his study A Predictive Logistic Regression Model of World 
Conflict Using Open Source Data (Boekestein, 2015).  As the name implies, the 
Boekestein model uses logistic regression similar to the CIA-funded and FACT studies to 
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produces a parsimonious model that is tailored to each of the six geographical regions 
identified in his study: Sub-Saharan Africa; South and East Asia; Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia; Arab Nations; Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD); and Latin America, comprising 180 of the 193 United Nations member nations, 
with the states of Palestine and Kosovo also included for consideration.  As in previous 
studies, conflict intensity or level of violence was chosen as the dependent variable for 
this study and is based off the levels calculated by the HIIK.  The HIIK levels of violence 
are calculated using the five metrics of: Weapons – light or heavy, Personnel – number 
engaged per month; Casualties – number per month, destruction – infrastructure, 
accommodation, economy, and culture; and Cross Border Refugees and Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDP) – number per month (Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research, 2014).  Using these metrics, the HIIK assigns one of the six 
aforementioned intensity levels to every identified political conflict.   The Boekestein 
model subsequently maps these six levels of conflict to two dependent variables: “Not 
Violent Conflicts”: Levels 0 – 2, and “Violent Conflicts”: Levels 3 – 5. 
Twenty-two statistic and four trend variables were considered for this study, 
thirteen of which are common to the CIA funded and the FACT studies (Boekestein, 
2015).  The data supporting these variables is gathered from multiple sources to include 
the World Bank, HIIK, and the CIA World Fact Book, with some sources maintaining 
data sets from 1970.  As Boekestein points out, many of these data sets are not complete 
or available for the current year of the study, requiring a two or three year lag in the 
model to predict current year nation-state conflict levels.  Additionally some variables 
had significant gaps in the data requiring imputation to complete the data set.  For 
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example the data set supporting the variable “Conflict in Bordering States”, whose 
calculation took into account the number of bordering nations, and the percent border 
shared with nation i, required the imputation of data for 29 island nations (Boekestein, 
2015).  A rigorous variable screening process, to check for collinearity among the set of 
26 variables was implemented prior to model development using three separate analysis 
methods.  Despite the rigorous testing, the initial Boekestein models failed to achieve 
postdictive accuracy rates in excess of 76%.  To improve the model, several factor 
analysis and noise reduction techniques were used to reduce the initial set of 23 variables 
to a set of six factors, with highly correlated variables represented by a single factor 
(Ahner, Boekestein, & Deckro, 2015).  Given the nature of the study, it was also 
desirable to minimize the number of false negative reports by the model, i.e., the number 
of times the model predicts “Not in Violent Conflict” when in actuality the nation in 
question is in “Violent Conflict” (Boekestein, 2015).  This objective was accomplished 
by adjusting the logistic regression cutoff level, for which the default setting was 0.5, 
through extensive sensitivity testing.  The testing determined a potential need for an 
additional variable to explain a nation’s region, due to the nature of the particular nations 
consistently reporting as either false positives or false negatives.  This insight led to the 
construction of separate model for each of the six previously identified regions.  Each 
model employs a specific subset of variables from the original 26 statistic and trend 
variables that best describe the conflict risk factors unique to each region.  This 
methodology resulted in a reduction of false negative predictions in the range of 2–7%, 
and a combined postdictive accuracy for both the model and validation sets of 80.22%, 
given a logistic regression cutoff of 0.28 (Ahner, Boekestein, & Deckro, 2015). 
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2.3 Markov Models and the Prediction and Spread of Disease Epidemics 
The prediction of the outbreak and spread of disease epidemics in many ways is 
analogous to the study and prediction of violent conflict and its antecedents.  Additionally 
given the various states of disease a host, outbreak, or epidemic can exist in, such as no 
signs of disease, susceptible, infected, and cured, the prediction methodology lends itself 
to the use of Markov models.  The 2007 paper, Bayesian Markov switching models for 
the early detection of influenza epidemics, explores a methodology for the early detection 
of influenza outbreaks, using a two-state Markovian process.  The methodology created 
by Martinez-Beneito and his team, employs a two-state, or binary, hidden Markov 
process in which the population is in a non-epidemic or epidemic phase, states 0 and 1 
respectively.  The underlying concept of the model is to associate the variable Yi,j, the 
difference in disease rates between weeks i and i+1 in year j, with Zi,j, the unobserved 
random variable that indicates the state of the system (Martinez-Beneito et al., 2007).  
The model for the Yi,j variable is specific to the state and season of the system, and is 
either an Gaussian white-noise process (non-epidemic) or an autoregressive process of 
order 1 (epidemic).  Upon determination of the model, the parameters P0,0 and P1,1 were 
estimated using the Bayesian paradigm requiring the specification of prior distributions. 
To validate the model’s predictive accuracy, Martinez-Beneito compared its 
performance using a near term partial and complete data set.  The model was constructed 
using a dataset covering a nine-year period, allowing the team to develop robust estimates 
of the various parameters used in the model.  However, given the nature of disease 
outbreaks, time horizons are measured in weeks as opposed to months or years, requiring 
that the model be tested using limited subset of the near-term preceding weeks.  The 
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results showed that, even with the reduced data set, the model predicted the same 
incidence of epidemic in 93% of the scenarios of the model using the full data set, given a 
p > 0.30 (Martinez-Beneito et al., 2007). 
In his 2004 paper, The analysis of hospital infection data using hidden Markov 
models, Cooper proposes a new process to analyze infections that are generally 
considered endemic to hospitals, and are carried asymptomatically before infections 
begin to appear in proportions of the patient population.  The data associated with 
hospital-acquired infections generally consists of short time series with low number 
counts (Cooper & Lipsitch, 2004).  For his analysis, Cooper stresses the importance of 
patient-to-patient transmission, which shares many similarities to conflict spillover from 
one state to the next.  The transmission chain is modeled using a structured hidden 
continuous time Markov chain over a short time increment h.  Germane to this discussion 
are the parameters 𝛽 𝑁⁄ , the transmission rate to each susceptible patient in population N 
given an infected host; 𝑣, the probability of being a pathogen host; 𝜇, patient discharge 
rate; and 𝐶𝑡 𝜖 {0, 1, 2, …𝑁}, the state of the system given as the number of infected hosts 
at time t (Cooper & Lipsitch, 2004). 
In this model new infections arise due to cross-infection, at a rate proportional to 
the product of the number of infected hosts, Ct, and the number of susceptible patients, (N 
– Ct). New infections can also occur in the newly discharge susceptible population 
(Cooper & Lipsitch, 2004).  In the modeling of cross border conflict spill-over, the 
parameter 𝛽 𝑁⁄ , can be interpreted as the proportion of a nation’s border that shares a 
mutual border with a state currently in violent conflict; where 𝑣 and 𝜇 are the respective 
probabilities of entering and terminating a conflict given a neighboring state is in conflict.  
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In his concluding remarks, Cooper identifies several limitations associated with his 
methodology, specifically that it may not be appropriate for large systems.  He 
specifically states: “A further limitation is that while such a model may be appropriate for 
a single ward or unit, for larger hospital populations made up of several interacting units 
its value is not so clear” (Cooper & Lipsitch, 2004).  He ties the reason for this limitation 
to the model’s use of short time series with limited data, increasing the collinearity 
between multiple variables.  Therefore, the overall methodology is likely not appropriate 
for the prediction of nation-state conflict, but the modeling of disease transmission gives 
insight on how to possibly model cross-border conflict spillover. 
The final methodology we will explore is the Modeling of Viral Epidemiology in 
Connected Networks, discussed by Spears of the Naval Research Laboratory.  In this 
instance, Spears adapts methodology for the prediction and spread of disease epidemics 
and applies them to the spread of computer viruses in a network.  Given the level of 
interconnectedness shared by most nations, a result of globalization, it is easy visualize 
the current geo-political topology as a vast network, where conflict in one state sends 
shockwaves through the network, eventually affecting numerous other nations.   The 
methodology for this research employs very general discrete-time Markov chains and 
continuous-time differential equations to model the propagation of viral attacks in a 
network.  The network envisioned in this in this study consists of N nodes that exist in 
one of four medical conditions or states: S, susceptible; E, exposed; I, infected; and C, 
cured (Spears, 2001).  The discussion of the methodology builds upon two- and three-
state Markov chains, but for the purposes of this discussion we will focus on his four 
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condition S-E-I-C model.  In this model a susceptible node must be exposed to the 
pathogen before it becomes infected, infected before cured, cured before susceptible. 
The transition associated with this Markov model requires that I’ – I more nodes 
become infected at time j, where I’ can be less than, equal to, or greater than I, with 
similar requirements for the other three medical conditions (Spears, 2001).  The transition 
probabilities for this model take on binomial characteristics that either a node exists in a 
specific medical condition, or it does not.  Four variables are employed in this model:  𝛼,  
the probability a susceptible patient become exposed to a pathogen;  𝜇, the probability an 
exposed patient is infect; 𝛿, the probability an infected patient is cured; and 𝛿′, the 
probability a cured patient become susceptible.  In the end, the methodology employed 
by Spears may permit the modeling of the spread of violent conflict as a function of 
bordering states, or geographic nearest neighbors in the case of island nations.  
Additionally, through the depiction of strongly and weekly connected nodes, we have a 
methodology that may simulate secure and porous international borders. 
2.4 Relevant Variables 
As stated previously, many conflict prediction studies have expended substantial 
effort and resources in the pursuit of statistically significant variables while failing to 
understand how those variables improve the predictive qualities of their respective 
models.  When analyzing conflict predictor variables used in previous studies, one must 
ask: “will these variables still remain significant in future conflicts?”  Furthermore, will 
variables currently identified as insignificant in current conflicts become significant as 
the nature of violent conflict evolves?  When analyzing and studying different conflict 
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predictor variables, the analyst must avoid falling into a common trap propagated through 
dystopian visions of future conflict that are so common in this day and age (Johnson, 
2014).  The trap is the belief that future global incidences of violent conflict will only 
increase, eventually becoming unmanageable by most national governments.   However, 
as Hegre noted, if UN projections prove reliable, his model actually predicts the opposite 
outcome, with the global incidence of conflict decreasing by 2050.  All this being said, it 
is imperative the analyst understands the effects of historical predictor variables on 
current conflicts while staying abreast of emerging trends, predictors, and their effects 
that will frame the nature of future conflicts. 
The recent Boekestein study created a model using 27 total variables, achieving 
accuracy rates in excess of 80% by region.  Given these results, one can assume the set of 
27 statistic and trend variables represent a set of available predictors that offer excellent 
predictive accuracy of modern violent conflicts, if properly tailored for different world 
regions.   As is seen in Table 2, each region in the Boekestein model has a particular 
subset of relevant variables, with some regions requiring as few as two and other regions 
as many as nine.  Additionally, the importance of the variables, referenced by the index 
corresponding to the variable-region intersection in Table 2, is also region specific.  For 
example, individual freedom statistics were shown to be the most significant variable in 
three regions: Sub-Sahara Africa, Easter Europe and Central Asia, and the OECD, but is 
the fifth most significant variable for Arab Nations and Latin America.  However, this 
table is not all-inclusive due to the absence of variables: border conflict, religious 
diversity, ethnic diversity, and the HIIK trend, which were removed during final model 
construction (Boekestein, 2015). 
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Table 2: Region Specific Relevant Variables 
 (Boekestein, 2015) 
 
A review of previous studies reveals that variables such as political statistics, 
conflict history, infant mortality rates (IMR), population statistics, civil liberties, and 
ethnic/religious dominance or diversity are frequently employed as significant predictors 
of violent conflict.  In addition to these variables, the Hegre model introduces the 
variables related to current conflict intensity, education, youth bulges, international 
treaties, neighborhood characteristics (a conglomeration of growth rates, per capita GDP, 
education levels, IMR, and other political considerations), and oil (Hegre et al., 2011).  
The oil variable is of particular interest due to the hypothesis that nation-states whose 
GDP is dependent upon primary commodities through export revenue, such as oil, tend 
towards weaker governmental institutions putting them at greater risk for violent conflict 
(Hegre et al., 2011). 
Variable/Region
Sub-Sahara 
Africa
South and East 
Asia
Arab Nations
Easterm Europe 
and Central 
Asia
OECD Latin America
Freedom 1 5 1 1 5
2 Yr Freedom Trend 9
3 Yr Freedom Trend 6
5 Yr Freedom Trend 8
Regime Type (Central) 7 4
Regime Type(Democratic) 9
Polity IV 3 2
GDP Per Cpita 6
Refugees Asyulm 3 3 7
Refugee Origin 4
Unemployment 5 0 8
Rural Population 3
Infant Mortality 2 4
Caloric Intake 1 5
Death Rate 3 1 1
Arable Land 2
Population Growth Rate 7
Improved Water 2
Trade 4 2 4 2 6
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Economic factors such as gross domestic product (GDP), primary commodity 
exports, and income growth have also been demonstrated as significant predictors of 
violent conflict.  As noted in their 2002 paper, On the Incidence of Civil War in Africa, 
Collier and Hoeffler employ an econometric model to predict incidences of conflict in 
Africa (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002).  While their study primarily focused on African 
nations, the authors note that patterns of conflict in Africa largely resemble other 
developing regions throughout the globe, indicating that economic variables may be 
useful conflict predictors in other regions.  Similarly, other studies have shown that 
population variables, specifically ethnic and religious oriented statistics, are powerful 
predictors of and historical contributors to violent conflict.  In the 2001 paper titled 
Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War, Fearon and Laitin aurgue that post-Cold War civil 
wars and insurgency were driven and exacerbated through numerous ethnic and religious 
factors, not the least of which was ethnic nationalism (Fearon & Laitin, 2001).    
In his book Out of the Mountains: The Coming age of the Urban Guerilla, 
Kilcullen discusses several drivers of violence and instability that may compliment the 
current set of common conflict predictors.  The basic premise of his work is that future 
conflict is likely to occur in the urban sprawl of coastal mega-cities, and in the peri-urban 
settlements that exist in Africa, the Middle East, Latin America, and Asia (Kilcullen, 
2013).   He discusses the growth of criminal violence networks combined with a 
simultaneous decay or complete lack of basic infrastructure (such as sanitation) as two 
drivers of instability.  The respective rates of growth and decay of these two predictors 
may serve viable and significant variables in a predictive model.  The same variables, 
along with national inflation rates, changes to military expenditure/manning levels, and 
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the application of international sanctions are echoed in the paper, Statistical Approaches 
to Developing Indicators of Armed Conflict, whose purpose is to “explore the feasibility 
of developing a meaningful system of indicators of armed violence” (Kisielewski, Rosa, 
& Asher, 2010). 
2.5 Summary 
In this chapter, we surveyed multiple sources to identify useful methods, theories, 
and variables to enable the development of a methodology for the prediction of violent 
nation-state conflict using Markov Chain Models.  Previous conflict prediction studies 
employ multiple methodologies to include logistic regression and simulation with the 
best models achieving accuracy rates in excess of 80%.  While methodologies and 
variables differed between studies, the common trend was to construct region-specific 
models to better estimate the global incidence of violence.  This methodology allows for 
the use of region-specific significant variables, whose value when applied to a global 
model may be insignificant or even detrimental to the predictive accuracy of the model.  
Next, we survey a group of studies using Markov models for the prediction and analysis 
of the spread of disease epidemics, which share common traits with the spread of conflict.  
The studies featured in this chapter use multi-state hidden Markov models, emphasizing 
patient-to-patient transfer of pathogens.  Notable studies combine Markov models with 
strong and weakly connected patient networks, which may provide a suitable 
methodology to the modeling of the nation-states within their various regions.  Finally, 
we review commonly used and emerging predictor variables that are relevant to modern 
conflict.  Such variables include recent conflict history, infant mortality rates, various 
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political and economic statistics, and region type.  Subject matter experts also identify 
predictors such as crime rates, population migration, and changes to military spending 
and force levels as possible drivers of instability in susceptible nations.  
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III. Methodology 
“This is no formula of war.  No one dares to arrogantly claim to have the perfect method 
in the sphere of war.  No one has ever been able to use one method to win all wars.  But it 
does not mean that there are no rules regarding war.” 
Qiao Liang, Unrestricted Warfare 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
This research examines the methods germane to the prediction and forecasting of 
nation-state violent conflict transitions.  Section 3.2 describes the methodology guiding 
the development of the conditional conflict database, to include variable selection, 
database design, and data imputation. Next section 3.3 discusses the mathematical 
principals and development of the conditional logistic regression models to include the 
Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique.  Finally, Section 3.4 describes the theory 
and development of the nation specific Markov models used to determine the near- and 
long-term conflict trends of the nation-states examined in this research. 
3.2 Conditional Conflict Database Development 
Nation-State Case Selection 
This study examines the incidences of violent conflict for 181 of the 193 member 
states of the United Nations, as well as Palestine, which is referred throughout this study 
as the West Bank (United Nations, 2015).  The 182 nations states examined in this 
research are consistent with those surveyed in the Boekestein model (Boekestein, 2015).  
The 12 member states not considered in this study are Andorra, Dominica, Liechtenstein, 
The Marshall Islands, Monaco, Nauru, Palau, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint 
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Vincent and the Grenadines, San Marino, and Tuvalu.  These nations were omitted due 
their relatively small populations, combined with inadequate or incomplete data.  Similar 
to previous studies, disputed territories and regions such as Nagorno-Karabakh, South 
Ossetia, Western Sahara, Somaliland, and Taiwan are also omitted from consideration. 
Case selection, the specific years of interest for each nation-state status 
observation, was predicated on the availability of adequate data, combined with the 
requirement to capture sufficient amounts of data relevant to the current operational 
environment.  Cases for all 182 nation states are drawn from the years 2004 to 2014, the 
11-year period immediately following the United States led invasion of Iraq in March 
2003; a total of 2,002 individual nation-year cases.  This time period was ultimately 
selected based on the findings of several recent operational environment assessments that 
emphasized the importance of current visible trends for meaningful conflict prediction 
(Johnson, 2014). 
Description of the Dependent Variable 
This study utilizes the conditional dependent variable “Conflict Transition given 
Previous Year Status”, which is derived from the Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research (HIIK) conflict intensity levels for each nation.  To understand how the 
HIIK derives a nation’s conflict intensity score, one must first define a set of conflict 
measures and conflict items which constitute the key elements of the score.  The HIIK 
definitions for Conflict Measures and Conflict Items are provided. 
Conflict Measures  
Conflict measures are actions and communications carried out by 
a conflict actor in the context of a political conflict.  They are constitutive 
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for an identifiable conflict if they lie outside established procedures of 
conflict regulations and – possibly in conjunction with other conflict 
measures – if they threaten the international order or a core function of 
the state.  Core state functions encompass providing security of a 
population, integrity of territory and of a specific political, socioeconomic 
or cultural order (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 
2014). 
Conflict Items 
Conflict items are material or immaterial goods pursued by 
conflict actors via conflict measures.  Due to the character of conflict 
measures, conflict items attain relevance for the society as a whole – 
either for coexistence within a given state or between states.  This aspect 
constitutes the genuinely political dimension of political conflicts 
(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014). 
The 2014 Conflict Barometer developed by the HIIK utilizes the 10 conflict items 
described in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Conflict Items 
(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014) 
 
To determine a conflict’s intensity level, the HIIK utilizes five proxy measures to 
assess the means and consequences of the given conflict.  The means of conflict include 
the weapons and personnel involved therein, while the conflict consequences includes the 
casualties, refugees and internally displaced persons (IDP), and destruction sustained by 
said conflict (Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014).  The 
parameters and assigned values are provided in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
Conflcit Items Description
System / Ideology
Conflict actor aspires to change the ideological, religious, socioeconomic, or judicial orientation of 
the political system or regime.
National Power The power to govern a state.
Autonomy
Attaining or extending political self-rule of a population within a state of a dependent territory 
without striving for independence.
Secession
The aspired separation of a part of a territory aiming to establish a new state or to merge with 
another state.
Decolonization The desired independence of a dependent territory from foreign rule.
Subnational 
Predominance
The attainment of de-facto control by a government, a non-state organization, or a population over 
a territory or a population.
Resources The pursuit of the possession of natural resources or raw materials, or the profits gained thereof.
Territory The desire to change the course or alter an international border.
International 
Power
The change aspired in the power constellation in the international system or regional system 
therein, especially by changing military capabilities or the political or economic influence of a state.
Other Items A residual category.
The Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research Conflict 
Items
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Table 4: HIIK Proxy Measures 
(Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research, 2014) 
 
The intensity levels of a particular conflict are an attribute sum of the conflict 
measures for a given geographic area and time period.  The HIIK employs a six-level 
model with the following intensity levels: 0 – No Conflict, 1 – Dispute, 2 – Non-violent 
Crisis, 3 – Violent Crisis, 4 – Limited War, 5 – War (Heidelberg Institute for 
International Conflict Research, 2014).   Nations that were or are currently experiencing 
multiple conflicts are assigned an overall HIIK intensity level equating to the highest 
level assigned to any of the ongoing conflicts for a particular year. These levels were 
subsequently mapped to a binary variable called “Level of Violence”, with levels 0 
through 2 mapped to “Non-Violent Conflicts” and levels 3 through 5 mapped to “Violent 
Conflicts” (Boekestein, 2015). 
The conditional dependent variable “Conflict Transition given Previous Year 
Status” is mapped to the level of violence variable for the preceding year (y – 1) and the 
level of violence variable for the following year.  A transition is said to occur if the status 
0 Points 1 Point 2 Points
0 Point
Violent 
Crisis
Violent 
Crisis
Limited 
War
1 Point
Violent 
Crisis
Limited 
War
War
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Limited 
War
War War
C
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Conflcit Means
Light Heavy
Light 
Heavy 1 Point 2 Points
Weapons
Employment
T
y
p
e 0 Points
Low Medium High
Pax < 50 50 < Pax < 400 Pax > 400
0 Points 1 Point 2 Points
Personnel
Low Medium High
Cas < 20 20 < Cas < 60 Cas > 60
0 Points 1 Point 2 Points
Casulaties
Low Medium High
Ref < 1000 1000 < Ref < 20,000 Ref > 20,000
0 Points 1 Point 2 Points
Refugees & IDPs
Low Medium High
Within 0 
Dimensions
Within 1 - 2 
Dimensions
Within 3 - 4 
Dimensions
0 Points 1 Point 2 Points
Destruction
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changes over the course of the year.  The mapping of the second order dependent variable 
from the HIIK conflict intensity levels is provided in Table 5. 
Table 5: Mapping of Conditional Dependent Variable 
 
Independent Variable Selection 
This study incorporates 26 nation specific statistic variables and four trend 
variables obtained from six data repositories: the Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research, The World Bank, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) World Fact 
Book, Freedom House, the Center for Systemic Peace, and the Food & Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (UN FAO).  Variable selection was heavily 
influenced by the Center for Army Analysis FACT studies, 12 variables in common 
(Reed, 2013); the CIA – Goldstone study, three variables in common (Goldstone, et al., 
2005), and the Boekestein study, 25 variables in common (Boekestein, 2015).  These and 
similar studies have repeatedly demonstrated the significance of theses variables as 
conflict predictors, hence their consideration in this study.  Recent studies, such as those 
HIIK 
Intesity 
Level
HIIK 
Terminology
Level of 
Violence
Status Year 
(y - 1)
Conflict Transtion year (y), 
given status year (y - 1)
0 No Conflict
1 Dispute
3 Violent Crisis
4 Limited War
Transition into Non-conflict (0)
Transition Into Conflict (1)
Transition into Non-conflict (0)
Transition Into Conflict (1)
Not in 
Conflict
In Conflict
Non-Violent 
Conflicts
Violent 
Conflicts
5 War
2 Non-violent Crisis
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conducted by Hegre at the University of Oslo, have expounded the necessity of including 
statistical variables representing emerging trends within the operational environment such 
as military spending, urbanization of populations, loss of natural sources of fresh water, 
and burgeoning youth populations that are seen as future drives of instability (Hegre et 
al., 2011).  Therefore, the following five variables are also included for consideration 
within this study and are defined as: 
Military expenditure (Percent of central government expenditure): 
Military expenditures data from the Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute (SIPRI) are derived from the North Atlantic Treaty organization (NATO) 
definition, which includes all current and capital expenditures on the armed forces, 
including peacekeeping forces; defense ministries and other government agencies 
engaged in defense projects; paramilitary forces, if these are judged to be trained and 
equipped for military operations; and military space activities. Such expenditures include 
military and civil personnel, including retirement pensions of military personnel and 
social services for personnel; operation and maintenance; procurement; military research 
and development; and military aid (World Bank, 2015). 
Military expenditure (Percent of gross domestic product): 
This variable is defined in the same fashion as above, but takes into account the 
relative defense expenditure as it relates to the total national output. 
Population ages 0 – 14 (percent of total): 
This variable is based on a nation’s population between the ages 0 to 14 as a 
percentage of the total population. Population is based on the de facto definition of 
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population (World Bank, 2015).  This variable is referred to as “Youth Bulge” throughout 
this study. 
Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters): 
Renewable internal freshwater resources flows refer to internal renewable 
resources (internal river flows and groundwater from rainfall) in the country. Renewable 
internal freshwater resources per capita are calculated using the World Bank's population 
estimates (World Bank, 2015).  Due to the limitations of this data set, this variable is the 
average of the 2007, 2012, and 2013 statistics for each nation, and it is subsequently fixed 
as a stationary variable. 
Government Type: 
This is a six-level indicator variable derived from the Polity IV scores for each 
nation.  Polity is defined as a political or governmental organization; a society or 
institution with an organized government (Marshall, Gurr, & Jaggers, 2014).  Polity IV 
scores a nations political body on a 21 point scale of -10 (fully autocratic) to 10 (fully 
democratic), with additional identifiers -66 (indicating foreign interruption), -77 
(indicating anarchy), and -88 (indicating a transitional government).  From these scores 
the six levels are defined as: Level 0: Autocratic Government (Polity IV: -10 to -6); Level 
1: Emerging Democratic Government (Polity IV: -5 to +5); Level 2: Democratic 
Government (+6 to +10); Level 3: Foreign Interruption (Polity IV: -66); Level 4: 
Anarchy (Polity IV: -77); Level 5: Transitional Government (Polity IV: -88).  This 
variable was included to provide greater fidelity when modeling political instability 
within a nation.  The Center for Systemic Peace provides polity scores for 166 of the 182 
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nations considered in this study.  To account for this data gap, government type was 
correlated to the “Regime Type” variable that is discussed later in this chapter.   
Overview of Independent Variables 
Table 6 provides a synopsis of the 30 statistical and trend variables.  Several near-
year data sets (for years 2012, 2013, and 2014) are missing.  These occurrences result in a 
“data lag” ranging between 1 and 2 years, based upon the year 2014 (forecast year 0), for 
14 of the 30 variables. In cases involving variables with a data lag, the variable i at year j 
will be used to predict conflict at year j + lag(i).  For example, the variable arable land 
has two-year lag in the data set requiring that the 2012 data model 2014 conflicts.  There 
are two serious implications when constructing a predictive model using “lagged” data.  
The first implication is that we are attempting to develop a predictive tool using less 
current data that may not capture or completely disregards current trends that lead to 
conflict transitions, thus reducing the accuracy of the model.  The second implication is 
that such data ultimately increases the overall variance in the model due to increased 
forecasting time horizons.  In addition to the data lag, incomplete data sets (i.e., variable-
year instances with less than 182 entries) are also pervasive.  Imputation methods 
employed to replace missing data are covered later in this chapter. 
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Table 6: Independent Variables 
 
A majority of the independent variables are self-explanatory in both origin and 
function; however, the derivation of several key statistical and trend variables requires 
further discussion. 
Border Conflict Score 
Conflicts in bordering states are cited as a variable of interest in both the CIA-
Goldstone (as a binary indicator variable) and the Boekestein studies.  The developed 
border conflict score seeks to model the external pressures applied to a nation as a 
function of HIIK intensity level of a nation’s bordering neighbors for a given year, and 
the relative proportion of the international border attributed to each of those nations.  The 
2012 2013 2014
1961 2 Arable Land (hectares per person) 181
1961 1 Birth Rate (per 1,000 people) 182 182
1961 1 Death Rate (per 1,000 people) 182 182
1961 1 Fertility Rate (births per woman) 182 182
1960 0 GDP Per Capita (current USD) 179 179 164
1990 0 Improved Water Source (% population with access) 178 175 175
1960 1 Life Expectancy (years) 182 182
1990 2 Military Expend (% Gov Spending) 100
1988 0 Military Expend (% GDP) 179 141 131
1961 0 Infant Mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 182 182 182
1961 0 Population ages 0 - 14 (% of total population) 182 182 182
1961 0 Population density (people per square kilometer) 181 181 181
1961 0 Population Growth (annual %) 181 182 182
1990 1 Refugee Population by county of asylum (% population) 159 160
1990 1 Refugee population by country of origin (% population) 180 181
1962 Locked Renewable Fresh Water per Capita (cubic meters, average of 2004 - 2014 data) 174 174 174
1960 0 Trade (% GDP) 168 161 130
1991 1 Unemployment (total % of labor force) 171 171
2010 0 Border Conflict Score 182 182 182
Locked Regime Type (3 level indicator variable) 182 182 182
Locked Ethnic Diversity (% of Dominant Ethnic Group) 182 182 182
Locked Religious Diversity (% of Dominant Ethnic Group) 174 174 174
1972 0 Freedom Score (Average of Civil Liberties and Political Rights (scores 0 to 1)) 180 180 180
1960 0 Polity IV (Political behavior score -10 to 10, and -66, -77, -88) 166 166 166
1960 0 Government Type (6 level indicator variable derived directly from Polity IV scores) 166 166 166
1961 1 Caloric Intake (average caloric intake from all sources per person) 39 39
1996 1 2 Yr Conflict Intensity Trend (Derived from HIIK intensity levels) 182 182 182
1 2 Yr Freedom Trend (Derived from Freedom Score) 179 180 180
1 3 Yr Freedom Trend (Derived from Freedom Score) 179 180 180
1 5 Yr Freedom Trend (Derived from Freedom Score) 180 181 181
CIA World Fact Book Variables
Trend Variable
Freedom House, The Center for Systemic peace, and Food & Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Variables 
Year of First 
Data Set
 VariableLag (years)
Number of Entries per Year
World Bank Variable
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international border data was obtained from the CIA World Fact Book.  The equation for 
calculating the Border Conflict Score is defined in Equation 1. 
𝐶𝑏𝑖𝑗 = ∑𝑥𝑖𝑗𝑝𝑖 for ∀ 𝑗
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Equation 1: Border Conflict Score (Boekestein, 2015) 
Where: 
 Conflict in border states statistic
    number of bordering nations
x    HIIK intensity level for nation  for year 
   percent of border shared with nation 
      Country  {1, 2, ..., 18
ij
ij
i
Cb
n
i j
p i
i




  2}
     Years {1996, 1997,..., 2014}j  
 
The border conflict score for Afghanistan in 2014 is provided as an example of 
the variable calculation in Table 7. 
Table 7: Border Conflict Score Example 
 
 
 
Bordering State Border (km) pi xij
China 91 0.015 4
Iran 921 0.154 3
Pakistan 2670 0.446 5
Tajikistan 1357 0.227 3
Turkmenistan 804 0.134 1
Uzbekistan 144 0.024 2
Border Conflict Score (Cbij)
Afghanistan Boder Conflict Score 2014
3.61
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Regime Type 
Regime Type is a three level indicator variable that was first cited in the CIA-
Goldstone study as a significant predictor of political instability.  The Boekestein study 
was the first to employ the variable in its current simplified form after mapping the 57 
government descriptions provided in the CIA World Fact Book to 10 then subsequently 
three nominative variables as shown in Table 8 (Boekestein, 2015). 
Table 8: Mapping of Regime Type 
 (Boekestein, 2015) 
 
The three levels of this variable are mapped as: Level 0: Central rule / ruling 
party; Level 1: Emerging, transitional, or disputed; Level 2: Democratic government.  
Unlike the Government Type indicator variable, Regime Type is locked, meaning that it 
cannot change from year to year.  Regime Type is correlated with the new dynamic 
indicator variable Government Type, which is envisioned as the primary means for model 
political institutions.  The continued use of Regime Type within this study is as a 
modeling alternative to the new variable. 
 
Class Total New Class Total
Communist 4
Dictatorship 2
Military Junta 1
Monarchy 24
Theocracy 2
Democracy 39
Republic 107
Transitional Government 2
Disputed 1
Gand Total 182 Grand Total 182
Central/Ruling Party
Expanded Regime Type
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137
9
Democratic
Emerging, Transitional, recent 
change, disputed
Reduced Regime Type
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Freedom Score 
The statistical variable Freedom Score was first identified as a significant variable 
during the Boekestein study which sought to develop a variable that incorporated the 
highly correlated aspects of the Civil Liberties and Political Rights variables aggregated 
by the Freedom House data base (Boekestein, 2015).  Freedom house has compiled this 
data set since 1972, and it currently covers 195 nations and 15 disputed territories 
(Freedom House, 2015).  For 2015, Freedom House adopted a new scheme for its two 
variables which they believe provided more nuanced information than the older 7-point 
scoring system; Freedom House now scores Political Rights on a 40-point scale, and 
Civil Liberties on a 60-point scale (Freedom House, 2015). 
As in the Boekestein study, this analysis combines Political Rights and Civil 
Liberties to create the variable Freedom Score by taking the average of the normalized 
scores for each nation-year instance.  Scores were normalized to remove bias attributed to 
having an uneven dual scoring system utilized by Freedom House. The derivation of the 
Freedom Score is provided in Equations 2, 3, and 4. 
𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗 =
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗
40
 
Equation 2: Normalized Political Rights 
𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑗 =
𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑗
60
 
Equation 3: Normalized Civil Liberties 
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𝐹𝑆𝑖𝑗 =
𝑛𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑗 + 𝑛𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑗
2
 
Equation 4: Freedom Score 
Where: 
  Freedom score for country  in year 
Pr    Political rights score for country  in year 
Pr Normalized political rights score for country  in year 
  Civil liberties score for countr
ij
ij
ij
ij
FS i j
i j
n i j
Cl



 y  in year 
Normalized civil liberties score for country  in year 
      Country  {1, 2, ..., 182}
     Years {1996, 1997,..., 2014}
ij
i j
nCl i j
i
j

 
 
 
Conflict and Freedom Trend Variables 
Trend variables seek to predict conflict transitions through modeling the change 
in trajectory of a specific nation’s conflict intensity levels and freedom scores.  Previous 
conflict prediction studies have successfully employed trend variables as indicators of 
instability.  Due to the nature of their calculations, all trend variables experience a one 
year lag in the model. 
Change in HIIK conflict intensity is modeled as a two-year trend variable dividing 
the change in HIIK intensity levels for the years in question by the number of intensity 
levels, as shown in Equation 5.  The objective of this variable is the improvement of 
conflict transition forecasting through the forecasting of increased or decreased levels of 
violence. 
2𝑌𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑗 =
𝐻𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑗−1 − 𝐻𝐼𝐿𝑖,𝑗−2
6
 
Equation 5: Two Year HIIK Trend Variable 
 
40 
 
Where: 
,
,
2  Two year conflict intensity trend for country  in year 
    HIIK intensity level for country  in year 
            Country  {1, 2, ..., 182}
           Years {1996, 1997,..., 20
i j
i j
YCIT i j
HIL i j
i
j


 
  14}
 
Like the HIIK conflict intensity trend variable, the two-, three-, and five-year 
freedom trends also seek to forecast conflict transitions through the modeling of a 
nation’s Polity functions.  In addition to the two-year trend variable, three- and five-year 
variables are also included to improve forecasting over longer time horizons as shown in 
Equation 6. 
, , 2 , 1
, , 3 , 1
, , 5 , 1
2  
3  
5  
i j i j i j
i j i j i j
i j i j i j
YFT FS FS
YFT FS FS
YFT FS FS
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Equation 6: Two-, Three-, and Five-Year Freedom Trend Variables 
Where: 
,
,
,
2  Two-year freedom trend for country  in year 
3  Three-year freedom trend for country  in year 
5  Five-year freedom trend for country  in year 
      Freedom score for cou
i j
i j
i j
ij
YFT i j
YFT i j
YFT i j
FS



 ntry  in year 
           Country  {1, 2, ..., 182}
          Years {1996, 1997,..., 2014}
i j
i
j
 
 
 
Database Design and Construction 
Data Base Criteria 
The design of the Conditional Conflict Database (CCD) facilitates the eventual 
construction of the conditional logistic regression and Markov models and consists of two 
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sub-databases: the “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict”.  The “In Conflict” database 
includes all instances of nations transitioning from a state of conflict (either remaining in 
conflict or transitioning out of conflict), while the “Not in Conflict” database includes all 
instances of transitioning from a state of non-conflict.  The CCD meets three design 
criteria essential for the development of studies using logistic regression and Markov 
models: 1 – Common nomenclature and time frame across all datasets; 2 – Automated 
raw-data refreshment; and 3 – Easily searchable/sortable by nation, year-group, region, 
etc.  The objective of the database design is the creation of six region specific databases 
which are used to develop the conditional logistic regression models.   
Issues 
The primary obstacle in the creation of the master database was the sorting, 
cataloguing, and formatting of the over 30 disparate databases that are loaded into the 
CCD.  Between all datasets there exist 338 separate entries for nations, regions, and 
territories (NRT), of which only 182 are considered in this study.  Additionally, a 
transliteration system was developed to ensure a common naming convention for all 338 
NRTs, in addition to the unique catalogue numbers (1 through 338) assigned to each 
entity.  A uniform database structure based on that used by the World Bank is employed 
to format the raw databases and segregate the “top” 182 nations-of-interest, creating the 
usable structures which are loaded into the CCD. 
  The master database requires a total 78,078 separate entries to properly 
catalogue the 2,002 separate nation-year instances included in this study.  Manual 
database updates are cumbersome, time-consuming, and prone to human error.  To 
overcome this obstacle, a Microsoft Office visual basic (VBA) based consolidated 
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database tool was developed to compile the 39 separate identifying-information and data 
spreadsheets into one consolidated file, which is subsequently time-stamped with the 
most recent compile date.  This tool enables timely and error free data updates of the 
CCD for any dataset conforming to the World Bank format. 
Data Imputation 
As shown in Table 6, the raw datasets employed for this study had numerous 
instances of missing data.  Since the study considers 182 of the world’s nations, data-year 
sets containing less than 182 data points require the data imputation prior to final 
consolidation in the CCD.  In general, nations with fledgling or unstable governments 
lack the ability to track and consolidate the large amounts of statistical data required for 
this study. For the data considered in this study, a total of 1,602 or 80% of the nation-year 
instances had between 28 and 30 of the 30 possible variables, with the average of 28.5 
variables per nation-year instance.  However, within the considered dataset, there exist 32 
nation-year instances that have less than 23 of the 30 possible variables; the complete list 
provided in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Number of Variables per Nation-year Instance; Worst Data 
 
A total of 2,903 of the 62,062 statistical data points required imputation prior to 
final consolidation in the CCD.  The JMP statistical software package was employed to 
impute the missing data.  JMP imputes missing data points by analyzing values in other 
columns and rows, developing an estimate of the missing value(s) (Hinrichs & Boiler, 
2010).  Imputed values are expectations conditioned on the non-missing values of each 
row in the data set (SAS Institute, 2015).  Two separate data imputation methods, isolated 
variable and holistic imputation (using entire data set), were conducted and compared to 
identify the optimal variables to import into the master CCD.  The final imputation 
method selection was based on the statistical similarity (average) of the imputed data to 
Index Country Year Total Data Sets
149 South Sudan 2009 13
149 South Sudan 2010 13
149 South Sudan 2011 13
149 South Sudan 2012 13
149 South Sudan 2006 16
149 South Sudan 2007 16
149 South Sudan 2008 16
109 Montenegro 2005 18
109 Montenegro 2006 18
149 South Sudan 2005 18
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2012 20
109 Montenegro 2004 20
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2011 21
149 South Sudan 2004 21
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2014 22
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2013 22
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2004 22
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2005 22
107 Micronesia, Federated States of 2006 22
136 Samoa 2014 22
176 Vanuatu 2014 22
179 West Bank 2004 22
179 West Bank 2005 22
179 West Bank 2006 22
179 West Bank 2007 22
179 West Bank 2008 22
179 West Bank 2009 22
179 West Bank 2010 22
179 West Bank 2011 22
179 West Bank 2012 22
179 West Bank 2013 22
179 West Bank 2014 22
44 
the raw data for nation-year instances within the same region.  Additionally, the 
imputation of the “Polity IV” and “Government Type” data was based off of the “Regime 
Type” variable.  Table 10 provides the list of variables requiring data imputation as well 
as the method of imputation employed. 
Table 10: Variables Requiring Data Imputation 
 
Conditional Conflict Database Structure 
The “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” CCDs share a common database structure 
that includes the catalogue number, standard name and code, the base year, transition 
year-pair, the year code, supporting HIIK data, region, and all statistical data from 2004 
to 2014.  The database also provides summary statistics concerning the total instances 
Variable Name Imputation Method
Arable Land Holistic Imputation
GDP Per Capitia Isolated Variable
Improved Water Holistic Imputation
Military Expend (% Gov Spending) Holistic Imputation
Military Expend (% GDP) Holistic Imputation
Population density Isolated Variable
Population Growth Holistic Imputation
Refugee (Asylum) Isolated Variable
Refugee (Origin) Isolated Variable
Fresh Water per Capita Holistic Imputation
Trade (% GDP) Holistic Imputation
Unemployment Holistic Imputation
Polity IV Based off regime type
Government Type Based off regime type
Caloric Intake Holistic Imputation
Freedom Score Holistic Imputation
2 Yr Freedom Trend Holistic Imputation
3 Yr Freedom Trend Holistic Imputation
5 Yr Freedom Trend Holistic Imputation
Religious Diversity Holistic Imputation
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and transitions of interest included within the dataset.  An example of the CCD structure 
is provided in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3: In Conflict Database 
Creation of the CCD requires that all instances of conflict transition, from one 
year to another, are identified and catalogued according to whether a transition from their 
current state occurred for the preceding year.  This formulation results in the possibility 
that data specific nation-year transition instances may be included in both the “In 
Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” databases. 
Regional Assignments 
The practice of creating region-specific conflict prediction models has been 
employed in several previous studies.  These studies have shown a relationship between 
the duration and scope of violent conflict and the significance of regional commonalities 
such as the incidence of natural resources, physical geography, adjacent border conflicts, 
and population demographics (Buhag, 2005).  Additionally, it has been shown that 
conflict risk factors such as poverty, famine, and despotism tend to cluster in so-called 
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“Bad Neighborhoods”, with an observable cross-border effect (Hegre, Karlsen, Nygard, 
Strand, & Urdal, 2011).  The regional assignments utilized in this study are based on the 
six-region world model developed in the Boekestein model, and are comprised of: Sub-
Sahara Africa, South and East Asia, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Arab and North 
African States, Latin America, and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) nations (Boekestein, 2015).  The number of nations assigned to a 
specific region ranges from 17 (Arab & North African states) to 49 (Sub-Sahara Africa).  
The regional assignments for the 182 nations considered in this study are provided in 
Appendix A. 
3.3 Logistic Regression 
Overview of Logistic Regression Concepts and Theory 
Logistic regression was employed as the regression method for this study due to 
the binary response of the conditional dependent variable, where a nation given its 
current status either “Transitions / Remains in Conflict” or “Transitions / Remains out of 
Conflict”.  As in any regression model, the goal of this analysis is to construct the best 
fitting, parsimonious, and operationally interpretable model to describe the relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 
2013).  Linear regression is not used since the dichotomous nature of the data used in this 
study violates many of the assumptions required for linear regression specifically those of 
measurement (dependent variable is continuous and unbounded), homoscedasticity 
(constant residual variance over regressor hull), and normality (residuals are normally 
distributed) (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  The measurement assumption is 
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violated through the use of the dichotomous variable that is constrained to 0 or 1.  This in 
turn violates the normality assumption of the distribution of errors, which themselves can 
only assume values of 0 or 1.  Finally, the homoscedasticity assumption is violated due to 
non-constant variance of the error terms associated with each instance.   
In logistic regression, the conditional mean of the dichotomous response is 
bounded between 0 and 1, or simply 0 ≤ 𝐸(𝑌|𝑥) ≤ 1.  This results in the non-constant 
variance discussed previously as the response approaches 0 or 1 producing the “S-curve” 
shown in Figure 4.  The curve itself resembles the plot of a continuous distribution of a 
random variable, leading to the use of the logistic distribution to model the conditional 
mean for a dichotomous response (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
 
Figure 4: Plots of the Logit π(x) and Logit Transformation g(x) 
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The Logit and Logit Transformation 
While other continuous distributions can adequately model dichotomous data, the 
logistic distribution provides superior mathematical flexibility in conjunction with 
operationally meaningful estimates of the covariate effects.  For the purposes of this 
study the conditional mean will be represented as 𝜋(𝑥) = 𝐸(𝑌|𝑥), where the logit 𝜋(𝑥) 
represents the probability of the response is equal to 1, or for the purposes of this study a 
“Transition into Conflict,” given the covariate(s).  The specific form of the logistic model 
is given in Equation 7. 
𝜋(𝑥) =
𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥+⋯+𝛽𝑛𝑥
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1𝑥+⋯+𝛽𝑛𝑥
=
𝑒𝑔(𝑥)
1 + 𝑒𝑔(𝑥)
 
Equation 7: The General Logistic Regression Model 
The general logistic regression model effectively ensures that the probability 
estimate of conflict transition is bounded between 0 and 1.  The error associated with the 
model assumes a binomial distribution with an expected value given by 𝐸(𝜀|𝑌 = 1) =
1 − 𝜋(𝑥) with a probability of 𝜋(𝑥), or 𝐸(𝜀|𝑌 = 0) = −𝜋(𝑥) with a probability of 1 −
𝜋(𝑥).  These properties of the error term result in the binomial distribution with the 
properties of 𝐸(𝜀|𝑌) = 0 and 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜀|𝑌) = 𝜋(𝑥)[1 − 𝜋(𝑥)] (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & 
Sturdivant, 2013). 
Central to the development of this study’s logistic regression models is the 
concept of the logit transformation g(x).  The logit encompasses many of the desirable 
properties of the linear regression model such as a continuous, unbounded response that 
is linear within its parameters as shown in Figure 4 (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 
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2013).  The logit transformation is calculated by taking the natural logarithm of the odds 
ratio: 𝜋(𝑥) [1 − 𝜋(𝑥)]⁄  presented in Equation 8. 
𝑔(𝑥) = 𝑙𝑛 [
𝜋(𝑥)
1 − 𝜋(𝑥)
] = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥 + ⋯+ 𝛽𝑛𝑥 
Equation 8: The Logit Transformation 
The covariate parameters 𝛽𝑖 are estimated through the method of maximum 
likelihood which seeks to determine the estimates of the covariate parameters that agree 
most closely with the observed data of the response (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 
2013).  As with the error terms, each sample observation follows a binomial distribution 
with the likelihood function given by Equation 9. 
𝑙(𝛽) = ∏𝜋(𝑥𝑖)
𝑦𝑖[1 − 𝜋(𝑥𝑖)]
1−𝑦𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Equation 9: Likelihood Function 
Where: 
 
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0 1        , ,...,
  i  response probability
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The principal of maximum likelihood simply seeks to maximize the expression 
provided in Equation 10.  However, the use of the Log-likelihood function provided in 
Equation 11 provides a simpler means of estimating the covariate parameters (Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
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𝐿(𝛽) = ∑{𝑦𝑖𝑙𝑛[𝜋(𝑥𝑖)] + (1 − 𝑦𝑖)𝑙𝑛[1 − 𝜋(𝑥𝑖)]}
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Equation 10: Log-likelihood Function 
Testing for Model and Coefficient Significance 
As in linear regression, the basic premise for determining the significance of any 
logistic regression model is comparing the model containing the covariates of interest to 
the model without those parameters via hypothesis testing.  The comparison method in 
logistic regression is the likelihood ratio test, which assumes a Chi-square (χ2) 
distribution.  In order to conduct the hypothesis tests using the likelihood ratios, we must 
calculate the deviance in the likelihood values of the saturated and fitted models.  The 
deviance (D) statistic is shown in Equation 11. 
𝐷 = −2∑{𝑦𝑖𝑙𝑛 [
𝜋(𝑥𝑖)
𝑦𝑖
] + (1 − 𝑦𝑖)𝑙𝑛 [
1 − 𝜋(𝑥𝑖)
1 − 𝑦𝑖
]}
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Equation 11: Deviance of the Saturated and Fitted Models 
Given that the likelihood 𝑙(𝛽) of the saturated model (i.e. the model containing 
the entire set of variables) is equal to 1.0, it follows that the deviance is equal to 𝐷 =
−2𝑙𝑛[𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑜𝑓 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑚𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙].  It should be noted that the deviance statistic 
has the same function in logistic regression as the residual sum-of-squares (SSE) does in 
linear regression (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  
To assess the significance of the covariate in question, the statistic G, the negative 
two log ratio of the deviance statistics, with and without the variable in question, is 
calculated.   The statistic G has the same function in logistic regression as the numerator 
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of the partial F-test does in linear regression (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
The statistic G, which assumes a Chi-square distribution, can be calculated as either the 
ratio of likelihoods between the different models as shown in Equation 12, or as the 
differences between the deviances of the two models as shown in Equation 13. 
𝐺 = −2𝑙𝑛 [
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒
] 
Equation 12: Likelihood Ratio Method 
𝐺 = 𝐷(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) − 𝐷(𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒) 
Equation 13: Difference in deviances method 
Figure 5 presents a likelihood ratio hypothesis test using JMP software output.  
Model significance for a given confidence level (1-α)% is determined through a standard 
hypothesis test wherein the null hypothesis (H0), the intercept only model is sufficient is 
tested against the alternate hypothesis (Ha), the reduced model is equivalent to the full 
model.  The G statistic is compared against the Chi-Square test statistic χ2(1-α, n), for a 
given confidence level and n degrees of freedom, the difference in the number of 
variables between the two models.  In this example the null hypothesis is rejected if 
𝐺 > 7.815.  
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Figure 5: Hypothesis Test for Model Significance 
Variable significance for a given confidence level (1-α)% is determined through a 
standard hypothesis test similar to that discussed previously.  In this case, the Wald 
statistic (W), which follows a Chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom, is used 
as the test statistic.   The null hypothesis (H0), the variable does not significantly 
contribute to the model, is tested against the alternate hypothesis (H1), the variable 
significantly contributes to the model.  The W statistic is compared against the Chi-
Square test statistic χ2(1-α, 1), for a given confidence level and one degree of freedom.  In 
this test the null hypothesis is rejected if 𝐺 > 𝜒(1−𝛼,1)
2 .  Figure 6 provides an example of 
such a test.  In this case, “Refugee Asylum” is identified as a significant variable, while 
the intercept, “Trade (% GDP)”, and “Religious Diversity” fail the test for a 0.05 level of 
significance. 
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Figure 6: Hypothesis Test for Covariate Significance 
Model Building Strategies 
The Purposeful Selection of Covariates method is the model building strategy 
employed throughout this study.  The strategy entails a seven step, iterative process that 
individually analyzes each of the independent variables, fits and analyzes a preliminary 
effects model, assesses covariate interaction, and assesses the fit and adequacy of the 
main effects model (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  The methodology guiding 
the purposeful selection of covariates is provided in Table 11. 
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Table 11: Purposeful selection of Covariates Methodology 
 
The first step entails fitting separate univariate logistic regression models for each 
variable.  The significance of each variable is assessed based on the standard Chi-square 
test.  Candidate variables for the initial multivariate model are screened and selected 
based on p-values less or equal to 0.25.  This relaxed selection criteria allows for the 
inclusion of possibly significant variables that may not have been included in the model 
otherwise (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
Step 1 Univariate assessment of all candidate variables
Candidate variables for the first multivariable model 
are selected based on the univariate test p-value.  
Include if p < 0.25
Step 2
Fit a multivariable model containing all 
covariates identified in step 1
Assess the importance of each covariate using the its 
p-value analyzed at traditional levels.  Eliminate all 
vaiariables (one at time), that do not significantly 
contribute to the model.
Step 3 Assessment of initial covariate estimates
Compare the values of the estimated coefficients in 
the reduced model, built during step 2, to the original 
model identified in step 1.  Identify any variable 
whose Δβ ≥ 20%, as this indicated one or more 
excluded variables are important in providing 
adjustment to effect of the variable in question, and 
should be added back into the model.
Step 4
Add each variable not selected in step 1 to 
model obtained at the conclusion of step 3.
Variables are added one at a time, checking for 
variable significance using the p-value.
The final model produced in step 4 is referred to as 
the preliminary main effects model.
Step 5 Construct the Main Effects Model.
For each continuous variable, check the assumption 
of logit linearity as a function of the covariate.
Step 6
Check for covariate interaction within the Main 
Effects Model. 
Create a list of possible pairs of variables that have a 
realistic possibility of interacting.  This can include the 
various levels of categorical variables.  Interaction 
terms are added and tested one at a time for 
significance in univariable model.  Significant 
interaction terms are added to the Main Effects 
Model.
Step 7 Assess model Adequacy and Fit.
Assess model adequacy using the Hosmer-Lemsow 
Goodness of Fit test, analysis of classification tables, 
and the receiver operating charactersitic curve.
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The second and third steps involve the fitting of the initial multivariate model 
containing all the variables identified in the first step, assessing model and covariate 
significance, followed by a systematic removal, one variable at a time, and analysis of 
variables based upon the studies desired significance level (𝑝 = 0.05, was the standard 
significance level employed throughout this study).  As part of the systematic analysis of 
variables in the second and third steps, a comparison of the coefficient values of the 
variables remaining in the model, prior to and following the removal of a variable, was 
conducted.  If the change in coefficient value (∆𝛽𝑖) for any variable was greater than 
±20%, it indicated the possible importance of the removed variable within the model; the 
variable is subsequently added back into the model on the next iteration. 
During the fourth step, variables initially excluded from consideration, are 
systematically added back into the model and tested for significance creating the 
preliminary effects model in the fourth step.  In the fifth step, each covariate within the 
preliminary effects model is checked for logit linearity.  If a covariate is found to behave 
in a nonlinear fashion, appropriate transformations are applied and tested.  During the 
sixth step, covariate is tested for significance within the final model.  Interaction between 
two variables implies that the effect of each variable is not constant over the levels of the 
other variable (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  Ultimately, the final decision 
to include interaction terms in the main effects model must be based on statistical 
significance of the interaction term, and practical considerations such as whether the 
interaction term improves the model and whether  it operationally relevant.  Following 
the addition of significant interaction terms to the preliminary effects model, the 
systematic model reduction of variables described in the second step is repeated with the 
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coefficients of the main effects locked.  The model constructed at the end of the sixth step 
is known as the main effects model (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
Assessing Model Fit and Adequacy 
Assessing the fit and adequacy of model fit is the seventh and final step of the 
purposeful selection of covariates method.  However, further discussion of the various 
methods employed in this steps warrant a separate section within this chapter.  Three 
methods are employed in concert to provide a holistic assessment of the fit and adequacy 
of the conditional logistic regression models in this study, those methods were: The 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test, classification tables, and the area under the 
curve for model-specific receiver operating characteristic curves. 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness of fit assesses the overall fit of probability 
𝜋(𝑥𝑖) based population sub-groups, through the use of the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic ?̂?.  
Two grouping strategies are generally employed; the first is based on the percentiles of 
the estimated probabilities, and the second is based on the actual fixed values of the same 
probabilities (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  In general the population is 
broken into 10 sub-groups (g), but more or fewer can be used depending on the data set.  
The squared differences between the expected and observed observations, for both 
success “1” and failure “0” responses for each sub-group are calculated added.  The 
summation of the sub-group specific statistics is known as the Hosmer-Lemeshow 
goodness of fit statistic (?̂?) and is presented in its entirety in Equation 14 (Hosmer, 
Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  
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Equation 14: Hosmer-Lemeshow Test Statistic 
Where: 
1
1
0
   = Number of sub-groups
 = Number of "1" or success observations within the kth sub-group
 = Number of "1" or expected successes within the kth sub-group
 = Number of "0" or failure observat
k
k
k
g
o
e
o
0
ions within the kth sub-group
 = Number of "0" or expected failures within the kth sub-group
 = The average estimated probability in the kth sub-group
k
k
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Like other logistic regression test statistics, ?̂? follows a Chi-square distribution 
with given significance level (𝛼) and 𝑔 − 2 degrees of freedom, where 𝑔 is the number of 
sub groups employed with within the goodness of fit test.  Model fit is also assessed 
through a standard hypothesis test where the null hypothesis (H0), there is evidence of 
model fit, is tested against the alternate hypothesis (H1), there is little evidence of model 
fit.  The ?̂? statistic is compared against the Chi-Square test statistic χ2(1-α, g-2), for a given 
confidence level and one degree of freedom (the difference in the number of variables 
between the two models).  In this test the null hypothesis is accepted if 𝜒(1−𝛼,   𝑔−2)
2 > ?̂?.  
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An example of such the Hosmer-Lemeshow hypothesis test for 𝛼 = 0.05 is shown in 
Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7: Hosmer-Lemeshow Hypothesis Test 
Classifications tables, or confusion matrices, gauge the adequacy of logistic 
regression models through the depiction of the total number of true-positive, false-
positive, true-negative, and false-negative responses as they relate to the total population.  
True-positive and true-negative are referenced as model sensitivity and model specificity 
respectively.  These tables are the result of cross-classifying the dichotomous response 
variable, with the value of the outcome variable 𝜋(𝑥𝑖) (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & 
Sturdivant, 2013).  The cross classification is dependent on a probability cut-point which 
assigns values that fall below the cut-point to the “0” or failure response, and values 
greater that the cut-point to the “1” or success response; in general the cut-point is 
initially set at 0.5.  An example of a standard classification table is presented in Table 12. 
Ho: Model appears fit data
Ha: There is little evidence of model fit
Decision Rule: Reject if T.S. > C
C = 0.236
T.S. = 3.841
P{T.S. > C} 0.627
Fail to Reject: Model Apears to fit the data 
well.
Test Result
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Table 12: Classification Table 
 
  As can be observed in Table 12, the model sensitivity or true-positive (yi = 1|Yi 
=1) rate is given by the five correctly predicted “1” responses out of a total of nine 
occurrences.  Additionally, the model specificity or true-negative (yi = 0|Yi =0) is given 
by the 116 correctly classified “0” responses out of a total of 117 occurrences, given a 
cut-point equal to 0.50.  The overall model accuracy is gauged by the overall proportion 
of “true” responses to the total number of observations, and is provided in Equation 15. 
𝑀𝑜𝑑𝑒𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
∑𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑏𝑠 + ∑𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑒 𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑂𝑏𝑠
∑𝑂𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
 
Equation 15: Logistic Regression Model Accuracy  
The final method used to gauge the overall adequacy of the logistic regression 
model is the total area under the curve (AUC) for receiver operating characteristic (ROC) 
curves.  Unlike classification tables which depend on a single cut-point, ROC curves 
provide a better and more comprehensive description of model adequacy over the entire 
range of model responses (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  The ROC curve, 
whose use originates from signal theory, provides a means to measure the model’s 
Classified
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0 Total
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
5 1 6
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0
4 116 120
Total 9 117 126
Med Cut Point: 0.50
Model Acuracy: 0.960
Standard Classification Table
Observed
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(receiver) ability to detect true responses (signal) in the presence of noise.  The graph of 
the ROC curve plots the model’s probability of detecting a true signal (sensitivity) as a 
function of the probability of detecting a false signal (1 – specificity) over the entire 
range of cut-point values as shown in Figure 8 (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013). 
 
Figure 8: Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve 
The ROC area under the curve ranges from 0.5 to 1.0 and provides a measure of 
the model’s ability to effectively discriminate between observations experiencing the 
outcome of interest versus those who do not (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013).  
Model’s with low AUC values nearing 0.50, are said to have little to no discrimination 
capacity, or that the model provides little predictive benefit over that of a coin toss.  
While there is not set standard for gauging the adequacy of model discrimination, the 
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criteria provided in Table 13 set the guidelines for logistic regression model analysis 
employed in this study. 
Table 13: Discrimination Measures  
(Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 2013) 
 
Interpretation of the Logistic Regression Model 
The odds ratio can be used to approximate another measure known as the relative 
risk, which is the ratio of outcome probabilities (Hosmer, Lemeshow, & Sturdivant, 
2013).  The concept of relative risk can be related to the classification table, and model 
sensitivity/specificity as shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9: Relative Risk Relation to Classification Table 
Classified
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0
Total 1 1
Standard Classification Table
Observed
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Interpretation of the effects of significant covariates, as they relate to conflict 
transition is central to the research questions and operational relevancy of this study.  For 
this purpose, logistic regression analysis employs the concept of the odds ratio (OR), 
which is a measure of association that approximates the likelihood for the dichotomous 
response given a certain covariate remains in the model.  Equation 16 provides the 
derivation of the univariate odds ratio. 
𝑂𝑅 = [
 
 
 
 
 (𝑒
𝛽0+𝛽1
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1
⁄ )
(1
1 + 𝑒𝛽0+𝛽1⁄
)
]
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 (𝑒
𝛽0
1 + 𝑒𝛽0
⁄ )
(1
1 + 𝑒𝛽0⁄
)
]
 
 
 
 
 
= 𝑒𝛽1 
Equation 16: Univariate Odds Ratio 
The basic interpretation of the odds ratio is illustrated in the following example.  
If a certain model has an odds ratio of 2, it can be said that the odds of experiencing the 
outcome of interest, given the certain covariate effect is present, is 2 to 1.  Conversely if 
the odds ratio is 0.5, it can be said that odds of experiencing the outcome of interest is 
half of that when a certain covariate effect is present.  The mechanics and interpretation 
of multivariate model odds ratios is very similar to that of the univariate method, which is 
presented to demonstrate the basic premises of the concept. 
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Overview of JMP Software and Output 
JMP is a statistical software package developed by the SAS Corporation that is 
employed to construct and analyze the logistic regression models for this study.  For this 
reason, a brief discussion of the JMP model output is warranted.  Figure 10 displays the 
JMP whole model test for significance.  The JMP output displays the log-likelihood 
values for both the Full and Reduced models, as well as the Chi-Square distributed G 
statistic.  This interface enables the analyst to quickly ascertain the significance of the 
overall model.  This is done through visual inspection of the p-value given as 
“Prob>ChiSq” in the JMP interface.  For the purposes of this study the threshold for 
model significance was set at for p-values < 0.05; the JMP default threshold of 
significance indicated by “*” (Hinrichs & Boiler, 2010). 
 
Figure 10: JMP Whole Model Test 
The JMP environment also provides estimates of coefficients combined with the 
overall significance of the variables included in the model.  As with the whole model test, 
the threshold for covariate significance was set at p-values < 0.05.  The JMP estimates of 
Full Model: With Additional Variables
Reduced Model: Without Additional Variable
G = Likelihood Ratio
64 
the covariate coefficients (𝛽𝑖) are provided in the first column of Figure 11.  It should be 
observed that these estimates have the opposite sign when included in the final model.  
For example, the logit transformation for the Figure 11 estimates is given as: 𝑔(𝑥) =
25.247 − 2.12 × 10−5𝑥1 − 0.087𝑥2 − 21.558𝑥3. 
 
Figure 11: JMP Parameter Estimates 
Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique 
The nature of predicting conflict transitions, which are decidedly rare events, 
results in significantly unbalanced conditional conflict data sets; a data set is said to be 
unbalanced if the classification categories are not approximately equally represented 
(Chawla et al., 2002).  Due to the method of maximum likelihood, which is employed to 
estimate the covariate coefficients, the imbalance of the data set will favor the 
observation response, success or failure that forms the majority of the population 
responses.  This results in the tendency to misclassify the observations of interests, i.e., 
conflict transitions, in favor of the majority response, no transition from current status.  
To compensate for this phenomenon, the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique 
(SMOTE) was utilized to enable development of the conditional logistic regression 
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model for a single specific region, which experienced significant issues with 
misclassification. 
The SMOTE methodology conducts an over-sampling of the minority class 
through the creation of “synthetic” observations (Chawla et al., 2002).  The generation of 
synthetic observations is conducted in the feature space of the observations, through the 
creation of segments joining the k (in this study k = 5), nearest neighbors.  The synthetic 
examples added to the original data set result in the creation of larger and less specific 
data regions, which allows better training of the minority dataset (Chawla et al., 2002).  
Synthetic data points utilized in this study were generated using a MATLAB sub-routine 
based on the pseudo-code provided in Figure 12. 
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Figure 12: SMOTE Pseudo-code 
(Chawla et al., 2002) 
Construction of Regional Logistic Regression Models 
Model Dataset Overview 
Six regional logistic regression models, consisting of two sub-models, 
conditioned on a nation’s conflict status prior of the year of transition were developed for 
this study.  The use of “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” conditional models is a 
requirement for the subsequent development of the nation specific Markov conflict 
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transition models.  The “In Conflict” models include all instances of nations in conflict 
for year 𝑖 − 1, that either remain in conflict or transition out of conflict in year 𝑖.  
Similarly, the “Not in Conflict” models include all instances of nations not in conflict for 
year 𝑖 − 1, that remain out of conflict or transition into conflict in year 𝑖.  The data set 
utilized for the training and validation models covered the years 2004 to 2013; data for 
year 2014 was reserved for Markov model development due to the lack of HIIK conflict 
data for year 2015.  The summary statistics for the regional model data is provided in 
Table 14. 
Table 14: Summary Statistics of Regional Model Data 
 
On average, the “In Conflict” models experience transitions of interest (i.e. 
transitions out of conflict) in 15.1% of all cases, while the “Not in Conflict” models 
experience transitions into conflict in 12.6% of all cases.  These average transition rates 
were instrumental in the identification of the training and validation data sets, which 
sought to maintain these rates for model development. 
Design of Training and Validation Data Sets 
The overarching concept guiding the selection of the training and validation data 
sets was to identify the data subsets, for each conditional model, that provided transition 
Regional Models
Statisitcs In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict
Number of Cases 228 262 123 157 117 166 95 75
Number of Transitions 37 42 19 19 19 23 6 14
Transition rate (%) 16.2% 16.0% 15.4% 12.1% 16.2% 13.9% 6.3% 18.7%
Regional Models
Statisitcs In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict
Number of Cases 95 174 75 255 733 1089
Number of Transitions 19 26 11 13 111 137
Transition rate (%) 20.0% 14.9% 14.7% 5.1% 15.1% 12.6%
World View (Totals of 
Regions)
Sub-Saharan Africa South and East Asia
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
Arab & North African 
States
Latin America OECD
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rates comparable to the “World View” averages shown in Table 14.  In general, this 
principal was adhered to for every model except the Arab and North African “In 
Conflict” model and the OECD “Not in Conflict” model which experienced below 
average out-of-state transition rates of 6.3% and 5.1% respectively. Training and 
validation data sets were initially standardized across all models with year sets 2004 to 
2010 specified for the training models, and year sets 2011 to 2013 specified for model 
validation.  However, during the construction of the twelve conditional models, it became 
clear that a standardized year set across regions resulted in the development of sub-
optimal conditional models.  Continuous analysis and model refinement the construction 
of the conditional models resulted in the selection of the model specific data year sets 
provided in Table 15.  The final selection of data year-sets is predicated on balancing the 
competing requirements of maintaining individual model transition rates on par with 
world averages and constructing models that adequately predict the rare events of 
interest.   
Table 15: Nodal Model Training and Validation Year Sets 
 
 
Regional Models
Year Sets In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict
Training Year Set 2004-2010 2004-2010 2004-2010 2008-2011 2006-2011 2004-2010
Validation Year Set 2011-2013 2011-2013 2011-2013 2012-2013 2012-2013 2011-2013
Markov Year Set 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014
Regional Models
Year Sets In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict In Conflict Not In Conflict
Training Year Set 2004-2010 2004-2009 2008-2011 2004-2010 2004-2010 2005-2009
Validation Year Set 2011-2013 2010-2013 2012-2013 2011-2013 2011-2013 2010-2013
Markov Year Set 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014 2014
Sub-Saharan Africa South and East Asia
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia
Arab & North African 
States
Latin America OECD
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Issues Encountered with Rare Event Prediction 
As stated previously, the method of maximum likelihood estimation tends to favor 
the majority of occurrences in unbalanced data sets, resulting in the misclassification of 
rare events.  All twelve nodal models experienced minor-to-moderate detrimental impacts 
to model prediction accuracy as a result of this phenomenon.  The careful selection of 
training and validation year-sets enabled the mitigation of misclassification issues in 11 
of the 12 nodal models.  However, all initial Eastern Europe & Central Asia “Not in 
Conflict” models failed to properly classify a single conflict transition in any of the 
validation models.  To correct this deficiency, the Synthetic Minority Over-sampling 
Technique was utilized to produce 48 additional minority instances (transitions from no-
conflict into conflict) for the training model data set.  The additional data points were 
generated using a SMOTE algorithm developed for the MATLAB modeling environment 
using the 16 conflict transitions from year sets 2004 to 2010 as the primary input 
(MathWorks, 2015).  Following generation, the 48 instances were analyzed to ensure 
completeness and similarity to the original variables.  It was noted that design variables 
such as “Government Type” and “Regime Type” were approximated as continuous 
variables with values ranging from 0.20 to 0.70.  To correct this issue, values less than 
0.50 were rounded down to 0, where those greater than or equal to 0.50 were rounded up 
to 1, while ensuring only 1 level for each variable assigned to a particular instance.  Five 
separate models were developed using the SMOTE training-set, all of which predicted at 
least one of the seven observed conflict transitions from year-set 2011-2013.  Discussion 
and analysis of the final nodal models for each region is discussed in Chapter IV. 
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3.4 Markov Models 
Overview 
The use of nation-specific Markov models as a forecasting tool for conflict and 
conflict transitions is envisioned to provide operationally relevant and tractable analysis 
of future conflict trends.  This study utilizes the two-state Markov Model depicted in 
Figure 13, providing the probabilities of conflict transition for the following year, given 
the current conflict status of the nation in question.  The Markov model base year (year 0) 
is for this study is affixed at 2014, corresponding to the data provided in the most recent 
HIIK conflict barometer.  Subsequently, the transition probabilities for the Markov base 
year are calculated using the conditional logistic regression models and applied to all 182 
nations in the 2014 data set.  The use of Markov models provides insights into expected 
transition times, mean recurrence, as well as the long-run proportions that a nation will 
remain in a particular status.  Ultimately the use of Markov models provides 
operationally relevant global conflict forecasting with prediction horizons greater than 
one year. 
71 
 
Figure 13: Nation Specific Conflict Transition Markov Model 
The Markov Process 
A discrete time Markov process is a stochastic process given {𝑋𝑛, 𝑛 = 1, 2, …,} 
that takes on a finite number of possible values, which for the purposes of this study will 
include the entire set of non-negative integers.  If 𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖, the process is said to be in state 
𝑖 at time n (Ross, 2014).  Given that the current system in in state 𝑖 at time n, there exists 
a fixed probability 𝑃𝑖𝑗 that the system will transition to state 𝑗, at time 𝑛 + 1, as shown in 
Equation 17. 
𝑃{𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖, 𝑋𝑛−1 = 𝑖𝑛−1, … , 𝑋1 = 𝑖1, 𝑋0 = 𝑖0} = 𝑃{𝑋𝑛+1 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑛 = 𝑖} = 𝑃𝑖𝑗 
Equation 17: Markov Chain (Ross, 2014) 
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This equation may be interpreted as the conditional probability of any future state 𝑋𝑛+1, 
given past states and the present state 𝑋𝑛, is independent of all previous states, and is 
conditioned only on the current state (Ross, 2014).  This is known as the one-step 
transition probability, and can also be represented as: 𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 𝑃𝑖𝑗
0 = 𝑃𝑖𝑗
1 , which will provide 
a useful form of notation when dealing with n-step transition probabilities as shown in 
Equation 18.  It follows then that the sum of the probabilities of all transition options 
given a current state, is equal to 1. 
∑𝑃𝑖𝑗 = 1, ∀ 𝑖 = 0, 1, 2, …
∞
𝑗=0
 
Equation 18: Summation of Transition Probabilities for a Current State 
This feature of the Markov state probabilities is illustrated in the generic two-state 
Markov chain (P) depicted in Equation 19. 
𝑷 = ‖
𝛼 1 − 𝛼
1 − 𝛽 𝛽
‖ 
Equation 19: Generic Two-state Markov Chain 
Generic Two-state Markov Chain In this example the probability of remaining in 
state “0”, given you are currently in “0” is given by 𝑃00 = 𝛼, while the probability of 
transitioning from state “0” to state “1” is given by 𝑃01 = 1 − 𝛼.  Similarly, the 
probability of transitioning to state “0” from state “1” is 𝑃10 = 1 − 𝛽, and remaining in 
state “1” is 𝑃11 = 𝛽.  For the purposes of the study, the following state transition 
probabilities are defined. 
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00
01
10
 = Probability that nation not in conflict remains out of conflict
 = Probability that nation not in conflict transitions into of conflict
 = Probability that nation in conflict transitions out
P
P
P
11
 of conflict
 = Probability that nation in conflict remains in conflictP
 
A brief discussion of the accessibility of states within a Markov model is 
warranted before we proceed further.  State 𝑗 is said to be accessible from state 𝑖 if 
𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑛 > 0 (Ross, 2014).  Additionally, the states of the models employed in this study are 
said to communicate, since they are always accessible from each other.  This is germane 
to this study, as all included nations have the potential to transition from one state to 
another (i.e., there exist no probabilities such that 𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑛 = 0).  However, as will be 
discussed later, there are numerous states that have transition probabilities approaching 0.  
This condition results in some very interesting phenomena when analyzing the stability, 
recurrence and long-run proportions of nations and is discussed in Chapter IV. 
Chapman-Kolmogorov Equations 
The Chapman-Kolmogorov equations provide a method for computing the 
probability  that a system  currently  in  state 𝑖 will  transition  to  state 𝑗 after n additional 
transitions (Ross, 2014).  The concept of the n-step transition probability is easily 
relatable to the 1-step transition discussed previously and is shown in Equation 20. 
𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑛 = 𝑃{𝑋𝑛+𝑘 = 𝑗|𝑋𝑘 = 𝑖} 
Equation 20: Markov n-step probability 
Computation of the n-step transition probabilities occurs via sum-product of the 
transition probabilities for periods k and n, as shown in Equation 21. 
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𝑃𝑖𝑗
𝑛+𝑚 = ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑗
𝑚
∞
𝑘=0
 
Equation 21: Chapman-Kolmogorov Equation 
The multiplication of transition probabilities 𝑃𝑖𝑘
𝑛𝑃𝑘𝑗
𝑚, represent the probability that, 
starting in state 𝑖 the process will transition to state 𝑗 in 𝑛 + 𝑚 transitions, through a path 
that will move through state 𝑘 at the 𝑛𝑡ℎ transition (Ross, 2014).  This concept is 
subsequently adapted to the calculation of the n-step transition matrix probabilities 𝑷(𝑛), 
through the use of matrix multiplication as shown in Equation 22. 
𝑷(𝑛+𝑚) = 𝑷(𝑛) ∙ 𝑷(𝑚) 
Equation 22: Transition probabilities for the n-step matrix 
This extremely powerful concept of using matrix multiplication to simultaneously 
determine the transition probabilities of each state for a given time period, forms the basis 
of the conflict forecasting and analysis tool developed for this study. 
Sojourn Times and Variance 
Relevant to the forecasting of conflict transitions is the expected time to the first 
conflict transition, or simply given that a nation is currently in state 𝑖, what is the 
expected time 𝑅𝑗 until is it is in state 𝑗?  The time to first transition, from a designated 
time 0, is simply calculated by taking the inverse of the probability given the system is 
currently in state 𝑖, the system will transition into state 𝑗.  The expected time to the first 
transition and its variance are calculated using Equation 23. 
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Equation 23: Expected Time to First Transition and Variance 
Where: 
1
0
0
01
0
10
 = Time to 1st transition (non-conflict to conflcit)
 = Time to 1st transition (conflict to non-conflcit)
 = Transition probability at time zero (non-conflict to conflcit)
 = Transition proba
R
R
p
p bility at time zero (conflict to non-conflcit)
 
It should be remembered that, due to the memoryless properties of the Markov 
model, time 0 is relative and can be designated at any point in time. 
Recurrence and Long-Run Proportions 
As stated previously, the Markov models employed in this study have states that 
are accessible from every other state; creating a condition known as positive recurrence.  
A state 𝑗 is said to be positive recurrent if the number of expected transitions it takes to 
start and then return to state 𝑗 is less than infinity (i.e., 𝑚𝑗 < ∞) (Ross, 2014).  The mean 
recurrence for any state is given by Equation 24. 
𝑚𝑗 =
1
𝜋𝑗
 
Equation 24: Mean recurrence time for state 𝒋 
Where: 
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 Long run proportion of time spent in state j j   
The concept of recurrence leads directly to the idea of Markov model long run 
proportions 𝜋𝑗, the expected percentage of time a system will be in state j.  The long run 
proportions of a Markov chain are closely associated with the eigenvalues of the 
transition matrix P (Ross, 2014).  Additionally, like the state specific transition 
probabilities pij, the long run proportions must also sum to 1.  The derivation of the two-
state long run proportions is provided in Equation 25. 
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Equation 25: Two-State Long Run Proportions 
Where: 
0
1
 Long run proportion of time spent not in conflict
 Long run proportion of time spent in conflict




 
 It should be noted, that the long run proportions 𝜋𝑗 can be approximated by 
raising the transition probability matrix P, to a significantly high power, as demonstrated 
in the Equation 26. 
0 1
0 1
50
 = number of periods into the future
nP P
where
n
n
 
 
  

 
Equation 26: Long Run Proportion Approximation 
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Development of the Nation Specific Markov Models 
The construction of the two-state transition probability matrix required that the 
region-specific conditional models calculate the transition probabilities for the year 2014 
data set.  The process involved applying both conditional models, for a specific region, to 
the same data set, resulting in four distinct transition probabilities for each of the 182 
nations considered.  Specifically, the transition probabilities 𝑝00 and  𝑝01 were calculated 
from the “Not in Conflict” models, while  𝑝10 and  𝑝11 were calculated from the “In 
Conflict” models.  These probabilities are subsequently compiled into a VBA enabled, 
Microsoft Excel workbook known as the “Conflict Transition Probability Markov Chain 
Tool.”  The tool enables the automated calculation of the n-step transition probabilities 
for a specified time-period, first and second sojourn times and variances, the mean 
recurrence times, as well as the long-run proportions for each state.  An example of the 
tool is shown in Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14: Conflict Transition Probability Markov Tool 
Number of Years into Future = 5
1 Country Year 2014 Year 2018 Year 2019
Afghanistan
No Conflict Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict Conflict
Status: Conflict No Conflict 0.96043009 0.0395699 No Conflict 0.85087309 0.149127 No Conflict 0.817206405 0.182794
Conflict 1.5314E-05 0.9999847 Conflict 5.7715E-05 0.999942 Conflict 7.07442E-05 0.999929
2 Country Year 2014 Year 2018 Year 2019
Albania
No Conflict Conflict No Conflict Conflict No Conflict Conflict
Status: No Conflict No Conflict 0.92440784 0.0755922 No Conflict 0.73104279 0.268957 No Conflict 0.676322497 0.323678
Conflict 0.00201078 0.9979892 Conflict 0.00715438 0.992846 Conflict 0.008609958 0.99139
Conflict Tranistion Probability Markov Chain Tool
Initialize Markov 
Chains
Run Markov 
Models
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3.5 Summary 
This chapter described the methodology employed to construct the conditional 
conflict database, as well as the theory and methodology guiding the development of the 
logistic regression models that are used to calculate the transition probabilities required 
for the Markov Models.  The creation methodology enables repeatability of this study’s 
results as well a means to evaluate additional alternatives associated with variable 
selection and model development. 
This methodology examined 30 statistical variables acquired from several open 
sources for the development of both the dependent variable and the conditional logistic 
regression models.  The data resources employed in this methodology are similar to, or 
updates of, the previous analytical efforts discussed in Chapter II.  The data sets utilized 
in this study are professionally created and maintained by reputable organizations, that 
strive to maintain the most current and accurate data.  However, the nature of data 
collection in less than fully permissive environments results in incomplete and often time 
lagged data sets that form the basis of this study.  Despite less than timely and perfect in 
data, there exist methods and techniques that enable the construction and relevant 
analysis of robust conflict prediction models. 
The strengths of the models developed for this study lie in their ability to 
“operationalize” complex regional conflict environments to key underlying factors that 
influence conflict transitions.  Additionally, the combination of logistic-regression and 
Markov models enables long range forecasting of world-wide conflict trends that is not 
possible with logistic-regression models alone.  Moreover, the models developed for this 
study are surprisingly not limited in their predictive power by the quantity, quality, and in 
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some instances the timeframe of the information currently available.  As will be 
discussed in later on in this work, seminal events such as the Arab Spring or the rise of 
the Islamic State signal a possible paradigm shift of relevant predictors of violent 
conflict, a shift that may take several years of data collection to fully realize the 
precursors and impacts of these events.  The implementation of the methodologies 
previously described, and the relevant analysis is presented in Chapter IV. 
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IV.  Analysis and Results 
“However, the pulse of the God of War is hard to take. If you want to discuss war, 
particularly the war that will break out tomorrow evening or the morning of the day after 
tomorrow, there is only one way, and that is to determine its nature with bated breath, 
carefully feeling the pulse of the God of War today.” 
 Qiao Liang, Unrestricted Warfare 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe and analyze the results of the 
methodology discussed in Chapter III.  First, in Section 4.2, we discuss the construction 
and validation of the six regional conditional logistic regression models.  Next, Section 
4.3 provides an in depth analysis of the significant variables by region and conditional 
model.  Subsequently, Section 4.4 examines the construction, validation, and results for 
the nation specific Markov models.  Finally, in Section 4.5 we provide an analysis of 
future global conflict trends developed from the Markov models. 
4.2 Analysis of Region Specific Conditional Logistic Regression Models 
Development of the Regional Conditional Logistic Regression Models 
The Purposeful Selection of Covariates method was employed in the construction 
of all twelve conditional logistic regression models (two per region) used in this study.  
The method provides a systematic means to efficiently construct meaningful and 
operationally relevant models that achieve suitable classification accuracies in both the 
training and validation data sets.  Initial analysis of the logistic regression models focused 
on maximizing the area under the curve (AUC) for the specific ROC curves while 
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simultaneously ensuring appropriate model and variable significance.  It is the goal of 
this study to ensure an AUC greater than 0.80 for models with p-values less than or equal 
to 0.05.  As seen in Table 16, the conditional model developed for Sub-Saharan African 
States classified as not in conflict the previous year, is significant with p-value of 0.00001 
with a complimentary AUC of 0.874, indicating the model is both highly significant and 
an excellent discriminator.  Additionally all seven variables have p-values considerably 
less than 0.05, indicating high levels of significance, and further reinforcing the overall 
suitability of this model for conflict transition prediction.  
Table 16: Sub-Saharan, Given Non-Conflict Logistic Regression Model 
 
Given the multitude of potential variable combinations (equivalent to 30!) for 
each model, there exist multiple potential significant conditional models for each region.  
Consequently, multiple distinct models were developed, analyzed and compared to 
identify the optimal conditional models for each region.  If the initial analysis indicated 
the models experienced satisfactory significance and discrimination, an in-depth analysis 
Variable Coefficient G p
Arable Land 7.801 13.640 0.000
Birth Rate -0.474 8.740 0.003
Infant Mortality rate 0.053 8.240 0.004
Youth Bulge 0.346 6.470 0.011
Refugee (Asylum) 5.91E-06 5.890 0.015
Trade (% GDP) -0.052 7.830 0.005
Freedom Score -5.637 12.760 0.000
Log-Likelihood = 43.446
G = 40.754
P = 0.00001
AUC = 0.874
Sub- Saharan Africa (Given Non-Conflict) Model
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of overall model performance was conducted; an example of such a comparison is 
presented in Table 17. 
Table 17: Sub-Saharan Africa “Not in Conflict” Conditional Model Comparison 
 
In the example illustrated in Table 17, two distinct conditional models were 
developed for Sub-Saharan African states classified as not in conflict.  In this example, 
Model 1 is the same model shown in Table 16, while Model 2 has replaced the variables 
“Birth Rate” and “Youth Bulge” with “Population Growth” and “Caloric Intake” 
respectively.  Initial analysis indicates satisfactory significance for both models and their 
Variable Coefficient G p Variable Coefficient G p
Arable Land 7.801 13.640 0.000 Arable Land 6.574 11.300 0.001
Birth Rate -0.474 8.740 0.003 Population Growth -1.991 11.820 0.001
Infant Mortality rate 0.053 8.240 0.004 Infant Mortality rate 0.028 3.690 0.055
Youth Bulge 0.346 6.470 0.011 Caloric Intake 1.70E-03 6.170 0.013
Refugee (Asylum) 5.91E-06 5.890 0.015 Refugee (Asylum) 0.000 5.690 0.017
Trade (% GDP) -0.052 7.830 0.005 Trade (% GDP) -0.052 8.890 0.003
Freedom Score -5.637 12.760 0.000 Freedom Score -6.575 14.590 0.000
Log-Likelihood = 43.446 Log-Likelihood = 41.656
G = 40.754 G = 44.334
P = 0.000 P = 0.000
AUC = 0.874 AUC = 0.873
Classified
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0
Total Classified
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0
Total
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
6 4 10
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
5 1 6
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0
24 155 179
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0
25 158 183
Total 30 159 189 Total 30 159 189
Med Cut Point: 0.50 Med Cut Point: 0.50
Model Acuracy: 0.852 Model Acuracy: 0.862
Classified
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0 Total Classified
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0 Total
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
2 0 2
Transition to 
Conflict = 1
0 0 0
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0
10 61 71
Remain/Transition 
out of Conflict = 0
12 61 73
Total 12 61 73 Total 12 61 73
Med Cut Point: 0.50 Med Cut Point: 0.50
Model Acuracy: 0.863 Model Acuracy: 0.836
Sub- Saharan Africa (Given Non-Conflict) Model 2Sub- Saharan Africa (Given Non-Conflict) Model 1
Validation Data Se Model Validation Data Se Model
Training Data Set Model Training Data Set Model
Sub-Saharan Africa (Right Node): 2004-2010
Observed
Sub-Saharan Africa (Right Node): 2011-2013
Observed
Sub-Saharan Africa (Right Node): 2004-2010
Observed
Sub-Saharan Africa (Right Node): 2011-2013
Observed
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respective variables and equivalent discriminatory powers as indicated by their AUC 
values.  Model performance was then compared using the Training and Validation 
datasets as described previously, with a classification cut-point fixed at 0.50 for all 
comparisons.  The analysis focused on four criteria in descending order: (1) Overall 
Predictive Accuracy of the model on the validation data set, (2) Overall Predictive 
Accuracy of the model on the training data set, (3) Overall ability to properly classify 
rare-events (transitions from current state) in both data sets, and (4) Minimum number of 
“False Negatives” in the validation data set, shown in the bottom left-hand quadrant of 
the classification table. 
In this example, a rare-event is considered a “Transition to Conflict” which occurs 
in 42 of the 262 total instances across both data sets.  Analysis of the results shows that 
Model 1 outperforms Model 2 in three of the four criteria: higher validation model 
predictive accuracy (0.863), classification of rare events (8 of 42 transitions), and 10 total 
false negatives as opposed to 12 in Model 2.  Despite having a slightly lower training 
data set accuracy (0.852), attributed to classifying 155 of the 159 true-negative instances, 
using our criteria, Model 1 is considered to be the superior of the two prospective “non-
conflict” conditional models for the Sub-Saharan Africa region.  Similar analyses were 
conducted on the conditional models for all regions, ultimately identifying the 12 
conditional models used in this study. 
The objective of this model building strategy was the construction of 
parsimonious conditional logistic regression models that achieve prediction accuracies in 
excess of 80% for both the training and validation data sets.  A summary of the final 
conditional models for each region is provided in Appendix B. 
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Model Validation and Analysis 
Three methods were employed in the validation and analysis of the 12 conditional 
logistic regression models: (1) Receiver Operating Characteristic area under the curve 
values, (2) Classification Accuracy, and (3) Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Tests.  
These analyses assess the suitability of the conditional logistic regression models in terms 
of overall discriminative power, model accuracy (with an emphasis on rare-events), and 
the model’s approximation of the data. 
Receiver Operating Characteristic Area Under the Curve Analysis 
As stated earlier, the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve graphically 
depicts a models ability to detect a signal in the presence of noise across the entire range 
of possible cut-points.  ROC Curves are developed for both the training and validation 
data sets as means to assess the overall model performance.  An example of a typical set 
of training and validation ROC curves for a conditional model is provided in Figure 15. 
 
Figure 15: Graph of Training and Validation ROC Curves. 
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Visual inspection of the two ROC curves shows that the model in this example 
provides better discrimination than would be obtained by simple binary guess (e.g. a fair 
coin toss) represented by the AUC = 0.50 diagonal line that bisects the graph.  It is also 
readily apparent that the discriminative power of the training model exceeds that of the 
validation model, a logical result, which is a product of our model building strategy.  To 
understand the model’s performance more precisely, we employ AUC analysis using the 
criteria described in Chapter III.  Table 18 summarizes the AUC values for both the 
training and validation data sets for all conditional models across the six geographic 
regions and as a combined world model.  
Table 18: AUC Values by Region and Model 
 
The assessed performances of all the models using the training data set ranges 
from excellent discrimination (0.80 ≤ 𝐴𝑈𝐶 < 0.90) to superior discrimination (𝐴𝑈𝐶 ≥
0.90); with 8 of the 12 models assessed as superior discriminators on the training data 
AUC Assessment AUC Assessment
In Conflict 0.962 Superior 0.500
No Model 
Discrimination
Not in Conflict 0.930 Superior 0.520 Poor
In Conflict 0.972 Superior 0.659 Poor
Not in Conflict 0.946 Superior 0.651 Poor
In Conflict 0.878 Excellent 0.750 Acceptable
Not in Conflict 0.952 Superior 0.776 Acceptable
In Conflict 0.914 Superior 0.561 Poor
Not in Conflict 0.974 Superior 0.735 Acceptable
In Conflict 0.938 Superior 0.689 Poor
Not in Conflict 0.932 Superior 0.696 Poor
In Conflict 0.889 Excellent 0.704 Acceptable
Not in Conflict 0.874 Excellent 0.796 Acceptable
In Conflict 0.887 Excellent 0.655 Poor
Not in Conflict 0.922 Superior 0.743 Acceptable
South & East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Combined World 
Model
Receiver Operating Characterist AUC Scores by Region
Arab & North 
African States
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin America
OECD
Region Model
Training Data Set Validation Data Set
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set.  However, there is a noticeable degradation in model performance on the validation 
data sets, with performance assessments generally ranging from poor discrimination 
(0.50 ≤ 𝐴𝑈𝐶 < 0.70) to acceptable discrimination (0.70 ≤ 𝐴𝑈𝐶 < 0.80).  Of interest is 
the significant decline in model performance for the Arab and North African conditional 
models, each of which experiences performances losses in excess of 40% from the 
training to the validation data sets.  Initially, it was theorized that the relative rarity of 
conflict transitions was the root cause of the degradation in performance.  However, 
analysis of validation sets for other region models shows that this theory is not highly 
correlated with validation model performance.  Another possible explanation in the 
degradation of the validation model performance may be linked to the “Arab Spring”.  
The Arab Spring and its resulting conflicts have continued to engulf Southwest Asia and 
North Africa since the Tunisian revolution.  This date is significant to the Arab & North 
African models, due to resulting conflicts in otherwise stable regimes that occur only in 
the validation data sets. 
Another interesting occurrence that is observed in the AUC scores is the general 
trend for “Not in Conflict” models to experience better performance at both regional and 
combined world levels than their “In Conflict” counterparts.  This trend is observed in 
both the training and validation data sets, and it occurs in 19 of the 24 instances presented 
in Table 18.  A possible explanation of this phenomenon may be related to the inability to 
accurately collect data from nations experiencing conflict.  The results suggest the data 
associated with nations that transition or remain out of conflict provides improved 
predictive performance over nations that tend to be in conflict. 
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Analysis of Model Validity Based on Classification Accuracy 
Analysis of classification tables provides a second method used to assess logistic 
regression model validity and suitability.  Classification table analysis, as it pertains to 
this study, focuses on three areas: (1) Overall model accuracy, (2) Percentage of rare-
events properly classified, and (3) Model false negative rate.  Initial analyses fixed the 
classification table cut point at 0.50, thereby classifying all instances with 𝜋𝑖 < 0.50 as 
transitioning/remaining out of conflict, and all instances with 𝜋𝑖 ≥ 0.50 as 
transition/remaining in conflict.  As stated previously, the objective of our model building 
strategy is to construct models that achieve classification accuracies in excess of 80% for 
both the training and validation data sets.  A summary of the overall model strategies 
using the fixed cut-point of 0.50 is presented in Table 19 which details the accuracies and 
total instances per data set for each model. 
Table 19: Overall Classification Accuracies Given Fixed Cut-point of 0.50 
 
Accuracy No. Instances Accuracy No. Instances
In Conflict 0.50 94.2% 52 74.4% 43 85.3%
Not in Conflict 0.50 93.3% 60 60.0% 15 86.7%
In Conflict 0.50 92.5% 67 82.8% 29 89.6%
Not in Conflict 0.50 86.0% 171 76.7% 43 84.1%
In Conflict 0.50 81.1% 37 83.3% 30 82.1%
Not in Conflict 0.50 90.9% 132 88.1% 42 90.2%
In Conflict 0.50 88.7% 53 86.4% 22 88.0%
Not in Conflict 0.50 96.0% 126 95.0% 101 95.6%
In Conflict 0.50 87.3% 79 84.1% 44 86.2%
Not in Conflict 0.50 87.9% 66 88.0% 25 87.9%
In Conflict 0.50 86.4% 154 82.4% 74 85.1%
Not in Conflict 0.50 85.2% 189 86.3% 73 85.5%
In Conflict 0.50 88.2% 442 81.8% 242 86.0%
Not in Conflict 0.50 89.1% 744 87.0% 299 88.5%
Traning and 
Validation
Region Model Cut Point
Training Data Set Validation Data Set
Arab & North 
African States
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin America
OECD
South & East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Combined World 
Results
Model Accuracies Using 0.50 Classification Cut Point
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Model accuracies exceeded the 80% classification accuracy benchmark in all 12 
training data sets, and in 9 of the validation data sets.  Training data set accuracies 
averaged 88.2% for “In Conflict” conditional models, and 89.1% for “Not in Conflict” 
models, with 5 of the 12 training data sets yielding accuracies above 90%.  As expected, 
the models experience some degradation in their classification accuracies when applied to 
the validation data set, but they still achieve average accuracies of 81.8% and 87.0% for 
the “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” models respectively.  The overall classification 
accuracies for both the training and validation data sets exceed the 80% benchmark for all 
regions and are considered suitable for the purposes of this study.  Similar to the AUC 
analysis, the “Not in Conflict” models generally experience greater predictive accuracies 
than the “In Conflict” counterparts, with the phenomenon observed in 19 of the 24 
instances provided in Table 19.  The exception to this trend seems to occur more 
frequently in the Arab & North African, and the Eastern Europe & Central Asian models 
than in the rest of the regions. 
These results compare favorably with historical studies which have struggled to 
achieve prediction accuracies greater than 80%.  Studies such as the CAA-led Forecast 
and Analysis of Complex Threats (Reed, 2013) or the Political Instability Task Force’s 
global forecasting model (Goldstone, et al., 2005) only achieve accuracies greater than 
80% on limited and very specific data sets.  On the other hand, the Boekestein model 
achieved accuracies approaching 80% without implementing special conditions to enable 
prediction accuracy; these model accuracies were subsequently compared to those 
developed by this study (Boekestein, 2015).   To enable a one-to-one model comparison 
by region, we have developed weighted regional accuracies for both the training and 
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validation data sets; Table 20 provides a comparison of this study’s results with the recent 
Boekestein study.  As can be seen, both models perform very well at the regional level, 
with all training data sets yielding accuracies in excess of 80%.  Both models perform 
similarly at the regional level, however the conditional logistic regression / Markov chain 
(C-LR/MC) model developed for this study achieves higher overall prediction accuracies 
at the combined world level.  Comparison of the respective model performance on the 
validation data sets reveals that the C-LR/MC model realizes a significant improvement 
in prediction accuracy over the Boekestein model. The C-LR/MC model attains higher 
prediction accuracies for each of the six regions for the validation data set, and a 84.67% 
weighted prediction accuracy at the combined world level.  
Table 20: Comparison of Model Accuracies with the Boekestein Model 
 
Boekestein 
Model
Conditional LR/MC 
Weighted Accuracies
Boekestein 
Model
Conditional LR/MC 
Weighted Accuracies
Arab & North 
African States
84.31% 93.72% 70.59% 70.68%
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
77.38% 87.83% 75.00% 79.16%
Latin America 90.12% 88.75% 77.78% 86.10%
OECD 95.96% 93.84% 92.42% 93.46%
South & East Asia 90.48% 87.57% 76.79% 85.51%
Sub-Saharan Africa 82.31% 85.74% 74.49% 84.34%
Combined World 
Results
86.63% 88.76% 78.30% 84.67%
Training Data Set Accuracies Validation Data Set Accuracies
Region
Comparison of Boekestien Model Accuracies with Conditional Logistic Regression/Markov 
Chain Weighted Accracies by Region
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Three of the validation data sets, both Arab & North African conditional models, 
and the Eastern Europe & Central Asia “Not in Conflict” model, fail to achieve 
accuracies greater than 80%.  The classification tables for these three validation data sets 
are shown in Table 21. 
Table 21: Validation Data Set Accuracies below Accuracy Benchmark of 80% 
 
  The effects of the Arab Spring on model accuracy become apparent in the Arab 
and North African models, specifically in the “In Conflict” model which misclassifies 11 
of the 43 instances.  The model, developed using data that completely pre-dates the Arab 
Spring, achieves an accuracy of 74.4% and classifies nearly a quarter (10) of the total 
instances as transitioning out of conflict, when in reality only one such transition occurs 
during the 2011 to 2013 time period (i.e., Oman in 2011 – 2012).  The Arab & North 
African “Not in Conflict” model experienced even greater misclassification rates (40% of 
all instances misclassified), resulting in an overall classification accuracy of 60% for the 
validation model.  However, three misclassified transitions: Libya (2010 – 2011), Syria 
Classified
Transition/Remain in 
Conflict = 1
Transition out of 
Conflict = 0 Total Classified
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0 Total
Transition/Remain in 
Conflict = 1
32 1 33
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
1 2 3
Transition out of 
Conflict = 0
10 0 10
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0
4 8 12
Total 42 1 43 Total 5 10 15
Med Cut Point: 0.50 Med Cut Point: 0.50
Model Acuracy: 0.744 Model Acuracy: 0.600
Classified
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0 Total
Transition to Conflict 
= 1
2 5 7
Remain/Transition out 
of Conflict = 0
5 31 36
Total 7 36 43
Med Cut Point: 0.50
Model Acuracy: 0.767
Observed
E. Europe & Central Asia  (Given Non-Conflict): 2011 - 2013
Observed
Arab States (Given Conflict): 2011-2013
Observed
Arab States (Given Non-Conflict): 2010 - 2013
91 
(2010 – 2011), and Tunisia (2010 – 2011), all of which transition into conflict in 2011, 
are directly related to the Arab Spring, and it is likely these nations would have remained 
out of conflict had this event not occurred.   
As noted previously, the initial models developed for the Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia “Not in Conflict” data experienced numerous classification issues, often 
failing to properly classify any transitions into conflict.  As a result, the Synthetic 
Minority Oversampling Technique (SMOTE) was employed to aid development of a 
model that achieved satisfactory classification accuracy in both the training and 
validation data sets.  These initial models maximized the likelihood of these nations 
transitioning or remaining out of conflict resulting in significant false-negative rates (in 
excess of 20% of all instances), the complete failure to classify any nation as 
transitioning into conflict, and model accuracies in the 70% range.  Despite failing to 
generate classification accuracies above 80%, the final “Not in Conflict” model is a 
significant improvement over the earlier versions, providing better overall classification 
accuracy with reduce false-negative rates. 
Accurate model building challenges for Eastern Europe and Central Asia may be 
the result of an ethnically diverse and widespread geographic region that straddles the 
both Eastern and Western civilization.  The conflicts within this region generally take on 
two forms; in the east conflicts are generally the result of long standing tribal conflicts 
and foreign intervention, while in the west financial crises, immigration, and political 
turmoil (notably in the former Soviet states) exacerbate political and societal instability.  
Ultimately, future studies may wish explore a realignment of the nations within this 
geographic region in order to improve model performance. 
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While overall model accuracies are considered to meet or exceed expectations, 
further analysis is required to ascertain model performance concerning rare events (i.e., 
transitions into or out of conflict).  The principal of maximum likelihood will favor the 
majority population in any data set, at the expense of the minority.   With transition rates 
ranging from 5–20% across all data sets it is possible achieve benchmark classification 
accuracies simply by only properly classifying the majority population of the conditional 
model.  As part of the overall model assessment, rare event accuracies must be taken into 
account. 
Table 22: Model Rare Event Accuracies Given Fixed Cut-point of 0.50 
 
Rare event classification accuracies by region and model are provided in Table 
22.  Across all regions, the “In Conflict” models correctly classified 35 of the 72 (48.6%) 
transitions out of conflict, and the “Not in Conflict” models correctly classified 84 of the 
142 (59.2%) transitions into conflict for all twelve training set models.  Expectedly, 
validation rare-event classification accuracies are generally lower than their training 
counterparts at the regional level, with 9 of 29 (31.0%) transitions out of conflict, and 10 
Accuracy No. Instances Accuracy No. Instances
In Conflict 0.50 60.0% 5 0.0% 1 50.0%
Not in Conflict 0.50 66.7% 9 20.0% 5 50.0%
In Conflict 0.50 76.9% 13 50.0% 6 68.4%
Not in Conflict 0.50 79.7% 64 28.6% 7 74.6%
In Conflict 0.50 42.9% 7 0.0% 2 33.3%
Not in Conflict 0.50 61.1% 18 37.5% 8 53.8%
In Conflict 0.50 37.5% 8 0.0% 3 27.2%
Not in Conflict 0.50 55.6% 9 50.0% 4 53.8%
In Conflict 0.50 23.1% 13 33.3% 6 26.3%
Not in Conflict 0.50 41.7% 12 0.0% 2 35.7%
In Conflict 0.50 50.0% 26 36.4% 11 45.9%
Not in Conflict 0.50 20.0% 30 16.7% 12 19.1%
In Conflict 0.50 48.6% 72 31.0% 29 43.6%
Not in Conflict 0.50 59.2% 142 26.3% 38 52.2%
Region Model Cut Point
Training Data Set Validation Data Set Traning and 
Validation
Sub-Saharan Africa
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
Combined World 
Results
Latin America
OECD
South & East Asia
Model Rare Event Accuracies Using 0.50 Classification Cut Point
Arab & North 
African States
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of 38 (26.3%) transitions into conflict properly classified as an aggregate model.  It is 
observed that 4 of the 12 validation models failed to properly classify a single transition 
instance, represented by an assigned accuracy of 0.00%.   However, in each of these 
cases the total number of observed transitions is less than or equal to 3, resulting in below 
average transition rates for the four regions.  It is therefore assessed that overall model 
suitability is not affected by this singular result.  Ultimately, model rare event 
classification accuracies, for the aggregate data sets, average 43.6% for “In Conflict” 
models, and 52.2% for “Not in Conflict” models, which is considered acceptable given 
the above overall predictive accuracies of the logistic regression models combined with 
the relative rarity of conflict transitions within the data set. 
The final classification table analysis involves adjusting the cut-point in order to 
limit the number of false-negative classifications while maintaining suitable model 
accuracy.  In this study, a false-negative is defined as a nation classified as 
transitioning/remaining out of conflict, when in fact the nation remains/transitions into 
conflict.  Given the operational implications of misclassifying a potential transition into 
conflict, it is arguably better to reduce the model’s false positive rate, which is achieved 
by adjusting the cut-point for each conditional model, than to misclassify a nation as 
being “Not in Conflict”.  A typical cut point analysis is presented in Figure 16, which 
graphs the conditional model accuracy, false-negative rate, and false-positive rate as 
function of the probability cut-point.  As is the case for all models, the false-negative rate 
declines as the cut-point approaches zero.  The vertical dashed lines represent the JMP-
default cut points and adjusted default cut-points. 
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Figure 16: Analysis of Cut-Point Effects on Classification Accuracy and False-
Negative Rates 
Adjustment of the classification table cut-point seeks to balance three objectives: 
minimize false-negative rate, maintain model accuracy, and minimize the deviation from 
the JMP default cut-point of 0.50 for both the training and validation models.  
Minimization of the deviation in the adjusted cut-point from the JMP-default is desired 
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due to its effects on limiting the model’s false-positive rate, which increases as the cut-
point approaches zero.  The adjusted cut-points were set to values less than the JMP-
Default in 10.  However, in the remaining two cases, the default cut point was maintained 
due to no appreciable improvements in the training or validation models’ accuracy or 
false negative rate.  A summary of the adjusted cut-points effects on model accuracies 
and false negative rates in presented in Table 23. 
Table 23: Effects of Adjusted Cut-points on Model Accuracy and False Negative 
Rates 
 
Adjusted cut point values were tailored to each conditional model and ranged 
from 0.15 to 0.50, with the average cut-point set to 0.40 and 0.32 for the world level 
aggregate “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” models.  These average cut points have 
negligible adverse impacts on overall and rare-event accuracies, and in many cases offer 
modest improvements at the regional level.  Subsequently, the adjusted cut-points result 
in an overall decrease in the conditional model false negative rates at the aggregate world 
level for both the “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” models. 
Accuracy
False-Positive 
Decrease
Effects on Model 
Accuracy
Accuracy
False-Positive 
Decrease
Effects on Model 
Accuracy
In Conflict 0.30 94.2% -100.0% 0.0% 86.0% -50.0% 11.6%
Not in Conflict 0.15 81.7% -33.3% -11.6% 66.7% -25.0% 6.7%
In Conflict 0.34 92.5% -100.0% 0.0% 86.2% -50.0% 3.4%
Not in Conflict 0.33 87.1% -84.6% 1.1% 76.7% 0.0% 0.0%
In Conflict 0.45 83.7% -66.7% 6.7% 90.0% -66.7% 6.7%
Not in Conflict 0.40 90.9% -28.6% 0.0% 88.1% 0.0% 0.0%
In Conflict 0.50 88.7% 0.0% 0.0% 86.4% 0.0% 0.0%
Not in Conflict 0.30 96.0% -25.0% 0.0% 94.1% 0.0% -0.9%
In Conflict 0.50 87.3% 0.0% 0.0% 84.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Not in Conflict 0.42 84.8% 0.0% -3.1% 84.0% -50.0% -4.0%
In Conflict 0.30 85.1% -87.5% -1.3% 87.8% -83.3% 5.4%
Not in Conflict 0.30 85.2% -16.7% 0.0% 86.3% 0.0% 0.0%
In Conflict 0.40 87.3% -53.3% 0.5% 86.8% -29.2% 2.5%
Not in Conflict 0.32 84.5% -34.5% -0.3% 84.9% -3.6% -1.0%
Model Accuracies Seeking to Minimize False Negative Classifications in Training & Validation Models
Sub-Saharan Africa
Combined World 
Results
Training Data Set Validation Data Set
Arab & North 
African States
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin America
OECD
South & East Asia
Region Model Cut Point
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Analysis of Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Tests 
The Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit test provides the third and final method 
to assess the overall suitability of the logistic regression models.  The Hosmer-Lemeshow 
test assesses the fit transition probabilities, 𝜋(𝑥𝑖), generated for each model instance, as 
they relate to the observed transition state.  Model subgroupings were tailored to the 
individual models based on number of occurrences in the training model set and their 
corresponding transition probabilities.  The design objective is to construct 10 equally 
sized sub-groups, providing a corresponding test statistic of  𝜒(0.05,   8)
2 = 15.507.  
However smaller numbers of sub-grouping were employed in 5 of the 12 tests.  Via 
Equation 16, we are able to develop the Hosmer-Lemeshow Statistic (?̂?) and compare it 
to its corresponding Chi-square test statistic for each model.  Assessed fit of a particular 
model is considered satisfactory if ?̂? <  𝜒(0.05,   𝑔−2)
2 .  The results of this analysis are 
summarized in Table 24. 
Table 24: Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Test Results 
 
Initial results indicate that 8 of the 12 conditional models appear to provide 
satisfactory fits with the exceptions being: Eastern Europe – Not in Conflict, both South 
Region Model H-L Statistic (C) Test Statistic P{T.S. > C} Assessment
In Conflict 1.550 5.991 0.461 Model Apears to fit the data well.
Not in Conflict 6.390 15.507 0.604 Model Apears to fit the data well.
In Conflict 0.414 5.991 0.813 Model Apears to fit the data well.
Not in Conflict 18.392 15.507 0.018 Model Does Not Fit Data Well
In Conflict 1.425 5.991 0.490 Model Apears to fit the data well.
Not in Conflict 4.812 15.507 0.777 Model Apears to fit the data well.
In Conflict 0.236 3.841 0.627 Model Apears to fit the data well.
Not in Conflict 0.347 7.815 0.951 Model Apears to fit the data well.
In Conflict 856.726 15.507 0.000 Model Does Not Fit Data Well
Not in Conflict 37.342 15.507 0.000 Model Does Not Fit Data Well
In Conflict 6.440 15.507 0.598 Model Apears to fit the data well.
Not in Conflict 48.543 15.507 0.000 Model Does Not Fit Data Well
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of Fit Results given α = 0.05
OECD
South & East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Arab & North 
African States
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin America
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& East Asia models, and the Sub-Saharan Africa – Not in Conflict model.  Analysis of 
these four models identified the set of outliers, provided in Table 25, that significantly 
contribute to the adverse test results.   
Table 25: Hosmer-Lemeshow Test Significant Outliers 
 
While the Hosmer-Lemeshow test assesses the overall fit of the model to the data, 
the overarching objective of this analysis is to identify and assess the existence of any 
significant model defects; this is achieved through outlier analysis.  For the purposes of 
this study, significant outliers are misclassified observations with assigned transition 
probabilities less than 0.10 for “In Conflict” and greater than 0.90 for “Not in Conflict” 
models.  In two of the four models: Eastern Europe – Not in Conflict and South & East 
Nation Year
Transition/Remain 
in Conflict (0, 1)
Probability Sub Group
Belarus 2008-2009 0 0.974 10
Maldives 2004-2005 0 0.965 2
Bangladesh 2007-2008 0 0.973 2
Cambodia 2004-2005 0 0.977 2
Korea, North 2010-2011 0 0.987 2
Timor-Leste 2008-2009 0 0.995 3
China 2004-2005 0 0.999 4
Sri Lanka 2009-2010 0 1.000 7
Samoa 2011-2012 1 0.005 3
Congo, Republic of the 2006-2007 1 0.014 4
Comoros 2006-2007 1 0.015 4
Comoros 2009-2010 1 0.015 4
Mali 2005-2006 1 0.024 5
Mauritania 2007-2008 1 0.028 5
Sierra Leone 2010-2011 1 0.041 6
South & East Asia (In Conflict)
South & East Asia (Not inConflict)
Sub-Saharan Africa (Not in Conflict)
Easter Europe & Central Asia (Not in Conflict)
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Asia – Not in Conflict, the presence of a single outlier indicates a possible issue in model 
fit, a highly dubious result given that a single outlier represents approximately 1% of the 
total instances for each model.  This result is due in part to the method used to calculate 
the Hosmer-Lemeshow statistic (?̂?), which exponentially penalizes differences in the 
number of observed (oik) and expected (eik) occurrences (per bin), when the number of 
expected occurrences is small (i.e., eik < 0.15).  While a single significant outlier does not 
elicit concern in the overall suitability of a particular model, the presence of multiple 
outliers may indicate the presence of model defects that require further investigation. 
The seven significant outliers present in the South & East Asia-In Conflict model 
represent misclassifications of nations predicted to remain in conflict but which 
transitioned to a non-conflict status in the following year.  Similarly, the six instances in 
the Sub-Saharan Africa-Not in Conflict model represent occurrences of nations predicted 
to remain out of conflict but which transitioned to a conflict status in the subsequent year. 
Given the demonstrated difficulty of correctly classifying conflict transitions, an audit of 
the individual outliers was conducted to determine if the assigned conflict transition 
probabilities were appropriate for the nation and region.  For the South & East Asia – In 
Conflict model, the audit revealed that the assigned probabilities were appropriate in five 
of the seven instances, the exceptions being Maldives (2004 – 2005) and North Korea 
(2010 – 2011), given average probability of remaining in conflict and the number of 
years the nations were in a state of violent conflict between 2004 and 2014.  The audit of 
the Sub-Saharan Africa-Not in Conflict model determined that the assigned probabilities 
were appropriate for three of the five nations, with only Mali and Mauritania, tending to 
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be in a state of conflict, due to above average political instability, over the same 11-year 
period.  The results of this audit are provided in Table 26. 
Table 26: Audit of Significant Outliers 
 
Overall Assessment of Logistic Regression Models 
Given the results of this analysis, each of the 12 conditional logistic regression 
models are considered satisfactory and valid for the purposes of this study.  Each of the 
logistic regression models exhibit excellent to superior levels of discrimination for the 
training data sets and adequate discrimination for the validation data sets.  Model 
accuracies exceeded pre-established benchmarks (80% accuracy) in all 12 training 
models and 10 of 12 validation models, with overall model accuracies averaging 86.0% 
and 88.5% for the “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” models respectively.  Assessment 
of model fit initially determined that only 8 of 12 models appeared to fit the data, 
however further analysis determined that the transition probabilities assigned to the 
Nation Year
Transition/Remain 
in Conflict (0, 1)
Probability
Average 
Probabity
Number Years in 
Conflict Status 
(2004 -2014)
Maldives 2004-2005 0 0.965 0.521 3
Bangladesh 2007-2008 0 0.973 0.984 10
Cambodia 2004-2005 0 0.977 0.992 8
Korea, North 2010-2011 0 0.987 0.551 2
Timor-Leste 2008-2009 0 0.995 0.620 4
China 2004-2005 0 0.999 0.999 10
Sri Lanka 2009-2010 0 1.000 0.884 9
Congo, Republic of the 2006-2007 1 0.014 0.123 3
Comoros 2006-2007 1 0.015 0.312 3
Comoros 2009-2010 1 0.015 0.312 3
Mali 2005-2006 1 0.024 0.606 9
Mauritania 2007-2008 1 0.028 0.452 6
Sierra Leone 2010-2011 1 0.041 0.206 2
South & East Asia (In Conflict)
Sub-Saharan Africa (Not In Conflict)
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“significant outliers” were suitable and acceptable given historical data.  Table 27 
provides a summary of the results of the various analysis conducted on the conditional 
logistic regression models.  Given our metrics we assess as superior the Latin America – 
Not in Conflict and OECD – Not in Conflict models due to their overall AUC, accuracy 
and model fit.  Additionally six models are assessed as excellent models, while four 
models as assessed as satisfactory due to their overall fit of the data. 
Table 27: Overall Assessment of Conditional Logistic Regression Models 
 
4.3 Analysis of Significant Conflict Transition Variables 
While there is significant benefit in accurate prediction of nation-state violent 
conflicts, many of these benefits are rendered operationally irrelevant without an 
understanding of the underlying correlation and effects of the significant predictor 
variables.  This analysis seeks to assess the relative importance, based upon p-value, of 
the specific predictor variables within a model and determine how those variables are 
correlated with a transition into conflict.  Figure 17 provides the basic mapping scheme 
for covariate correlation based upon correlation type (positive or negative) and magnitude 
(Dark Green – highly negatively correlated; Dark Red – highly positively correlated).  
In Conflict 0.962 85.3% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Excellent
Not in Conflict 0.930 86.7% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Excellent
In Conflict 0.972 89.6% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Excellent
Not in Conflict 0.946 84.1% Model Does Not Fit Data Well Model is Satisfactory
In Conflict 0.878 82.1% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Excellent
Not in Conflict 0.952 90.2% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Superior
In Conflict 0.914 88.0% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Excellent
Not in Conflict 0.974 95.6% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Superior
In Conflict 0.938 86.2% Model Does Not Fit Data Well Model is Satisfactory
Not in Conflict 0.932 87.9% Model Does Not Fit Data Well Model is Satisfactory
In Conflict 0.889 85.1% Model Apears to fit the data well. Model is Excellent
Not in Conflict 0.874 85.5% Model Does Not Fit Data Well Model is Satisfactory
Overall Model 
Assessment
Overall Assessmnet of Conditional Logistic Regression Models
South & East Asia
Sub-Saharan Africa
Training Data 
Set AUC
Overall Model 
Accuracy
Hosmer-Lemeshow Goodness of 
Fit Results
Region Model
Arab & North 
African States
Eastern Europe & 
Central Asia
Latin America
OECD
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Additionally in all subsequent analyses, the predictor variables are listed from left to right 
in terms of statistical significance, based on their p-value, within the model. 
 
Figure 17: Covariate Correlation to Dependent Variable 
The operational relevance of this analysis is predicated on identifying variables 
that can be either monitored or affected in some manner with the goal controlling a 
nation’s transition into or out of conflict.  While correlation does not imply causation, this 
analysis seeks to enable the influencing of the behavior of these large scale regional 
dynamic systems in a manner beneficial to United States strategic objectives.  
Arab & North African States – In Conflict 
Of the four statistical variables employed in the Arab and North African States – 
In Conflict model, ethnic diversity and democratic governments are statistically the most 
influential variables associated with conflict transitions for Arab nations currently in 
conflict.  As seen in Figure 18, ethnic diversity is negatively correlated with transitions 
into conflict, implying that increasing a nation’s ethnic diversity score (i.e., the 
percentage of the population made up by the dominant ethnic group) reduces the 
probability that an Arab nation currently in conflict will remain in conflict.  Conversely, 
the presence of democratic governments is positively correlated to a nation’s probability 
of remaining in a state of violent conflict.  While previous studies have suggested that 
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that risk of conflict is highest among emerging democracies (Goldstone, et al., 2005), the 
significance of this variable is heavily influenced by the conflicts in Algeria, Lebanon, 
and Tunisia, the only nations with fully democratic governments within the region during 
this time period.  In all instances, these nations are classified as being in a state of violent 
conflict, with no observed transitions out of that state. 
 
Figure 18: Arab & North African States (In Conflict) Covariate Effects 
A more accurate appraisal of the effects of regime type within this region can be 
obtained by comparing the ratio of instances violent conflict by government type.  The 
Arab & North African data set contains 187 total instances, with 58.3%, or 109 
observations, of those instances classified as being in state of violent conflict.  From this 
data set, 91 nation-year instances are classified as having Autocratic governments, with 
the remaining 96 instances classified as having one of the five alternative regime types.  
Overall the rate of violent conflict in autocratic regimes was 29.7%, 27 total instances, 
significantly lower than the regional average.  However, nations listed as having some 
other regime type experienced conflict in 85.4% or 82 instances over the 11-year period.  
The significance of this finding is the correlation between Arab autocratic governments 
lower probabilities of conflict.  Goldstone found similar results in the CIA-funded study, 
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where he found that the risk of instability was lowest in full autocracies (Goldstone, et al., 
2005). 
Arab & North African States – Not in Conflict 
As in the Arab & North African “In Conflict” model, ethnic diversity is identified 
as the most significant of the six variables employed in this model.  However, for nations 
currently not in conflict, higher ethnic diversity scores are correlated with an increased 
likelihood of that such a nation will transition into conflict in the following year.  Since 
many of the same nations are present in both the “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” data 
sets, such a finding implies that an imbalance exists in the region’s ethnic diversity, 
exacerbating the overall instability of the region.  In addition to ethnic diversity, 
increased religious diversity scores (% of the population comprised by largest religious 
group), death rates, and youth populations are correlated with transitions into conflict.  
Additionally these variables are also positively correlated with each other, indicating 
likely interdependencies between these predictor variables.  On the other hand, greater 
average life expectancies are correlated to lower incidences of transitions into conflict, 
though this result may be a function that life expectancies should logically be greater 
when violent conflicts are not taking place.  The summary of variable effects and 
correlations is provided in Figure 19. 
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Figure 19: Arab & North African States (Not in Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia – In Conflict 
Analysis of the variables associated with conflict transitions of eastern European 
and central Asian nations currently identified as being in a state of conflicts identifies a 
nations international trade level, as a percentage of it gross domestic product (GDP) as 
the most significant with the model.  Trade is identified as being negatively correlated 
with a state remaining in conflict, an expected result given that stable and less violent 
nations should have higher levels of international trade.  Similar to other regional models, 
population statistics (specifically those correlated with increased youth populations high 
densities) are correlated with increased incidences of transitions into conflict.  As seen in 
Figure 20, fertility rates, infant mortality rates, and population density are all positively 
correlated with transitions into conflict, and with each other.  This finding indicates a 
reduction in one of the variables, such as “Fertility Rate”, may result, over time, in 
subsequent decreases in a nation’s infant mortality rate, population density or both, with a 
corresponding decrease in the probability of violent conflict. 
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Figure 20: Eastern Europe & Central Asia (In Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia – Not in Conflict 
A total of nine variables were identified as significant for eastern European and 
central Asian nations current in a state of non-conflict.  Of note is the significance 
associated with regime type, specifically those governments identified as either emerging 
democracies, or experiencing foreign interruption of their political processes, which is 
given in Figure 21.  As noted earlier, the existence of transitional or emerging 
governments is highly correlated with violent conflict, which makes logical sense due to 
the loss of government function and continuity.  As was the case for the Arab nation 
models, this finding is only part of story.  For the period of 2004 to 2014, there are 308 
total instances in the Eastern Europe & Central Asian data set; of these 125 instances 
(40.6%) are identified as being in a state of conflict.  However, unlike the Arab and North 
African models, democratic nations, within the region are less likely to be in state of 
violent conflict.  Of this subset, only 45 (25.6%) of the 176 instances involving 
democratic governments were identified as being in a state of conflict.  Further analysis 
revealed that of the 16 nations identified as having democratic governments, only 
Pakistan is located outside of Eastern Europe, indicating that government type may not 
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provide the operational fidelity required for conflict prediction and forecasting within this 
region. 
 
Figure 21: Eastern Europe & Central Asia (Not in Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Of the remaining variables, access to improved water sources and the GDP per 
Capita were both highly significant and negatively correlated with transitions into 
conflict.  Within this model, these variables represent likely candidates that can be 
monitored, manipulated and improved through the judicious application of the 
diplomatic, information, military, and economic elements of national power, resulting in 
a possible reduction in the total number of future transitions into conflict. 
Latin America – In Conflict 
Figure 22 provides the covariates for this model.  Non-autocratic functioning 
governments are highly correlated with increased levels of violence in Latin American 
nations, with 95% of the conflict incidences occurring in these nations.  Fully democratic 
nations account for 21 of the 27 nations within the Latin American data set and 
subsequently account for a majority of the conflict transitions that occur within the 
region.  However, nations identified as having emerging democratic governments, such 
as Ecuador, Suriname, or Venezuela are nearly twice as likely to remain in conflict as 
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their fully democratic neighbors.  Increased religious diversity and freedom scores are 
correlated with transitions out of violent conflict, indicating that increasing the 
percentage of the population made up by the religious majority or increasing individual 
liberties may result in increased incidences of transitions to a non-conflict state.  The 
CIA-funded study yielded similar results showing that increased factionalism due to 
ethnic and religious diffrences was positively correlated with political instability 
(Goldstone, et al., 2005). 
 
Figure 22: Latin America (In Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Latin America – Not in Conflict 
As shown in Figure 23, nations currently not in conflict with higher ethnic 
diversity scores tend to experience few transitions into conflict than nations with more 
diverse populations.  However, ethnic diversity is positively correlated with religious 
diversity, which is shown to have a moderate destabilizing effect for countries not in 
conflict.  Similar to the Arab and North African nations, there appears to be an imbalance 
with regards to the region’s ethnic and religious demographics that may aggravate 
regional discord.  On the other hand, access to improved water sources appears to be 
positively correlated to fewer transitions into violent conflict.  However, this finding may 
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also be the result of a more permissive environment allowing for improved access to 
fresh water. 
 
Figure 23: Latin America (Not in Conflict) Covariate Effects 
OECD – In Conflict 
Nations belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (first world nations) experience violent conflict rates 50% below the world 
average.  However, like other regions, increased youth populations within OECD nations 
are correlated with increased levels of violence and the tendency for nations to transition 
or remain in a state of conflict.  While not identified as a significant variable within the 
final “In Conflict” model, population migrations represented by the two “Refugee” 
variables are correlated with transitions into conflict as well as increased youth 
populations and military expenditures within OECD nations.  With regard to population 
migrations, historically refugees are 2.2 times more likely to seek asylum in an OECD 
nation than originate from one.  According the 2014 HIIK Conflict Barometer, conflicts 
arising from population migrations have resulted in, or contributed to, many of the 
violent conflicts experienced by OECD nations, with noted examples being the ongoing 
immigration and border conflict between the United States and Mexico, violence 
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associated with Refugee and immigrant populations in France, and the ongoing Refugee 
crisis along Turkey’s southern borders with Iraq and Syria.  The summary of the 
covariate for both OECD models are given in Figures 24 and 25. 
 
Figure 24: OECD (In Conflict) Covariate Effects 
OECD – Not in Conflict 
As in the “In Conflict” model, defense expenditures and youth populations are 
considered significant predictors of conflict transitions for nations currently not in a state 
of conflict.  Again, population migrations are highly correlated to many of the significant 
variables within this model, underpinning the importance of this emerging global trend in 
national and regional stability and security.  Common to all regions, improvements in the 
overall quality of life, measured through proxy variables such as death rates and average 
life expectancy are correlated with decreased levels of violence, even if such predictor 
variables are not identified as significant within the final model(s). 
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Figure 25: OECD (Not in Conflict) Covariate Effects 
South & East Asia – In Conflict 
As shown in Figure 26, increased levels of population growth are correlated with 
transition out of conflict.  This relatively counterintuitive finding is correlated with 
improvements in overall quality of life and influenced by many of the island nations 
within the Pacific that have higher population growth percentages and decreased levels of 
violence than many of the mainland and coastal Asian nations. Government type is 
considered a highly significant predictor variable within this region, with democratic 
governments experiencing rates of conflict above regional averages.  However, unlike 
other regions, fully autocratic governments do not offer significant improvements to out-
of-conflict transition rates, and they seem as likely to perpetuate ongoing conflicts as any 
other government type.  Finally, as seen in other regional models, increasing trade levels 
is correlated with decreased levels of violence, and it is positively correlated with military 
expenditures which may also bring about transitions out of conflict. 
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Figure 26: South & East Asia (In Conflict) Covariate Effects 
South & East Asia – Not in Conflict 
As shown in the “In Conflict” model, increases in military expenditures are 
affiliated with transitions in non-conflict statuses for all nations within South and East 
Asia.  This variable which is positively correlated with a nation’s trading ability may 
result in improvements to internal security apparatuses within many of these nations 
resulting in decreased levels of violence.  However, the ten-year trend within the region 
has shown a general increase in military spending, for all nations, which may indicate 
developing arms race, with the potential of increased cross border conflicts.  Previous 
studies, notably the Boekestein study, have also identified the significance of trade, 
caloric intake, and refugee migrations as conflict predictor variables within South and 
East Asia.  Additionally improvements in overall quality of life, measured through proxy 
variables such as death rates and life expectancy, are positively correlated with 
improvements and access to food supplies and potable water.  The covariate correlations 
for this conditional model are provided in Figure 27. 
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Figure 27: South & East Asia (Not in Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Sub-Saharan Africa – In Conflict 
Population demographics positively correlated to increases in population density, 
such as increases in youth populations, birth rates, and refugees appear to exacerbate and 
prolong existing conflicts in Sub-Saharan African nations.  It also appears that 
populations increased diversity, due to predominately tribal cultures found in these 
nations, are more at risk for violent conflict than those nations with higher ethnic 
diversity scores.  Again, improvements in quality of life statistics, in this case available 
fresh water and life expectancy, are correlated with out of conflict transitions.  Over the 
11-year period Sub-Saharan Africa experience conflict in 253 (47%) of the 539 observed 
instances.  Government type was identified as being significant with this conditional 
model.  Predominantly, Sub-Saharan African governments are categorized as either 
emerging democracies (23 nations) or full democracies (22 nations), with only Eritrea 
and Swaziland identified as having fully autocratic governments as of 2014.  Within this 
region, emerging democracies are twice as likely to experience violent and sustained 
conflicts as fully democratic nations, most likely associated with the inherent instability 
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of their governments.  Figure 28 provides the covariate effects for the Sub-Saharan 
Africa-In Conflict model. 
 
Figure 28: Sub-Saharan Africa (In Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Sub-Saharan Africa – Not in Conflict 
As shown in Figure 29, and other regions, arable land appears to be a source of 
instability and confounding factor for conflict transitions.  Historical and recent conflicts 
over arable land have generally arisen due to either actual or perceived scarcity of the 
resource, with the general conclusion being that limited availability and access to arable 
land leads to conflict (Black, 2010).  However, as is other regional models, arable land is 
identified as being positively correlated to violent conflict, implying that increasing the 
supply of this resource will lead to increased levels of violence, which is contradictory to 
previous studies.  Analysis of this and other regional models has shown that arable land is 
also positively correlated with such statistics as increased population densities, youth 
populations, and increased number of refugees seeking asylum, all of which have 
demonstrated a positive correlation to instance of violent conflict across the globe.  
Essentially, it appears that nations in Sub-Saharan Africa with increased food production 
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capacities are at a moderately greater risk of violent conflict associated with a 
corresponding increase in their populations due to procreation and migration. 
 
Figure 29: Sub-Saharan Africa (Not in Conflict) Covariate Effects 
Summary 
A total of 30 variables, including the different levels of the Government and 
Regime type variables, were employed in the construction of the 12 conditional logistic 
regression models.  Table 28 provides the ranking of variables in terms of statistical 
significance for each conditional model, with variables listed in terms of overall world 
view significance.  Ethnic diversity, youth bulge, military expenditure by percentage of 
GDP, infant mortality rate, and religious diversity were identified as the five ordinally 
most significant variables at the combined world level, based upon their weighted 
average rankings.  Studies conducted by the Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO), 
also found similar variables highly significant, lending credence to this finding (Urdal, 
2002).  Ethnic diversity, which is significant in 5 of the 12 logistic regression models, and 
is the single most significant variable in Arab and North African states, is negatively 
correlated to nations transitioning into or remaining in conflict.  Additionally, increased 
youth populations which are also significant in five models, are positively correlated to 
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increased levels of violence.  Of note, the various levels of the government and regime 
type variables were identified as statistically significant in 6 of the 12 models.  “In 
Conflict” models tend to employ government or regime type variables more frequently 
than “Not in Conflict” models. 
Table 28: Ranking of Variables in terms of Model Statistical Significance 
 
4.4 Analysis of Nation Specific Markov Models 
Overview 
As stated in Chapter 3, the use of Markov models is intended as an operationally 
relevant forecasting model of future conflict trends conditioned on whether a nation is or 
is not currently in a state of violent conflict.  Conditional probabilities for each nation are 
calculated using both the “In Conflict” and “Not in Conflict” models on the 2014 data set, 
which is the base year for all Markov models.  A Visual Basic (VBA) based Markov 
model tool, operating in the Microsoft Excel environment, was developed to generate the 
required outputs and aid in the analysis of future conflict trends.  In addition to 
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calculating the conditional probabilities for any future year, this tool also calculates the 
sojourn times, mean conflict recurrence times, and long-run conflict probabilities specific 
to each of the 182 nations included in this study.   
Model Validation 
Analysis of Expected Number of States in Conflict for 2014 
As part of a higher level analysis and validation of the conditional conflict 
probabilities, this study compared the global and regional incidence of violent conflict 
observed by HIIK, with the expected number of nations in conflict determined using the 
conditional probabilities calculated by the logistic regression models using 2014 conflict 
data, and a 0.50 cut point.  This analysis does not seek to specifically identify which 
nations are in conflict for a particular region, but rather provide the expected incidence 
level by region that can be compared to current global trends.  A summary of this 
comparison, by region, is provided in Table 29. 
Table 29: Comparison of HIIK Observed and Expected Incidences of Conflict using 
a 0.50 Cut Point for 2014. 
 
Region
HIIK Observed 
States Not in 
Conflict
Expected Number 
of States not in 
Conflict
HIIK Observed 
States in Conflict
Expected Number 
of States in 
Conflict
Arab & North 
African States
3 4.44 14 12.56
Easter Eurpoe & 
Central Asia
17 16.57 11 11.43
Latin America 13 14.00 14 13.00
OECD 26 25.99 7 7.01
South & East Asia 15 13.57 13 14.43
Sub-Saharan Africa 24 27.64 25 21.36
World View 98 102.21 84 79.79
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The 2014 conditional conflict probabilities that are subsequently used to develop 
the nation specific Markov models for this study predict approximately 80 nations 
experiencing violent conflict and 102 nations remaining out of conflict, and an expected 
conflict incidence rate of 43.8%.  The observed incidence of conflict for 2014 had 84 
nations experiencing some level of violent conflict, with 98 nations remaining in a state 
of no conflict, resulting in an observed conflict incidence rate of 46.2%.  At the regional 
level, the absolute difference in the observed and expected incidence of violent conflict 
was less than 1.45 in five of the six regions, and 3.64 in the Sub-Saharan Africa region.  
The Arab and North African States, followed by Latin America, and South and East Asia 
can be expected to experience conflict rates of 50% or greater.  Conversely, the conflict 
incidence rates for OECD nations are less than half the world average at 21.3%.  Overall, 
the conditional models provide a very accurate prediction of the 2014 conflict incidence 
rates of each region, and the world as a whole. 
Forecasting Validation 
The validation of the nation specific Markov models presented an interesting 
challenge due to the inability to foresee all future events with 100 percent certainty.  As a 
result, we looked to the past to develop a validation set to compare against the Markov 
models using conditional probabilities calculated using 2014 conflict data.  To validate 
our 2014 Markov models, we construct another set of Markov models having conditional 
probabilities calculated using 2011 conflict data; these model are subsequently known as 
the 2011 Markov Models.  This set of 2011 Markov models subsequently forecasts the 
2014 conflict probabilities, which are then compared to the conflict probabilities 
calculated using 2014 conflict data to assess the level of deviation between the two 
118 
models.  The 2011 year set was selected for validation purposes due to it containing 
nearly all the data used in the construction of the logistic regression models and its 
relatively recent timeframe that more closely resembles conditions present in the 2014 
operational environment.  The purpose of this validation is to ascertain the fidelity of the 
2014 conditional conflict probabilities by comparing their deviations from the 2014 
probabilities predicted using 2011 conflict data.  The deviation is calculated using 
Equation 27. 
 
3 0
2011 0,0 2014 0,0
3 0
2011 1,1 2014 1,1
Deviation (Not in Conflict) = P P
Deviation (In Conflict) = P P
% Deviation (Not in Conflict) % Deviation (In Conflict)
Average Deviation =
2



 
Equation 27: Markov Validation 
These equations were applied to the 2011 and 2014 Markov models for all 182 
nations considered in this study.  The validation process then analyzed to statistics for the 
entire set of models, which are provided in Table 30.  On average, the difference between 
the 2014 Markov models and the 2011 Models predicting 2014 was 0.12 with a variance 
of 0.016.  Additionally, a total of 152 of the 182 models had average difference less than 
0.25.  Only the Ukrainian model experiences deviations greater than 0.50 for both the 
“Not in Conflict” and “In Conflict” conditional probabilities; this result is attributed to 
the ongoing conflicts in Crimea that significantly escalated in intensity in late 2013 and 
early 2014, and is considered reasonable.  
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Table 30: Markov Model Validation Statistics 
 
Additionally, Markov model accuracy was assessed by comparing the 2014 
conflict forecasts created by the Markov models developed using 2011 data.  In total the 
2011 Markov models correctly classified the conflict status of 155 of the 182 nations, for 
a total forecast accuracy of 85.16%.  Given the high number of nation models that 
experience average deviations less than 25%, and the number of significant events that 
have occurred since 2011 (The Arab Spring, the Rise of the Islamic State, Crimean 
conflict, etc.), the 2014 Markov models appear as valid representations of current conflict 
transition probabilities. 
Analysis of HIIK Conflict Intensity Levels and Conflict Probability 
As part of the model validation process, this study analyzed the conditional 
conflict probabilities as they relate to the HIIK levels of violence.  The theory behind this 
analysis is that there should exist a strongly positive correlation between a nation’s 
conditional probability of conflict and its level of violence in 2014.  As part of this 
analysis, the HIIK levels of violence were mapped to the corresponding ranges of 
probabilities shown in Table 31, with the assumption that the HIIK levels of violence are 
linear and well scaled. 
Category
Average 
Difference 
Between Models
Variance
Number < 
0.05
Number < 
0.10
Number < 
0.25
Number < 
0.50
Number > 
0.50
Non-Conflict Deviation 0.1227 0.0369 100 22 32 16 12
Conflict Deviaition 0.1211 0.0297 100 20 27 26 9
Average Model Deviation 0.1219 0.0158 69 32 51 29 1
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Table 31: HIIK Intensity Bin Assignments 
 
Nations are then assigned to a HIIK bin based upon their assigned conditional 
conflict probability.  The average HIIK score, based upon the nations’ actual conflict 
intensity for 2014, is then calculated for each bin as shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30: Average HIIK Conflict Intensity Levels by Bin 
As can be seen, the average HIIK score is positively correlated with its bin 
assignment; with a calculated correlation of 0.731.   However the average HIIK score 
does not strictly increase over the entire bin range, noted by the decrease from Bin 2 to 
HIIK Bin > Lower Bound < Upper Bound
0 0.000 0.167
1 0.167 0.333
2 0.333 0.500
3 0.500 0.667
4 0.667 0.833
5 0.833 1.000
HIIK Intesity Level Bin Assignments
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Bin 3.  The decrease in the average HIIK score for Bin 3 may be the result of an outlier(s) 
that may significantly decrease the average score within the bin.  Such points would be 
significant false-positives or false-negatives; nations assigned either a very low or very 
high conditional conflict probability in respect to its actual level of violence.  Figure 31 
provides a visual depiction of bin assignments versus conflict intensity for 2014. 
 
Figure 31: Identification of Significant Outliers by HIIK Bin 
A total of eight possible significant outliers were initially identified, based upon 
having an absolute deviation in the HIIK conflict intensities and assigned bins greater 
than or equal to two (with the exception points having a HIIK level of 3); these point are 
marked by the circles in Figure 31.  The identified outliers consist of: Libya (Bin 0), 
Egypt (Bin 2), Cameroon (Bin 3), Panama (Bin 4), Kiribati (Bin 5), Qatar (Bin 5), Oman 
(Bin 5), and the United Arab Emirates (Bin 5).   A formal outlier analysis was conducted 
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to verify these outliers, and identify other potential outliers within the data.  Outliers were 
identified through examination of the scaled “R-studentized” residuals, a method 
commonly used in linear regression to identify extreme points that are considerably 
different from a majority of the data (Montgomery, Peck, & Vinning, 2012).  This 
process identified the nine nations listed in Table 32 as being possible significant outliers 
in their respective models if they fail to transition from their 2014 conflict status by 2015. 
Table 32: Significant Outliers, 2014 
 
A majority of the these outlier nations are from the Arab & North African States 
region, with Tunisia and Libya identified as possible significant false-negative 
classifications; and Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) identified as 
possible significant false-positive classifications.  This result further highlights the 
extreme instability within the region and the effects of the Arab Spring, hindering conflict 
transition analysis.  Removal of these outliers results in the plot provided in Figure 32.  
Comparison of this plot with that shown in Figure 30, shows an improvement in the 
overall linearity of the plot, and the expected positive correlation associated the average 
conflict intensity and HIIK bin level.  Such a result indicates that we have identified all 
Nation HIIK Bin Conflict Probability HIIK Intensity Level
Gabon 0 0.004 3
Kyrgyzstan 0 0.008 3
Tunisia 0 0.009 3
Vietnam 0 0.100 3
Libya 0 0.000 5
Kiribati 5 0.863 0
Qatar 5 1.000 0
Oman 5 1.000 1
United Arab Emirates 5 1.000 1
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significant outlier nations for 2014.  Ultimately the objective of this analysis is the 
identification, as opposed to the removal, of possible significant misclassified nations for 
the purpose of monitoring both the Markov model outputs and future conflict status for 
consistency and accuracy.   
 
Figure 32: Average HIIK Conflict Intensity Levels with Outliers Removed 
Overall Assessment of Markov Models 
Analysis of overall suitability and validity of the nation-specific Markov models 
has demonstrated that the tool functions properly and provides accurate calculations 
based on the logistic regression model inputs.  The validity of the 2014 logistic regression 
model inputs was verified through comparison of 2011 conditional probabilities 
predicting the 2014 conflict transition probabilities.  This comparison yielded satisfactory 
results with 83.5% of all nations experiencing absolute deviations in respective conflict 
probabilities less than 0.25.  The conditional probabilities were then compared with the 
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HIIK conflict intensity levels, identifying a positive correlation associated with conflict 
probability and a nation’s observed conflict intensity for 2014.  As part of this 
comparison, analysis of significantly misclassified outliers identified only nine nations 
whose models may produce faulty or inaccurate forecasts, based on 2014 predictions, and 
may require further refinement in future studies.  Finally, comparison of the expected and 
observed regional incidences of conflict indicated a high level of accuracy in the models’ 
ability predict regional levels of violence, further substantiating the suitability of the 
models for forecasting future conflict trends. 
Key Markov Model Outputs 
The objective of the nation-specific Markov models is to provide operationally 
relevant insights on future conflict trends.  In addition to conflict forecasts, which will be 
discussed at length in the following section, this study also seeks to determine the sojourn 
times, long-run conflict probabilities, and mean conflict recurrence times for each nation.  
It should be understood that these calculations are predicated on the assumption that 
current conditions regarding the 2014 independent conflict variable remain unchanged 
within each region, and that the forecasted trends may be altered through the application 
of national power, Black Swan events (Taleb, 2010), or both.  The complete table of 
Markov model outputs is provided in Appendix C. 
Sojourn times 𝐸[𝑅𝑗] are simply time expected for a nation’s n
th conflict transition.  
For this study, we examine the first and second sojourn times, and their respective 
variances, for each nation beginning in the base year 2014.  An example of first and 
second Sojourn times, as well as the 2014 Markov model, is provided in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33: Example of First and Second Sojourn Times 
In this example, Angola’s Markov 2014 model indicates that the nation is more 
likely to be in a state of conflict, due to the highly likelihood (94%) that once Angola 
enters into a state of conflict, it will remain in that state the following year.  This 
tendency is subsequently reflected in Angola’s sojourn times.  Given that Angola was in 
a state of non-conflict in 2014, it is calculated that Angola will experience its first 
transition into conflict in approximately 4.21 years with a standard deviation of 
approximately 4 years.  It is therefore likely that Angola will transition into conflict 
within the next 8 years.  However, as stated previously, once Angola enters into a state of 
conflict it is predicted to remain in that state for approximately 18 years.  The second 
sojourn time, in this case the time for Angola to transition back into a state of non-
conflict, is simply the sum of its first sojourn time and its expected time to remain in 
conflict, and is calculated to be approximately 21.7 years from 2014, with a standard 
deviation in the expected second sojourn time of approximately 17 years.  The increased 
variance associated with this standard deviation can subsequently be equated to an higher 
levels of risk, in terms of model accuracy, due to a prolonged prediction horizon. 
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While Angola’s sojourn times are representative of many of the nations included 
in this study, numerous nations have predicted sojourn times that span hundreds if not 
thousands of years.  This phenomena, is due to nations having an overwhelming 
tendency, as of 2014, to remain in one state or another.  Figure 34 provides an example of 
significantly long sojourn times for Canada, which is primarily in a state of  non-conflict, 
and the Central African Republic, which is predicted to spend an vast amount of time in a 
state of conflict. 
 
Figure 34: Example of Significantly Long Sojourn Times 
As can be seen, the expected time for Canada to transition into a state of conflict 
is approximately 339,000 years, indicating a significant preference towards non conflict.  
Similarly the Central African Republic shows an even greater predilection to remain in 
state of conflict based on the 2014 model.  The significantly large variances, for these and 
similar nations, are  functions of the extreme time horizons associated with their sojourn 
times and indicate that a transition can occur any time within the forecast window.  The 
operational relevance of these significantly long sojourn times is the insight that certain 
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nations are not expected to experience a conflict transition within the foreseeable future if 
2014 conditions remain unchanged. 
The long-run proportion (𝜋𝑗) of time a nation spends either in a state of conflict 
or non-conflict is an indicator of the transience, the tendency to transition in or out of 
conflict, of a nation.  Again the operational relevance of this statistic is the identification 
of nations that either tend to be in one state or the other, as well as nations that have the 
experience frequent conflict transitions.  In total, 95 nations have long run probabilities 
that indicate a tendency for violent conflict, while 87 nations have long run probabilities 
that indicate a predisposition for non-conflict.  An example of these three categories of 
long-run conflict probabilities is presented in Figure 35. 
 
Figure 35: Long Run Conflict Probabilities 
As can be seen, China’s long-run probability indicates that China is expected to 
be in conflict 99.7% of the time, a nearly permanent state of conflict, that is reinforced by 
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its violent history and ongoing internal conflicts.  To a lesser extent, Comoros is expected 
to be in a state of non-conflict nearly 86% of the time, indicating that the nation has some 
region-specific conflict risk factors but possesses a level of stability that limits the overall 
incidence of violent conflict.  Columbia, however, has long-run conflict probabilities that 
predict the nation will spend nearly equal amounts of time in and out of conflict, equating 
to a high conflict transience rate.  Transience, which will be discussed in depth in the 
following section, may be an indicator of a nation’s susceptibility to both internal and/or 
external forces resulting in a nation’s transition from one conflict status to the other. 
Long-run conflict probabilities can be translated into the mean conflict status 
recurrence (𝑚𝑗), or the average number of steps a nation requires to return to its current 
state.  As shown in Equation 24, the mean recurrence time is calculated by simply taking 
the inverse of the long-run conflict probability.  While similar to sojourn time, the mean 
recurrence is the long run average of conflict transition steps, and it represents the 
predicted number of steps a nation can expect to experience in order to return to either a 
state of conflict or non-conflict.  Figure 36 provides the mean recurrence steps that 
correspond to the long-run probabilities for China, Columbia and Comoros. 
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Figure 36: Example of Mean Recurrence Times 
Corresponding to an overwhelming probability of remaining in conflict, the 
predicted non-conflict recurrence (𝑚0), in China is approximately 385 steps, equating an 
extremely low transience rate.  However, when China does enter into a state of non-
conflict, it is expected that the nation will transition back into conflict within a year.  As 
stated earlier, Columbia is predicted to spend nearly equal amounts of time, over the 
long-run, in states of conflict and non-conflict.  This transient tendency equates to 
recurrence rates, for both conflict and non-conflict, of approximately two steps.  Given, 
this prediction, Columbia could theoretically experience up to 2.5 conflict recurrences 
every 10 model steps, possibly resulting in severe and recurrent instability within the 
region. 
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4.5 Forecasting Global Conflict trends 
Overview 
The use of nation specific Markov models enables forecasting of conflict for time 
horizons far greater than those possible with logistic regression alone.  For this study we 
examine the predicted incidences of violent conflict for 2016, 2019, and 2024, identifying 
which nations are predicted to experience significant changes in their conflict 
probabilities.  As part of this analysis, we will then examine the predicted individual 
transience of each nation over this ten year forecasting period, identifying which nations 
are predicted to experience a conflict transition rate above regional and world averages.  
It should be remembered that the forecasts provided in this study are predicated on the 
assumption that regional factors germane to violent conflict remain unchanged from 
current conditions throughout the forecast period. 
Two, Five, and Ten Year Conflict Forecasts 
World Overview 
The two-, five- and ten- year conflict forecasts for each nation were calculated by 
raising their specific Markov models, using 2014 conflict transition probabilities, to the 
2nd, 5th, and 10th powers.  The analysis focused on determining the incidence of conflict at 
the regional and world levels by identify which states had a probability of greater than or 
equal to 0.50.  Additionally, the analysis also identified the ten-year conflict trends for 
each nation by calculating the difference in the 2014 and 2024 conflict probabilities.  The 
analysis sought to identify which nations experienced significant, moderate, or slight 
changes in the probability of conflict; Table 33 provides the assessment of the change in 
conflict over the range of probabilities.  Negative changes in conflict probability equate 
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to a predicted decrease in the level of violence over ten year period, while positive equate 
to an increase in violence over the same time span.  Additionally, nations that experience 
an absolute change in conflict probability less than or equal to 0.05 are assessed as having 
no significant change in their conflict status over the ten year time horizon.   
Table 33: Forecasting Assessment Matrix 
 
A total of 17 nations were identified as having significant changes in their 
probabilities of conflict over the ten-year forecast period, and are presented in Table 34.  
Twelve of these nations are projected to experience significantly more conflict by 2024, 
while only five nations are expected to realize significant decreases in their levels of 
violence over the same time frame.  In total, 40 of the 182 nations considered in this 
study are predicted to experience increases in conflict over the ten-year forecast period.  
Additionally, 30 nations are expected to realize net decreases in conflict, with 112 nations 
experience no significant change in their current conflict levels over the same period. 
Change in P[Conflict]: 
2014 to 2024
Assessment of Change in 
Conflict
ΔP < -0.50 Significantly Less Conflict
ΔP < -0.25 Moderately Less Conflict
ΔP < -0.05 Slightly Less Conflict
-0.05 < ΔP < 0.05 No Change
ΔP > 0.05 Slightly More Conflict
ΔP > 0.25 Moderately More Conflict
ΔP > 0.50 Significantly More Conflict
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Table 34: Significant Changes in Conflict Probability Over 10 Year Period 
 
Table 35 provides a summary of the global incidence of conflict and ten year 
conflict trends.  As of 2014, 84 of the 182 nations considered in the study were observed 
to be in violent conflict, and it is predicted that this global incidence of conflict will 
remain constant over the 10 year period.  However, over the same time frame, it is 
predicted that 40 of nations will experience increased probabilities of conflict, while only 
30 nations will realize decreases in their respective conflict probabilities.  However, it 
should be noted that changes in conflict probabilities do not necessarily equate to conflict 
transitions but instead identify nations that are expected to experience a measurable 
change in their current levels of violence.  Analysis of the long term conflict 
probabilities, based on 2014 data, indicates that the global incidence of violence is 
expected to increase, with a projected 95 (52%) of the 182 nations existing in a state of 
Country Region 10 Year Trend
Libya Arab Countries Significantly More Conflict
Tunisia Arab Countries Significantly More Conflict
Kazakhstan Eastern Europe and Central Asia Significantly More Conflict
Romania Eastern Europe and Central Asia Significantly More Conflict
Trinidad and Tobago Latin America Significantly More Conflict
Korea, North South and East Asia Significantly More Conflict
Micronesia, Federated States of South and East Asia Significantly More Conflict
Mongolia South and East Asia Significantly More Conflict
Nepal South and East Asia Significantly More Conflict
Timor-Leste South and East Asia Significantly More Conflict
Angola Sub Saharan Africa Significantly More Conflict
Sierra Leone Sub Saharan Africa Significantly More Conflict
Honduras Latin America Significantly Less Conflict
Paraguay Latin America Significantly Less Conflict
Greece OECD Significantly Less Conflict
Cambodia South and East Asia Significantly Less Conflict
Burundi Sub Saharan Africa Significantly Less Conflict
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violent conflict.  The complete two-, five-, and ten-year forecasts for each nation are 
provided in Appendix D. 
Table 35: Summary of Conflict Forecasts: World View 
 
Arab & North African States 
The Arab and North African States currently experience the highest rates of 
violent conflict among the six geographic regions, with 14 of 17 states experiencing 
violent conflict as of 2014, as shown in Table 36.  These levels of violence are project to 
increase over the ten-year forecast, with a projected regional violent conflict rate of 100% 
by year 2024, given no change in current conditions.  These regional conflict rates are 
expected to continue indefinitely past the ten- year forecast horizon.  It should be noted 
that the conflict rates within this region are predicted to cycle between 14 and 17 nations 
during the forecast period.  This cycling is the result of predicted state transitions by 
Egypt, Jordan, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia during the forecast period.  Over the long 
run, it is projected that this cycling will cease, and that all 17 nations within the region 
will be in a state of conflict given no change to current conditions. 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations Considered: 182 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 84 46%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 79 43%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 80 44%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 84 46%
Number trending towards conflict 40 22%
Number trending towards non-conflict 30 16%
Number experiencing no change 112 62%
World View Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
134 
Table 36: Arab & North African States Conflict Forecast Summary 
 
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 
The Eastern Europe and Central Asia region is projected to steady growth in its 
rate of violent conflict over the ten year forecasting period, with a projected conflict 
incidence rate of 46% by year 2024.  Long run conflict rates are expected to peak at 61%, 
with 17 of the 28 existing in a state of conflict.  Within the region violent conflict is 
expected to cluster in the Caucasus and the states bordering Afghanistan, while many of 
the eastern European and Baltic nations are predicted to remain out of conflict over the 
same period.  Internecine violence within Russia and Ukraine is predicted to continue 
unabated over the next decade, and may lead to increased instability within the 
surrounding former Soviet states.  The regional summary is provided in Table 37. 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations in Region 17 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 14 82%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 17 100%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 14 82%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 17 100%
Number trending towards conflict 6 35%
Number trending towards non-conflict 0 0%
Number experiencing no change 11 65%
Arab & North African States Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
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Table 37: Eastern Europe & Central Asia Conflict Forecast Summary 
 
Latin America 
Latin American violent conflict rates are predicted to remain constant over the 
forecasting period with 13 of the 27 nations predicted experience some level of violent 
conflict.  Violent conflict is predicted to cluster in South and Central American nations, 
while only two Caribbean nations (Jamaica and Trinidad) are projected to be in state of 
conflict by 2024.  The forecast also predicts that Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela will 
remain in conflict with levels of violence remaining constant in Brazil and Venezuela.  
Columbia, on the other hand, is projected to experience a moderate decrease in it conflict 
probability by 2024, given current conditions persist.  Over the long run, conflict rates are 
expected to increase to approximately 70%, with 19 of the 27 nations predicted to be in a 
state of violent conflict, a majority of which are located in Central America and norther 
South America.  The regional summary is provided in Table 38. 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations in Region 28 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 11 39%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 9 32%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 11 39%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 13 46%
Number trending towards conflict 8 29%
Number trending towards non-conflict 3 11%
Number experiencing no change 17 61%
Eastern Europe & Central Asia Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
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Table 38: Latin America Conflict Forecast Summary 
 
OECD 
Currently the OECD region experiences the lowest rates of violent conflict among 
the six geographic regions, a trend that is currently in a state of equilibrium, and is 
expected to continue over the forecast period.   Of the six OECD nations predicted to be 
in conflict in 2024, only South Korea is predicted to experience a transition into conflict, 
while Chile, Israel, Mexico, Turkey, and the United Kingdom are project to remain in 
conflict for the foreseeable future.  It is also predicted that only Poland and the United 
States are predicted to experience slight increases in their respective conflict 
probabilities, while all other nations will realize either a decrease or no significant change 
in the conflict probabilities over the next decade.  Long run incidences of conflict are 
expected to drop to 15%, with the nations of Chile, Israel, Mexico, South Korea, and 
Turkey remaining in a state of conflict.  The regional summary is provided in Table 39. 
 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations in Region 27 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 14 52%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 13 48%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 13 48%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 13 48%
Number trending towards conflict 6 22%
Number trending towards non-conflict 4 15%
Number experiencing no change 17 63%
Latin America Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
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Table 39: OECD Conflict Forecast Summary 
 
South & East Asia 
Rates of violent conflict in the South and East Asian region are projected to 
eclipse those of the both Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa regions, with 17 of the 
28 regional nations predicted to be in a state of conflict by 2024.  Over the forecast period 
six nations (Laos, Micronesia, Mongolia, Nepal, North Korea, and Timor-Leste) are 
predicted to experience transitions into conflict, while only two nations (Cambodia and 
Vietnam) are predicted to transition out of conflict.  Both China and India are predicted to 
remain in conflict over the next decade, with their respective conflict probabilities 
remaining nearly constant over the same period.  As shown in Table 40, conflict cycles 
over the course of the forecast period due to the transitions discussed previously.  
Ultimately the incidence rate of violent conflict is predicted to stabilize at 64% with 18 of 
the 28 nations experiencing some level of violent conflict. 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations in Region 33 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 7 21%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 6 18%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 6 18%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 6 18%
Number trending towards conflict 2 6%
Number trending towards non-conflict 4 12%
Number experiencing no change 27 82%
OECD Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
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Table 40: South & East Asia Conflict Forecast Summary 
 
Sub-Saharan Africa 
While the Sub-Saharan Africa region has the most states currently and predicted 
to b in violent conflict, it is the only region, other than the OECD, that is projected to 
experience a decrease in its regional rate of conflict over the ten year forecast.  Of the 18 
nations predicted to be in conflict in 2024, only Angola, Cameroon, and Sierra Leone are 
predicted to transition into conflict; additionally 10 nations are projected to transition out 
of conflict over the same period.  Similar to the OECD region, average conflict 
probabilities are projected to decrease in Sub-Saharan Africa over the next decade with 
15 nations projected to have lower probabilities of conflict, while only 10 nations are 
predicted to have increased conflict probabilities given current conditions.  Ove the long 
run, conflict rates in Sub-Saharan Africa are predicted to stabilize at 39% with 19 of the 
49 nations existing in a state of violent conflict.   The regional summary is provided in 
Table 41. 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations in Region 28 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 13 46%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 14 50%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 18 64%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 17 61%
Number trending towards conflict 8 29%
Number trending towards non-conflict 4 14%
Number experiencing no change 16 57%
South & East Asia Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
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Table 41: Sub-Saharan Africa Conflict Forecast Summary 
 
Analysis of Conflict Transience in Nations 
Conflict transience describes a nation’s tendency to transition into and out of 
conflict frequently.  Highly transient nations, such as Columbia, Morocco, or the United 
States, are identified as those having long-run conflict probabilities (𝜋𝑗) approaching 
0.50.  Such conflict probabilities indicate that a nation spends nearly equal amounts of 
time in states of conflict and non-conflict, resulting in relatively frequent conflict 
transitions.   A nation’s transience score is based on the sum of the mean recurrence steps 
(𝑀0, 𝑀1) provided in Equation 24.  The expected number of conflict transitions over a 
given time period (T) is given by Equation 28.  For the purposes of this study, T is set to 
10 years to coincide with the 10 year forecast discussed in the previous section. 
 
 
Statistic Count Percentage
Total Nations in Region 49 100%
Total Nations in Conflict 2014 25 51%
Number Projected in Conflict 2016 20 41%
Number Projected in Conflict 2019 18 37%
Number Projected in Conflict 2024 18 37%
Number trending towards conflict 10 20%
Number trending towards non-conflict 15 31%
Number experiencing no change 24 49%
Sub-Sahara Africa Conflict Trend Statistics
Projections
Likelihood Trends 2014 - 2024
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Equation 28: Expected Number of Conflict Recurrences for Given Time Period 
𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠] =
𝑇
∑ 𝑀𝑗
1
𝑗=0
 
Where: 
 = Time period of interest (years)
 = Mean Recurrence (number of steps)
j = Conflict State {0, 1}
j
T
M  
For a hypothetical nation exhibiting a long-run conflict probability of 0.50, the 
sum of the mean recurrence times for both conflict and non-conflict is 4 years, resulting 
in 2.5 expected recurrences over a 10 year period.  This hypothetical nation is used as the 
transience benchmark, against which all nations are compared, yielding the Transience 
Score provided in Equation 29. 
Equation 29: Nation Specific Transience Score 
𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 =  
𝐸[𝑅𝑒𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑠]
2.5
 
A nation’s transience score is utilized to identify nations that are identified as 
predisposed to conflict transitions.  Transience Scores approaching one indicate highly 
transient nations, while scores approaching zero identify nations that tend to remain in 
one state over the other.  The Transience Scores for each nation listed in the regional 
tables provided in Appendix E. 
Table 42 provides the top 25 most transient nations identified in this study, 12 of 
which were identified as being in conflict in 2014.  Libya and Tunisia, which have 
experienced relatively few conflict transitions over the past 20 years, were identified as 
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the most transient nations within the study with respective scores of approximately one.  
This finding is attributed to the dynamic changes resulting from the Arab Spring that first 
began in Tunisia and quickly spread to Libya and other Arab nations.  Similarly, 
Morocco, Jordan, and Egypt are also identified as being highly transient based on 2014 
data.  The United States is also identified as being highly transient, which concurs with 
its recent history of experiencing five conflict transitions between 2004 and 2014.  The 
transience of the United States is credited in part to it ongoing worldwide military 
engagements, instability due to a highly polarized political process, and ongoing conflicts 
along its southern border with Mexico resulting from population migration and an 
increasingly violent illicit narcotics trade.  Seven nations from the Sub-Saharan Africa 
Region are identified as being highly transient.  Similar to the United States, Cameroon 
and Cote d’Ivoire also have a history of multiple conflict transitions, experiencing four 
and two recurrences respectively between 2004 and 2014. 
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Table 42: Top 25 Most Transient Nations 
 
On the other end of the spectrum are the nations with exceedingly low Transience 
Scores that are projected to remain in their current conflict states for the foreseeable 
future.  Table 43 provides the listing of the top 25 least transient nations, with the 
Caribbean nations of Cuba and Antigua identified least transient nations within the Study.  
Latin American and OECD nations account for 12 of the 25 nations and show a 
propensity to remain in a state of non-conflict.  Of this group, only Suriname and 
Trinidad, both classified as not in conflict in 2014, are identified as having a 
predisposition for long term conflict.  Five Arab nations are also identified within this 
group, all of which showing proclivity towards remaining in a state of conflict, 
supporting the results of the conflict forecast provided in the previous section. 
Nation
2014 Conflict 
Status
Region M0 M1
Expected Number 
Recurrences per 10 
Years
Transience 
Score
Rank
Libya Conflict Arab Countries 2.00 2.00 2.5 1.00000 1
Tunisia Conflict Arab Countries 2.01 1.99 2.5 0.99998 2
United States Conflict OECD 1.94 2.07 2.5 0.99898 3
Bosnia and Herzegovina No Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.93 2.07 2.5 0.99884 4
Cameroon No Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 2.10 1.91 2.5 0.99774 5
Colombia Conflict Latin America 1.89 2.12 2.5 0.99685 6
Kiribati No Conflict South and East Asia 1.89 2.12 2.5 0.99677 7
Botswana No Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 1.89 2.13 2.5 0.99637 8
Malawi No Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 1.84 2.19 2.5 0.99228 9
Montenegro No Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.84 2.20 2.5 0.99199 10
Benin No Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 2.20 1.83 2.5 0.99191 11
Korea, South No Conflict OECD 2.21 1.83 2.5 0.99112 12
Morocco Conflict Arab Countries 2.24 1.81 2.5 0.98884 13
Jordan Conflict Arab Countries 2.54 1.65 2.4 0.95477 14
Georgia No Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.58 1.63 2.4 0.94998 15
Vietnam Conflict South and East Asia 1.62 2.63 2.4 0.94325 16
Bahamas No Conflict Latin America 2.63 1.61 2.4 0.94241 17
Laos No Conflict South and East Asia 2.71 1.58 2.3 0.93130 18
Cote d'Ivoire Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 2.76 1.57 2.3 0.92453 19
Lesotho Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 1.56 2.80 2.3 0.91823 20
Ecuador Conflict Latin America 2.80 1.55 2.3 0.91809 21
Egypt Conflict Arab Countries 2.84 1.54 2.3 0.91189 22
Mozambique Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 2.87 1.54 2.3 0.90836 23
Uzbekistan No Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.95 1.51 2.2 0.89568 24
Dominican Republic No Conflict Latin America 1.50 3.00 2.2 0.88888 25
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Table 43: Top 25 Least Transient Nations 
 
Analysis of Table 41 identified seven nations: Malta, Qatar, United Arab 
Emirates, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Nepal, and Micronesia, classified as not in 
conflict in 2014 that show an inclination towards long-term uninterrupted conflict.  A 
subsequent comparison with each of these nations’ respective ten-year forecast shows 
that five nations are predicted to be in conflict in 2024, and only Malta and Suriname are 
forecasted to remain in the current state over the same time period.  Subsequently, 
Micronesia, Nepal, Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates are 
identified as being at risk for near term transitions into conflict. 
The distribution of Transience Scores is presented in Figure 37.  As can be seen, 
113 (62%) of the 182 nations have Transience Score less than or equal to 0.200.  
Additionally only 37 (20%) nations have moderate transience scores between 0.20 and 
0.80, while 32 (18%) nations are classified as being highly transient with scores greater 
Nation
2014 Conflict 
Status
Region M0 M1
Expected Number 
Recurrences per 10 
Years
Transience 
Score
Rank
Cuba No Conflict Latin America 1.00 1.00E+36 0.0 0.00000 1
Antigua and Barbuda No Conflict Latin America 1.00 1.00E+36 0.0 0.00000 2
Kuwait Conflict Arab Countries 1.56E+13 1.00 0.0 0.00000 3
Malta No Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1.32E+13 1.00 0.0 0.00000 4
Central African Republic Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 4.42E+11 1.00 0.0 0.00000 5
Qatar No Conflict Arab Countries 1.43E+11 1.00 0.0 0.00000 6
United Arab Emirates No Conflict Arab Countries 1.42E+11 1.00 0.0 0.00000 7
Bahrain Conflict Arab Countries 1.42E+11 1.00 0.0 0.00000 8
South Sudan Conflict Sub Saharan Africa 2.65E+10 1.00 0.0 0.00000 9
Pakistan Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 3.93E+09 1.00 0.0 0.00000 10
Iceland No Conflict OECD 1.00 2.21E+09 0.0 0.00000 11
Norway No Conflict OECD 1.00 6.22E+08 0.0 0.00000 12
Ireland No Conflict OECD 1.00 1.43E+08 0.0 0.00000 13
Suriname No Conflict Latin America 7.21E+07 1.00 0.0 0.00000 14
Trinidad and Tobago No Conflict Latin America 4.29E+07 1.00 0.0 0.00000 15
Denmark No Conflict OECD 1.00 9.38E+06 0.0 0.00000 16
Sweden No Conflict OECD 1.00 8.85E+06 0.0 0.00000 17
Finland No Conflict OECD 1.00 5.08E+06 0.0 0.00000 18
Iraq Conflict Arab Countries 2.06E+06 1.00 0.0 0.00000 19
Nepal No Conflict South and East Asia 1.26E+06 1.00 0.0 0.00000 20
Indonesia Conflict South and East Asia 8.14E+05 1.00 0.0 0.00000 21
Belgium No Conflict OECD 1.00 7.16E+05 0.0 0.00001 22
Micronesia, Federated States of No Conflict South and East Asia 4.88E+05 1.00 0.0 0.00001 23
Netherlands No Conflict OECD 1.00 3.82E+05 0.0 0.00001 24
Tajikistan Conflict Eastern Europe and Central Asia 2.70E+05 1.00 0.0 0.00001 25
144 
than 0.80.  This result demonstrates the typical finding that nations tend to remain in 
either a state of conflict or non-conflict, and that in general national-level conflict 
transitions are rare events. 
 
Figure 37: Transience Score Histogram 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
“Be prepared to re-examine your reasoning” 
Robert S. McNamara, In Respect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam 
5.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter provides the research conclusions derived from developing a set of 
region specific conditional logistic regression and Markov models for the prediction and 
forecasting of conflict transition in nations.  In Section 5.2 we provide a summary of the 
study’s problem statement, research questions, and methodology.  Next, Section 5.3 
discusses the significance of the research and its applicability in operational and strategic 
level planning.  Finally, in Section 5.3 we discuss possible future research concerning the 
prediction and spread of violent conflict in nations. 
5.2 Conclusions of Research 
This study considered 30 statistical and trend variables in the development of 
models to predict future incidences of conflict transitions.  Relying on logistic regression, 
Markov models, and methodologies proven in previous studies, this research reconfirmed 
the validity of using geographic sub-regions to develop conditional logistic regression 
models for the 182 nations considered in this study.  These models subsequently 
developed the conflict transition probabilities utilized in the set of Markov models 
enabling long range forecasts of regional and global incidences of conflict seldom seen in 
previous analytical efforts.  Ultimately the models developed for this study and 
subsequent analysis answered the five research questions posed in Chapter 1. 
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Question 1: How accurately can statistical models predict conflict transitions for 
individual nations? 
A total of 12 conditional logistic regression models were developed for six 
geographic regions for this study.  These models achieved weighted predictive 
accuracies, at the world level, of 88.76% on the training data set, and 84.67% on the 
validation data set.  Regional weighted predictive accuracies exceeded 90% in the Arab 
and North African States model (93.72%) and the OECD model (93.84%) on the training 
set data as well as the validation OECD model which achieved a predictive accuracy of 
93.46%, far exceeding the pre-established bench mark of 80% predictive accuracy.  In 
addition to their overall classification accuracy, the logistic regression models correctly 
classify 43.6% of transitions out of conflict, and 52.2% of transitions into conflict; a 
metric concerning rare events, that has never been examined in previous conflict 
prediction studies. 
The overall model accuracies of this study significantly exceed those generated by 
the Goldstone (Goldstone, et al., 2005), Hegre (Hegre et al., 2011), and CAA studies 
(Reed, 2013).  Additionally, the regional models compare favorably with the recent 
Boekestein (Ahner, Boekestein, & Deckro, 2015) study, ultimately generating higher 
validation data set accuracies for all six regions.  With this result in mind, it is 
recommended that the Eastern Europe and Central Asian region be revaluated with a 
possible reassignment of some or all of the central Asian nations to the Arab & North 
African region, which shares similar ethnic, political, and geographic features.  A key 
insight gained from the validation of the logistic regression models is the finding that 
conflict transitions are generally easier to predict in nations not in conflict, compared to 
147 
those currently in conflict.  This finding may be due impart to the quality and accuracy of 
the statistical data collected in these nations, resulting from the presence of a more 
permissive and less violent environment. 
Question 2: What factors are the significant predictors of conflict transitions? 
Thirty independent variables were required to construct the 12 conditional logistic 
regression models.   Amongst the six geographic regions, statistics such as ethnic 
diversity, burgeoning youth populations, national military expenditures, religious 
diversity, and the type of government emerged as the most common and significant 
factors pertaining to conflict transitions.  While the conditional models within a specific 
region were always considerably different from each other, in many cases they share 
common variables.  However, in certain instances, such as the case with religious 
diversity in Latin American nations, the current status of a nation affects how the variable 
will increase or decrease to probability of a conflict transition.  As is the case in the Latin 
American models increases to a nation’s religious diversity score, will result in an 
increased likelihood that the nation will transition out of conflict in the following year.  
However, increasing the same religious diversity score in nations currently not in conflict 
corresponds to a subsequent increase in the likelihood that these nations will transition 
into conflict in the next year.  Due to this phenomenon, care must be taken when 
analyzing how a particular nation and region will react to the application of national 
power or other external forces over an extended period of time. 
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Question 3: How is the number of global conflicts predicted to change by 2024 and 
beyond? 
Two-state Markov models were developed using the probabilities generated by 
the 12 conditional logistic regression models, for each of the 182 nations considered in 
this study, enabling the forecasting and trend analysis of regional and global conflict.  
Over the next decade the global incidence of conflict is predicted to remain at 2014 levels 
with 84 (46%) nations experiencing some level of violent conflict.  However, given 2014 
conflict data, the global incidence of conflict is expected to increase to 95 (52%) nations 
in long run.  Regionally, conflict levels are predicted to increase by 2024 in Arab and 
North African states, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, and in South and East Asia; these 
trends are predicted to continue past the forecast horizon.  Conflict levels within Central 
and South America are projected to remain constant over the next decade with 48% of the 
regions nations experiencing violent conflict.  However, conflict rates within this region 
are predicted to increase to approximately 70%, with 19 of the 27 nations predicted to be 
in a state of violent conflict in the long run.  Conversely, conflict levels are predicted to 
decrease in OECD and Sub-Saharan African nations over the next decade and in the long 
run, with regional conflict incidence rates of 18% and 37% respectively. 
Question 4: What nations are susceptible to conflict transitions; which nations 
appear invulnerable to conflict transitions?  
 Identification of nations susceptible or invulnerable to conflict transitions is 
predicated on a nation’s Transience Score on a continuous scale from 0 to 1.  Nations 
with transience scores approaching 1 are said to be susceptible to frequent conflict 
transitions, while nations with low scores tend to experience infrequent conflict 
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transitions.  Of the 182 nations considered in this study, 32 nations were identified as 
being susceptible to frequent conflict transitions.  Out of this sub-group, Libya, Tunisia, 
and the United States are projected to experience repeated conflict transitions over the 
next decade.  This study also identified 113 nations as being relatively invulnerable to 
conflict transitions, with these nations remaining either in a state of conflict or non-
conflict over the long run.  The nations of Cuba, Antigua and Barbuda, as well as Kuwait 
respectively had the three lowest transience scores with the study, and thus are not 
projected to experience a conflict transition from their current state in the foreseeable 
future.  As a region, Sub-Saharan Africa followed by Latin America are the most 
susceptible to conflict transitions, while the OECD and South and East Asian regions are 
projected to be the least susceptible to such events. 
Question 5: Which nations, currently not in conflict, are identified as near-term 
risks for transitions into violent conflict? 
Analysis of long-run conflict probabilities and transience scores sought to identify 
nations as not being in a state of conflict in 2014 that show a tendency towards existing in 
a state of violent conflict.  This analysis identified the nations of Micronesia, Nepal, 
Qatar, Trinidad and Tobago, and the United Arab Emirates as at risk for near-term 
transitions into violent conflict.  This assessment is based on the geographic location of 
these nations, current regional political climates, and their proclivity towards long term 
internal conflicts. 
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5.3 Significance of Research 
This study accurately predicts the conflict status of 182 nations and provides 
senior leadership with insight into future conflict trends for both nations and regions, 
allowing for both near-term planning and long-range strategy development.  The research 
provided herein enables the identification of nations susceptible to conflict transitions, 
along with relevant factors that may possibly aid or prevent such a transition from 
occurring.  Such revelations are vital in the development and implementation of 
operational plans and national strategies, as they enable the identification of possible 
indicators of impending conflict transitions, and enable the informed allocation of 
resources to support our operational and strategic end states.  At the same time, it should 
be evident that national strategies cannot simply apply “one size fits all” policies to 
geographic regions or assume that they will achieve the desired effects within each 
nation.  Care must be taken to truly ascertain the conflict status of nations of interest and 
precisely apply the elements of national power in order to achieve strategic end states.  
Additionally, administrations must balance the risks and benefits as well as the second 
and third order effects of such international policies which, given the regional and global 
interconnectedness of the 21st century, will undoubtedly have far reaching and possibly 
global ramifications. 
5.4 Recommendations for Future Research 
As part of continuing research, this study recommends six areas that may yield 
significant analytical insights into nation-state conflict. 
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Relaxed Forecasting Assumptions 
To enable the forecasting of violent conflict, this study assumes that any variable 
identified as significant within the model will remain relevant from year-to-year, and for 
the duration of the conflict forecasting period.  Essentially, this study assumes that 
conditions present in 2014 will remain unchanged for the foreseeable future.  It is 
recommended that future analyses look at relaxing this assumption.  Similar to the Hegre 
conflict model (Hegre et al., 2011), these studies would use existing or develop internal 
projections of relevant independent conflict variables to develop forecasting and 
prediction models of regional and global conflict. 
Analysis of Alternate Geographic Regions 
As noted above, it is recommended that the geographic regions used in this study 
be reanalyzed and adjusted to improve regional commonality among the nations.  In this 
regard, a possible alternative is to model the regions as the six geographic Unified 
Combatant Commands (UCC).  The databases constructed for this study are currently set 
up to develop logistic regression models based off either the geographic regions used in 
this study or the current areas of responsibility of the combatant commands.  Such a study 
may yield insights regarding the predicted incidences of conflict within each UCC, and 
potential realignment of their respective areas of responsibility.  Such an analysis has 
immediate operational and strategic relevance following Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Joseph Dunford’s directive to revamp combat commands for the “fight of 
the future” (Scarborough, 2015). 
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Analysis of Significant Conflict Predictor Variables 
As part of continuing research it is recommended that an in depth analysis be 
conducted into correlation between significant covariates and transitions into conflict.  
This analysis would seek to ascertain if a causal relationship does in fact exist between 
the independent covariates and the dependent variable.  Such an analysis would also seek 
to ascertain how manipulating such variables at both the national and regional levels 
affect transitions into conflict. 
Development and Implementation of the Border Conflict Score Variable 
The variable Border Conflict Score was identified as significant in many of the 
preliminary logistic regression models and, despite its absence in the final models, it is 
believed that this variable may be a significant predictor of the spread of violent conflict.  
With that being said, the current methodology used to develop this variable fails to 
properly account for island nations or nations having large coastlines and few land 
borders.  As a result, this variable does not effectively model nations such as Australia or 
the Philippines, or other that do not share a land border with any other nation, resulting in 
a Border Conflict Score of zero.  An island and coastal nation analog to this variable 
(e.g., shared fisheries, number of international deep water ports, number of disputed 
claims to islands, or some other metric that may be used as a vector to model the spread 
of conflict) must be developed and implemented for use in future studies. 
Dynamic Border Conflict Variables in Forecasting Models 
Following the use of the Border Conflict Score variable within logistic regression 
models, subsequent methodologies may wish explore forecasting future incidences of 
nation-state conflict using a dynamic border conflict score within Markov models.  Such 
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a methodology would allow the nation specific Border Conflict Score variable to change 
by recalculating the conditional probabilities at each transition, followed by Monte Carlo 
simulations that obtain average outcomes.  Such an analysis would be able to derive 
insights into how conflict begins, terminates, and/or spreads based upon interactions at 
international boundaries. 
Conflict Spread through Interconnected Regional Networks 
The final recommendation for future research explores modeling the spread of 
violent conflict through interconnected regional networks.  Such an analysis may seek to 
employ a methodology similar to the Spears study that explored viral epidemiology in 
connected networks (Spears, 2001).  Such an analysis would require contributions from 
multiple disciplines including logistic regression, Markov and stochastic modeling, 
dynamic programming, and network analysis.  Due to the complexity of this problem, it 
is recommended that such a study focus on a specific region, such as South West Asia or 
Sub-Saharan Africa, as opposed to a global model.  This analysis would explore causes 
and develop insights into the spread of violent conflict across international borders due to 
such factors as trade, population migrations, or climatic and economic conditions. 
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Appendix A: Regional Assignments of Nations 
Table 44: Regional Assignments of Nations 
 
Number per 
Region
Sub-Saharan 
Africa
South and East 
Asia
Eastern Europe 
and Central 
Asia
Arab & North 
African States
Latin America OECD
1 Angola Bangladesh Afghanistan Algeria
Antigua and 
Barbuda
Australia
2 Benin Bhutan Albania Bahrain Argentina Austria
3 Botswana
Brunei 
Darussalam
Armenia Egypt Bahamas Belgium
4 Burkina Faso Cambodia Azerbaijan Iraq Barbados Canada
5 Burundi China Belarus Jordan Belize Chile
6 Cabo Verde Korea, North
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
Kuwait Bolivia Czech Republic
7 Cameroon Fiji Bulgaria Lebanon Brazil Denmark
8
Central African 
Republic
India Croatia Libya Colombia Estonia
9 Chad Indonesia Cyprus Morocco Costa Rica Finland
10 Comoros Kiribati Georgia Oman Cuba France
11
Congo, Republic 
of the
Laos Iran Qatar
Dominican 
Republic
Germany
12 Cote d'Ivoire Malaysia Kazakhstan Saudi Arabia Ecuador Greece
13
Congo, 
Democratic 
Republic of the
Maldives Kyrgyzstan Syria El Salvador Hungary
14 Djibouti
Micronesia, 
Federated States 
of
Latvia Tunisia Grenada Iceland
15 Equatorial Guinea Mongolia Lithuania
United Arab 
Emirates
Guatemala Ireland
16 Eritrea Myanmar Malta West Bank Guyana Israel
17 Ethiopia Nepal Montenegro Yemen Haiti Italy
18 Gabon
Papua New 
Guinea
Pakistan Honduras Japan
19 Gambia Philippines Moldova Jamaica Luxembourg
20 Ghana Samoa Romania Nicaragua Mexico
21 Guinea Singapore Russia Panama Netherlands
22 Guinea-Bissau Solomon Islands Serbia Paraguay New Zealand
23 Kenya Sri Lanka Slovakia Peru Norway
24 Lesotho Thailand Tajikistan Suriname Poland
25 Liberia Timor-Leste Macedonia
Trinidad and 
Tobago
Portugal
26 Madagascar Tonga Turkmenistan Uruguay Korea, South
27 Malawi Vanuatu Ukraine Venezuela Slovenia
28 Mali Vietnam Uzbekistan Spain
29 Mauritania Sweden
30 Mauritius Switzerland
31 Mozambique Turkey
32 Namibia United Kingdom
33 Niger United States
34 Nigeria
35 Rwanda
36
Sao Tome and 
Principe
37 Senegal
38 Seychelles
39 Sierra Leone
40 Somalia
41 South Africa
42 South Sudan
43 Sudan
44 Swaziland
45 Togo
46 Uganda
47 Tanzania
48 Zambia
49 Zimbabwe
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Appendix B: Region Specific Conditional Logistic Regression Models 
Table 45: Summary of Arab and North African State Models 
 
 
Table 46: Summary of Eastern Europe & Central Asian Models 
 
 
Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq
Intercept 43.828 0.0265 Intercept 728.886 0.009
3 Yr Freedom Trend 22.435 0.0781 Death Rate -16.257 0.0104
Ethnic Diversity -45.350 0.0271 Life Expectancy -7.545 0.0096
Regime Type (Emerging) -3.107 0.2338 Youth Bulge -2.279 0.0092
Regime Type (Democratic) 4.444 0.0161 Ethnic Diversity 168.499 0.0091
Religious Diversity -211.666 0.0083
Military Expend (% GDP) 1.317 0.0209
Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.006 Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000
Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.962 Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.930
Given "Conflict" Given "Non-Conflict"
Arab State Models
Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq
Fertility Rate 8.958 0.0051 Intercept -28.959 0.0011
Infant Mortality rate -0.337 0.0086 Arable Land 2.801 0.0037
Population density 0.078 0.0159 GDP Per Capitia 0.000 0.0047
Trade (% GDP) -0.381 0.007 Improved Water 0.208 0.0024
Freedom Score 11.598 0.0311 2 Yr Freedom Trend -44.417 0.0177
3 Yr Freedom Trend 58.898 0.0012
Religious Diversity 10.689 0.0052
2 Yr Conflict Intensity Trend -10.734 0.0018
Government Type (Emerging) 4.796 0.0028
Government Type (Democratic) -0.342 0.6275
Government Type (Foreign Interruption) 6.652 0.0004
Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000 Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000
Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.972 Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.946
Eastern Europe & Central Asia Models
Given "Conflict" Given "Non-Conflict"
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Table 47: Summary of Latina American Models 
 
 
Table 48: Summary of OECD Models 
 
 
Table 49: Summary of South & East Asian Models 
 
Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq
Religious Diversity -33.471 0.0361 Birth Rate -1.094 0.0186
Government Type (Emerging) 36.483 0.0281 Fertility Rate 9.990 0.009
Government Type (Democratic) 37.238 0.0233 Improved Water -0.644 0.0031
Government Type (Anarchy) 30.524 0.0287 Infant Mortality rate -0.535 0.0039
Freedom Score -7.958 0.1997 Ethnic Diversity -21.442 0.0002
Religious Diversity 11.832 0.0005
Regime Type (Democratic) 72.267 0.004
(Religious Diversity-0.62476)2 -18.746 0.1017
Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.010 Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000
Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.878 Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.952
Latin American Asia Models
Given "Conflict" Given "Non-Conflict"
Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq
Intercept -19.386 0.0181 Intercept 74.164 0.0173
Military Expend (% Gov Spending) -0.355 0.0255 Birth Rate 1.594 0.0709
Youth Bulge 0.489 0.0371 Death Rate -1.611 0.0262
Caloric Intake 0.005 0.027 Military Expend (% GDP) 5.874 0.0145
Infant Mortality rate 3.015 0.0157
Youth Bulge -3.148 0.0249
Caloric Intake -0.017 0.016
Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.001 Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000
Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.914 Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.974
OECD Nation Models
Given "Conflict" Given "Non-Conflict"
Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq
Intercept 25.048 0.0014 Intercept 17.886 0.0126
Military Expend (% GDP) -0.347 0.0272 Arable Land -20.358 0.0325
Population Growth -6.212 0.002 Military Expend (% GDP) -2.259 0.0175
Trade (% GDP) -0.109 0.0059 Refugee (Origin) 9.60E-06 0.0437
Ethnic Diversity -12.087 0.0066 Fresh Water per Capita -5.59E-05 0.0162
Government Type (Emerging) 2.916 0.0346 Caloric Intake -0.005 0.0241
Government Type (Democratic) 4.402 0.004
Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000 Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000
Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.938 Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.932
Given "Conflict" Given "Non-Conflict"
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Table 50: Summary of Sun-Saharan African Models 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq Term Estimate Prob > Chi-Sq
Birth Rate -0.400 0.0047 Arable Land 7.801 0.0002
Life Expectancy -0.190 0.003 Birth Rate -0.474 0.0031
Military Expend (% Gov Spending) -0.158 0.0454 Infant Mortality rate 0.053 0.0041
Youth Bulge 0.672 0.0006 Youth Bulge 0.346 0.011
Refugee (Origin) 1.17E-05 0.0044 Refugee (Asylum) 5.91E-06 0.0153
Fresh Water per Capita -7.40423E-05 0.0017 Trade (% GDP) -0.052 0.0051
Ethnic Diversity -4.421 0.0011 Freedom Score -5.637 0.0004
Government Type (Emerging) 2.797 0.0118
Government Type (Democratic) 3.779 0.0034
Government Type (Anarchy) 26.327 0.9999
Government Type (Transition) -1.530 0.3111
Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000 Model Significance (Prob > Chi-Sq): 0.000
Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.938 Area Under the Curve (Training): 0.932
Sub-Saharan Africa Nation Models
Given "Conflict" Given "Non-Conflict"
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Appendix C: Markov Model Outputs 
Table 51: Markov Model results by Nation 
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Table 51 Continued 
 
160 
Table 51 Continued 
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Table 51 Continued 
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Table 51 Continued 
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Table 51 Continued 
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Appendix D: Regional Conflict Forecasts for 2016, 2019, and 2024 
Table 52: Arab & North African States 2, 5, and 10 Year Forecasts 
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Table 53: Eastern Europe & Central Asia 2, 5, and 10 Year Forecasts 
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Table 54: Latin America 2, 5, and 10 Year Forecasts 
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Table 55: OECD 2, 5, and 10 Year Forecasts 
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Table 56: South & East Asia 2, 5, and 10 Year Forecasts 
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Table 57: Sub-Saharan Africa 2, 5, and 10 Year Forecasts 
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Table 57 Continued 
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Appendix E: Transience Scores by Region 
Table 58: Arab & North African States Transience Scores 
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Table 59: Eastern Europe & Central Asia Transience Scores 
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Table 60: Latin American Transience Scores 
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Table 61: OECD Transience Scores 
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Table 62: South & East Asia Transience Scores 
 
 
N
a
ti
o
n
2
0
1
4
 C
o
n
fl
ic
t 
S
ta
tu
s
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 
N
o
t 
in
 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t
P
ro
b
a
b
il
it
y
 i
n
 
C
o
n
fl
ic
t
M
i
M
j
E
x
p
e
c
te
d
 N
u
m
b
e
r 
R
e
c
u
rr
e
n
c
e
s
 p
e
r 
1
0
 
Y
e
a
rs
T
ra
n
s
ie
n
c
e
 
S
c
o
re
R
a
n
k
K
iri
ba
ti
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
53
0.
47
1.
89
2.
12
2.
5
0.
99
67
7
1
V
ie
tn
am
C
on
fli
ct
0.
62
0.
38
1.
62
2.
63
2.
4
0.
94
32
5
2
L
ao
s
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
37
0.
63
2.
71
1.
58
2.
3
0.
93
13
0
3
K
or
ea
, N
or
th
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
24
0.
76
4.
10
1.
32
1.
8
0.
73
79
2
4
M
al
di
ve
s
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
76
0.
24
1.
31
4.
20
1.
8
0.
72
53
7
5
T
ha
ila
nd
C
on
fli
ct
0.
16
0.
84
6.
26
1.
19
1.
3
0.
53
66
4
6
C
am
bo
di
a
C
on
fli
ct
0.
85
0.
15
1.
18
6.
53
1.
3
0.
51
89
3
7
M
al
ay
si
a
C
on
fli
ct
0.
12
0.
88
8.
12
1.
14
1.
1
0.
43
19
9
8
Sa
m
oa
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
09
0.
91
10
.8
9
1.
10
0.
8
0.
33
35
8
9
T
on
ga
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
95
0.
05
1.
06
19
.0
2
0.
5
0.
19
92
7
10
B
ru
ne
i D
ar
us
sa
la
m
C
on
fli
ct
0.
95
0.
05
1.
05
19
.8
1
0.
5
0.
19
17
4
11
M
on
go
lia
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
05
0.
95
20
.7
5
1.
05
0.
5
0.
18
34
5
12
V
an
ua
tu
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
95
0.
05
1.
05
22
.1
0
0.
4
0.
17
27
9
13
So
lo
m
on
 I
sl
an
ds
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
97
0.
03
1.
03
34
.7
4
0.
3
0.
11
18
2
14
M
ya
nm
ar
C
on
fli
ct
0.
03
0.
97
39
.8
4
1.
03
0.
2
0.
09
78
9
15
B
hu
ta
n
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
98
0.
02
1.
02
51
.0
6
0.
2
0.
07
68
1
16
Fi
ji
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
01
0.
99
91
.8
3
1.
01
0.
1
0.
04
30
8
17
T
im
or
-L
es
te
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
01
0.
99
13
9.
76
1.
01
0.
1
0.
02
84
1
18
B
an
gl
ad
es
h
C
on
fli
ct
0.
01
0.
99
19
8.
29
1.
01
0.
1
0.
02
00
7
19
C
hi
na
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
38
5.
11
1.
00
0.
0
0.
01
03
6
20
Si
ng
ap
or
e
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
1.
00
0.
00
1.
00
63
0.
98
0.
0
0.
00
63
3
21
In
di
a
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
10
96
.4
5
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
36
4
22
P
ap
ua
 N
ew
 G
ui
ne
a
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
24
68
.4
8
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
16
2
23
Sr
i L
an
ka
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
83
24
.6
2
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
04
8
24
P
hi
lip
pi
ne
s
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
74
58
8.
47
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
00
5
25
M
ic
ro
ne
si
a,
 F
ed
er
at
ed
 S
ta
te
s 
of
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
4.
88
E
+0
5
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
00
1
26
In
do
ne
si
a
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
8.
14
E
+0
5
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
00
0
27
N
ep
al
N
o 
C
on
fli
ct
0.
00
1.
00
1.
26
E
+0
6
1.
00
0.
0
0.
00
00
0
28
176 
Table 63: Sub-Saharan Africa Transience Scores 
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